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Abstract 
Despite the ongoing efforts to contain its spread, H5N1 is now considered endemic within 
poultry in various settings worldwide, threatening both the livelihoods of those involved in 
poultry production in affected countries and posing a continuous public health risk. The 
reasons for the varying levels of success in controlling H5N1 in Southeast Asia need to be 
better understood. In this thesis, various different methods of quantifying the effects of 
individual control measures, using the types of data available in various different contexts, 
are discussed and applied. In the first half of this thesis a spatio-temporal survival model is 
fitted to H5N1 outbreak surveillance data from Vietnam and Thailand using a Bayesian 
framework in order to account for unobserved infection times. Following vaccination in 
Vietnam it was found that transmissibility had been successfully reduced but, during a wave 
of outbreaks in 2007, that this coincided with a reduction in the rate of at which outbreaks 
were reported following the introduction of infection, limiting the overall impact this 
reduction in transmissibility had on the total epidemic size. In Thailand, active surveillance 
was found to be successful in contributing to the control of infection. Furthermore, 
backyard producers, whilst responsible for the majority of outbreaks, were, on average, less 
likely to transmit infection than those involved in more intensive production. In the second 
half of the thesis, the use of final size methods to assess the effectiveness of vaccination 
from trial data is explored. This involved an investigation into the effects of different 
assumptions regarding the action by which vaccination confers immunity and fitting 
estimates of transmissibility to data collected from outbreak investigations in the context of 
a field trial of vaccination in Indonesia, where, making strong assumptions about the 
underlying infection process, a reduction in both within and between flock transmissibility 
was detected for outbreaks occurring in areas where vaccination was being carried out.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Aims and objectives of this thesis 
The overall aim of this thesis is to develop and apply techniques in order to quantify the 
transmission dynamics of the spread of H5N1 in poultry in Southeast Asia, and from that, 
the effectiveness of different control measures, taking into account the kinds of outbreak 
data likely to be available. 
HPAI H5N1 continues to circulate widely in poultry in Southeast Asia. In Vietnam, the 
economic costs and level of destruction required to maintain a stamping out approach to 
disease control in the face of sustained transmission in many parts of the country led to the 
switch to a policy of mass nationwide vaccination in 2005. Although this resulted in a strong 
reduction in the number of cases in the short term, outbreaks reoccurred in sustained 
waves in 2007 and the disease remains endemic. 
The first aim of this thesis is to use the surveillance data for outbreaks of H5N1 in Vietnam in 
an attempt to assess the changes in the dynamics of transmission which may have occurred 
as the result of this vaccination campaign. 
Research Question 1: What was the impact of mass vaccination of poultry on the spread of 
H5N1 in Vietnam?   
Specific objectives: 
• Design a model and model fitting procedure appropriate to the spread of H5N1 in 
Vietnam, taking into account the data available. 
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 16 
 
• Fit this model to outbreak data for the waves of outbreaks occurring before, during 
and after the implementation of vaccination. 
• Use the results to assess the possible effects of vaccination.  
In Thailand, where poultry production is more heavily industrialised, measures to prevent 
the spread of infected have proved more successful. However, because measures such as a 
policy of carrying out mass culls of poultry flocks in the vicinity of reported outbreaks, a 
concerted drive to improve biosecurity and the use of active surveillance continue to be 
preferred to vaccination, this may have negatively affected the livelihoods of many 
smallholders.  
Research Question 2: To what extent were backyard flocks responsible for the spread of 
H5N1 in Thailand? 
Specific Objectives 
• Determine the best way to extend the existing model of the spread of H5N1 
transmission in order to incorporate intensive industrial production in Thailand.  
• Use this to estimate the extent to which transmission occurred from infected flocks 
in different sectors of the poultry production system 
• Interpret these results to assess where control policies are likely to have had an 
effect on the spread or reporting of infection. 
Thailand and Vietnam are examples of countries where outbreak data were collected 
routinely on a national scale. Many countries in Southeast Asia lack the veterinary 
infrastructure to implement such surveillance (Normile 2005; Sims 2007). In the absence of 
such data, inferences about the transmissibility of infection and the effects of control 
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 17 
 
measures such as vaccination are generally made using data on flock-level outbreaks, either 
in an experimental context or as a result of outbreak investigations in the field. In these 
settings, the final size of an outbreak is often used to quantify the transmissibility of 
infection, as such data is often the most straightforward to collect. 
Research Question 3: How can final size methods be used to quantify the effectiveness of 
vaccination from trial data? 
Specific Objectives 
• Assess the implications of assumptions commonly made about the action of the 
vaccine when analysing transmission experiments and investigate the effects of 
different experimental protocols. 
• Develop and apply suitable final size methods to analyse data collected from a field 
trial into the effects of vaccination in Indonesia. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 begins with an introduction into the history and epidemiology of avian influenza, 
leading to a description of the spread of H5N1 throughout Southeast Asia with particular 
focus on the poultry production systems and the experiences of H5N1 during the epidemics 
featured in this thesis. This is then followed with a review of the existing modelling 
literature.   
Chapter 3 describes a spatially explicit transmission model of the spread of outbreaks of 
HPAI H5N1 which is then fitted to report data for three waves of outbreaks which occurred 
in northern Vietnam before, during and after the switch to mass vaccination. The results of 
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this are then used to summarise the transmission dynamics of infection and to assess the 
potential effects of control measures including vaccination. 
Chapter 4 describes various attempts to extend the model in order to incorporate the 
industrial production sector in Thailand. The relative role of backyard production in the 
spread of infection, as well as the likely effects of different surveillance strategies on the 
spread of infection and on the modelled results, are then assessed and discussed. 
Chapter 5 reviews the use of final size methods in an experimental context and explores the 
implications of different assumptions regarding the protocol of such experiments and the 
action by which a vaccine confers immunity for the accuracy and reliability of estimates of 
vaccine efficacy. Chapter 6 then describes how final size methods were used to analyse data 
from outbreak investigations conducted in the context of a field trial of the effects of 
vaccination in Indonesia. 
Chapter 7 summarises the key findings of the thesis and suggests how these contribute to 
our understanding of the transmission dynamics of H5N1 in Southeast Asia. 
1.3 Role of the Author 
All work presented in this thesis was developed and carried out by the doctoral candidate 
Patrick Walker under the supervision of Azra Ghani and Simon Cauchemez. For the 
modelling work based on outbreak data in Vietnam, the data used were compiled and 
cleaned with help from Dirk Pfeiffer and Raphaelle Metras from the Royal Veterinary 
College and Do Huu Dung from the Ministry of Animal Health in Vietnam, all of whom 
provided helpful feedback and advice on data interpretation. For Thailand the data were 
obtained and prepared with the help of a technical collaboration with the PhD programme 
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 19 
 
of Tiensin Thanawat and with Nienke Hartemink and Hans Heesterbeek, from the University 
of Utrecht. For Indonesia, the data were collected and obtained through collaboration with 
Christine Jost and Jeff Mariner from the International Livestock Research Institute in Kenya 
and Muhammed Azhar from the Ministry of Agriculture, Indonesia. 
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Chapter 2 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
H5N1 and the Role of Mathematical Modelling 
 
The first half of this chapter presents a review of the epidemiology of avian influenza 
infection in poultry and humans, the impact HPAI H5N1 has had in Southeast Asia and the 
current options available for controlling its spread. This is followed by a review of the role of 
mathematical models in quantifying the dynamics of infectious disease transmission, 
including a description of existing models of avian influenza and an assessment of their 
application to existing H5N1 outbreak data. 
2.1 The biology of Influenza 
There are three types of influenza virus: A, B and C, all of the family Orthomyxoviridae. Of 
these only A and B, isolated in 1933 and 1940 respectively, are associated with significant 
seasonal disease in humans. These are segmented single-stranded RNA viruses with 
genomes composed of eight segments (Figure 2-1), two of which code for the hemagglutinin 
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA) surface proteins. These surface proteins are responsible for 
the binding and fusion of a virion to a host cell (HA) and for spreading the virus within the 
host by freeing virus particles from host cells (NA) and are additionally used to characterise 
subtypes of the virus.  HA binds with sialic acid found on the surface of the cell membrane. 
The virion is then brought into the cell by endocytosis, the process by which cells absorb 
molecules by engulfing them. This allows the virion to enter the cell without passing through 
the cell membrane and, by travelling within the endosome (a membrane-bound 
compartment which transports molecules required for digestion into the cell from the cell 
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membrane). The HA is then responsible for fusion between the viral envelope and the 
endosomal membrane which allows nucleoproteins containing viral RNA to enter the cell 
nucleus (Smith and Helenius 2004). Once within the nucleus the negative-sense viral RNA is 
transcribed and used for translation of viral proteins. The HA and NA surface proteins are 
then transported to the cell surface and integrate with the cell membrane, creating a 
protrusion into which viral RNA and core proteins are imported from the cell nucleus.  This 
buds into a mature virus which is freed from the host cell through NA activity (Webster, 
Bean et al. 1992).   
Once a subtype is established within a population, rising levels of herd immunity act as an 
evolutionary pressure and randomly generated mutations in the segments of genomes 
responsible for coding both proteins are accumulatively selected, increasing the ability of 
the pathogen to spread within a population (de Jong, Rimmelzwaan et al. 2000). 
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Figure 2-1| Schematic diagram of an influenza A virus virion. 
Source: (Horimoto and Kawaoka 2005) 
Figure illustrates the structure of an influenza A virus virion and the eight segments of negative-sense single 
stranded RNA comprising the viruses genome. These include segments responsible for encoding three 
polymerases PB2, PB1 and PA which localise in the cell nucleus and, amongst other known functions, are 
responsible for transcription of the viral RNA into positive-sense RNA and a segment which encodes non-
structural proteins (NS1 and NS2). Influenza A is differentiated from types B and C according to antigenic 
differences in matrix proteins (M1 and M2 which link the viral envelope to the virus core) and nucleoprotein 
(NP) which are encoded by two more segments of the genome. Different subtypes of Influenza A are then 
characterised according to the antigenicity of the NA and HA surface glycoproteins which are each encoded by 
separate segments of the genome (Webster, Bean et al. 1992; Horimoto and Kawaoka 2005). 
 
Whilst influenza B has been responsible for sustained epidemics and, prior to the 2001 
H1N1 pandemic, due to such ongoing antigenic drift in the interim, tended to become 
prominent every few years following peaks of influenza A infection, only one subtype of the 
virus has been identified and the host reservoir of such viruses is almost exclusively human 
(Hay, Gregory et al. 2001). In contrast, influenza A viruses, whilst primarily of an avian 
source, can infect a wide variety of mammalian hosts including cats, dogs, swine, whales 
and horses. The range of recognised subtypes of Influenza A consist of viruses exhibiting 
combinations of 16 distinct types of HA and 9 types of NA, with the most recent isolated for 
the first time in 2005. This large host range, combined with the ability of the virus to shift 
antigenically (as the structure of the virus allows the exchange of entire segments of the 
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genome when two subtypes are present within the same cell) facilitates the generation of 
novel strains which may have the potential to cause a global pandemic. Such reassortment 
events between human-adapted and avian viruses have been suggested as a primary cause 
of pandemics in 1957 and 1968 (Scholtissek, Rohde et al. 1978; Schafer, Kawaoka et al. 
1993; Webster, Sharp et al. 1995) and have been implicated in the development of the 1918 
H1N1 pandemic strain (Cox and Subbarao 2000). However the exact cause of this most 
severe pandemic of modern times remains open to debate (Reid and Taubenberger 2003). 
Since the subtyping of virus strains began, only those containing H1, H2 and H3 of the HAs 
and N1 and N2 of the NAs have been observed to spread widely in humans (Webster, Bean 
et al. 1992). The relatively small number of human-adapted viruses is largely, but not 
wholly, ascribed to the fact that avian influenza viruses bind preferentially to the SAα2,3Gal 
receptor in birds whereas human-adapted influenza viruses bind preferentially to 
SAα2,6Gal, corresponding to the distribution of receptors in prime virus replication sites 
within the two species (respectively the intestine and the trachea) (Webster, Bean et al. 
1992; Peiris, de Jong et al. 2007).  However, both receptors are found abundantly in the 
trachea of swine, leading to the hypothesis that pigs act as an intermediate host, 
reassortment within which can lead to the emergence of new strains capable of transmitting 
to and between humans (Webster, Bean et al. 1992; Ito, Couceiro et al. 1998; de Jong, 
Rimmelzwaan et al. 2000).  This was borne out in 2009 when a virus containing a hitherto 
unreported combination of gene segments from various swine viruses in the Classical, 
Eurasian and Triple reassortant lineages, all of which themselves were primarily of an avian 
source (Figure 2-2), caused the first global pandemic of the 21st Century (Garten, Davis et al. 
2009).  
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Figure 2-2|Illustration of the avian and swine origins of the individual gene segments of the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic influenza subtype. Influenza gene segments have the same abbreviation as in 
Figure 2-1, dates are approximate estimates of the year in which a virus with the corresponding gene 
segment of the 2009 H1N1 virus was isolated for the first time in the indicated mammalian host.  
Source: (Garten, Davis et al. 2009) 
 
Direct transmission of avian influenza viruses to humans does occasionally take place. In 
addition to the human cases of H5N1 which are currently accumulating globally, human 
cases of H9N2, H10N7, H7N2, H7N3 and H7N7 have all been documented in the past decade 
(Kalthoff, Globig et al. 2010) and there is evidence that the viruses involved in cases of H5N1 
and various H7 subtypes may have undergone mutations allowing them to bond more 
effectively to the SAα2,6Gal receptors in the upper respiratory tract (Yamada, Suzuki et al. 
2006; Belser, Blixt et al. 2008). However, with the possible exceptions of highly pathogenic 
H7N7 and H5N1 where the existence of clusters of cases have been the subject of much 
debate (Meijer, Wilbrink et al. 2004; Ungchusak, Auewarakul et al. 2005; Pitzer, Olsen et al. 
2007; Uyeki and Bresee 2007; Yang, Halloran et al. 2007), there has been negligible evidence 
of human-to-human transmissibility, though it has been suggested that the 1918 pandemic 
itself was caused by a virus entirely of avian origin (Belshe 2005). 
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2.2 The spread of H5N1 
In May 1997, a young boy in Hong Kong was confirmed to have died from infection with 
highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. This form of the virus was first detected in geese in 
Southern China in 1996 (Xu, Subbarao et al. 1999), following an outbreak within chickens in 
neighbouring farms (Claas, Osterhaus et al. 1998; Subbarao, Klimov et al. 1998). This was 
the first occasion that an avian influenza virus had been isolated from a human with 
respiratory infection (Shortridge, Gao et al. 2000), adding weight to the suggestion that 
animal influenza were a potential source of human pandemic strains (de Jong, Claas et al. 
1997).  This was followed by a further 17 cases between November and December of the 
same year, five of which were fatal. All of these cases had visited or been within the vicinity 
of live poultry markets, within which, it was later established, the prevalence of the virus in 
chickens had reached around 20%, with lower prevalence in  geese and ducks (Shortridge 
1999). This outbreak was eradicated by culling around 1.5 million poultry including the 
emptying of all live bird markets in Hong Kong and by imposing a ban on poultry importation 
(Shortridge, Gao et al. 2000). However, the virus continued to circulate and re-assort within 
geese and duck populations (Cauthen, Swayne et al. 2000; Guan, Peiris et al. 2002; Chen, 
Deng et al. 2004), until, in early 2003, further human cases were reported in Hong Kong 
(Peiris, Yu et al. 2004).   
Different genotypes of H5N1 are characterised by observed mutations in any of eight viral 
gene segments. Currently the most prevalent of these are descendents of the “Z” genotype, 
which was also the genotype isolated from the human cases in Hong Kong in 2003 (Li, Guan 
et al. 2004). This strain spread rapidly throughout Southeast Asia (Martin, Sims et al. 2006; 
Webster, Peiris et al. 2006) (Figure 2-3), with China, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and 
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Cambodia all reporting multiple human cases during the years 2003-2005 (WHO 2010). This 
became the predominant H5N1 genotype globally and remained so until 2005 when three 
divergent subgenotypes of virus were distinguished: subgenotype Z.1 which is responsible 
for causing outbreaks in many areas of the world including Africa and Europe, subgenotype 
Z.2 which has generally been isolated in Thailand and Vietnam and subgenotype Z.3 which 
has been mostly isolated in Indonesia (Neumann, Green et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 2-3| Outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry in Southeast Asia 2003-2006 
Map created using a “mashup” (a term referring to the compilation of data from different sources into a new 
service) of avian influenza outbreak locations (Butler 2006). 
 
To date 63 countries have experienced outbreaks of H5N1, with human cases reported in 
16, and the disease remains enzootic in much of Southeast Asia (Eagles, Siregar et al. 2009) 
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and other countries such as Egypt (Kim, Kayali et al. 2010) and Bangladesh (Loth, Gilbert et 
al. 2010). Sporadic cases of infection in poultry and wild birds within other parts of Asia and 
Eastern Europe have also been reported. However, the virus, so far, has never transmitted 
in a sustained chain between humans (Ungchusak, Auewarakul et al. 2005; Yang, Halloran et 
al. 2007). 
2.3 Avian influenza infection in humans 
Human cases of avian influenza arising from low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) subtypes 
have, to date, proved uniformly non-fatal (Kalthoff, Globig et al. 2010) . Cases of LPAI H9N2 
and LPAI H10N7 have only been associated with mild respiratory symptoms and fever (Lin, 
Shaw et al. 2000; Butt, Smith et al. 2005), whereas the majority of cases of infection with 
LPAI H7 subtypes are characterised by conjunctivitis (Meijer, Wilbrink et al. 2004; Nguyen-
Van-Tam, Nair et al. 2006). Indeed, with the exception of a single fatality caused by infection 
with HPAI H7N7 where a Dutch veterinarian developed pneumonia followed by acute 
respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) (Fouchier, Schneeberger et al. 2004), HPAI H5N1 is the 
only recorded avian influenza subtype to cause severe disease within humans.  
The majority of human cases of H5N1 have a history of handling sick or dead poultry (Abdel-
Ghafar, Chotpitayasunondh et al. 2008) and matched case-control studies have consistently 
identified this as a risk factor associated with H5N1 infection.  Specific practices associated 
with a high risk of infection include slaughtering, defeathering, handling fighting cocks, 
preparing sick poultry for cooking and consuming raw and undercooked poultry products 
(Areechokchai, Jiraphongsa et al. 2006; Dinh, Long et al. 2006; Van Kerkhove, Mumford et 
al. 2011). In some instances, environmental transmission, as a result of visiting live bird 
markets, has also been suggested (Mounts, Kwong et al. 1999; Yu, Feng et al. 2007). 
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Following exposure, cases generally become symptomatic after around 2-4 days (Yuen, Chan 
et al. 1998), although incubation periods of up to 8 days have been reported (Yuen, Chan et 
al. 1998; Hien, Liem et al. 2004; Chotpitayasunondh, Ungchusak et al. 2005). Early disease 
symptoms are non-specific and include fever, cough, shortness of breath and pneumonia, 
leading to a large level of initial misdiagnosis. Cases with pneumonia often progress to ARDS 
and multiple organ failure. When infection proves fatal, the median duration of time 
between the onset of disease and death is around 9 to 10 days (Abdel-Ghafar, 
Chotpitayasunondh et al. 2008; Peiris 2009).  
It has been suggested that some human cases in South-East Asia are not reported, 
particularly within rural areas (Normile 2005; Sims 2007).  This may be due to global 
surveillance for cases focusing primarily on hospitalised patients with respiratory symptoms 
who report being in contact with sick or dead poultry and thus missing those that do not 
access tertiary healthcare. As a result, the distribution of mild or asymptomatic infection is 
not well known (Uyeki 2008). However, sero-surveys of rural villagers in Cambodia (Vong, 
Coghlan et al. 2006; Vong, Ly et al. 2009), poultry workers in Nigeria (Ortiz, Katz et al. 2007) 
and healthcare workers in Vietnam (Liem and Lim 2005) and Thailand (Apisarnthanarak, Erb 
et al. 2005) suggest that mild or asymptomatic H5N1 infection is uncommon. 
2.3 Pathogenicity and transmissibility of HPAI in birds 
Clinical signs of HPAI infection in chickens include severe respiratory distress, cyanosis (blue 
or purple discolouration due to a lack of oxygen in the cells near the surface of the skin) of 
the wattles, combs and shanks, oedema of the head and eyelids, diarrhoea, eggs without 
shells, loss of the ability to stand and paralysis (Shortridge, Zhou et al. 1998; Martin, Forman 
et al. 2006). Following infection with H5N1 and a short incubation period, virus is shed for 
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an infectious period of around 1-3 days (negatively correlated with infectious dose received) 
with death generally occurring 2-3 days following the onset of infection (Shortridge, Zhou et 
al. 1998; Spickler, Trampel et al. 2008; Bouma, Claassen et al. 2009).  Flock-level mortality 
often reaches 100% (Alexander 2000). However, as infection often occurs in the context of 
high background mortality, upper limits of the time it takes to recognize an outbreak within 
an epidemic setting are hard to define. Outbreaks previously have been known to take 
periods of up to 14-21 days to be detected (Nguyen 2005; ACI 2006). 
The virus is also highly pathogenic to other species of domestic poultry such as turkeys and 
quails (Alexander 2000). However, the pathology of infection within ducks and other 
waterfowl is more complicated. HPAI viruses rarely cause severe disease in ducks, as the 
virus typically replicates in the intestine rather than in the upper respiratory tract (Webster, 
Yakhno et al. 1978), and prior to 2002, virus isolates of H5N1 failed to replicate effectively.  
However, a variant which emerged in Hong Kong in December 2002 showed increased 
pathogenicity to waterfowl with the virus causing systemic viraemia and neurologic disease 
(Ellis, Bousfield et al. 2004; Sturm-Ramirez, Ellis et al. 2004). Moreover, Clade 2.2 H5N1, a 
further new variant first detected during the mass die-offs of waterfowl at Qinghai Lake in 
China in 2005 (Chen, Li et al. 2006), has proven more lethal and infectious in a wide range of 
wild birds (Chen, Smith et al. 2005). Commercial ducks are also susceptible to severe disease 
(Vascellari, Granato et al. 2007). However, in experimental settings, a continuum of disease 
responses has been found, resulting in lower overall flock mortality than in other species of 
bird and the asymptomatic transmission of infection (Sturm-Ramirez, Hulse-Post et al. 
2005). The pathogenicity of both pre and post-Qinghai Lake variants has also been shown to 
be age-dependent (Pantin-Jackwood, Suarez et al. 2007; Londt, Nunez et al. 2008; Saito, 
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Watanabe et al. 2009). A surveillance study in Thailand found a high level of asymptomatic 
infection within sampled ducks (Songserm, Jam-on et al. 2006), suggesting that the silent 
spread of infection may be contributing to the global circulation of the virus (Kim, 
Negovetich et al. 2009). 
Although aerosol transmission cannot be ruled out, transmission experiments have shown 
that, when contact birds are caged directly adjacent to cages of infected birds, transmission 
between cages rarely occurs. In contrast, three out of four contact birds caged directly 
below infected chickens, which allowed faeces  to fall into the lower cage, were infected and 
died, which may indicate that the majority of direct infection takes place in the form of 
faecal-oral transmission (Shortridge, Zhou et al. 1998). In addition, wild and migratory birds 
have been identified as carriers of infection but their overall role in transmission between 
flocks remains unclear (Webster, Peiris et al. 2006). Transmission can also take place 
indirectly with the virus surviving for long periods in manure, contaminated feed and water 
(Webster, Hulse-Post et al. 2007; Stallknecht and Brown 2009). As a result, transmission is 
likely to be possible over long distances via fomites (Webster, Peiris et al. 2006). 
2.4 Poultry production in Southeast Asia prior to H5N1 
Poultry rearing is part of everyday life for a large proportion of people throughout Southeast 
Asia. By far the most common form of poultry production, in terms of the number of flocks, 
is that of informal “backyard” poultry (Rushton, Viscarra et al. 2005). This is especially the 
case in rural areas where around 60-80% of all households keep poultry of this type 
(Dolberg, Guerne-Bleich et al. 2005).  Generally, such flocks are defined as comprising of up 
to 100 birds which usually belong to a breed indigenous to the region (as opposed to 
commercial produced birds which are often bred from non-indigenous layer and broiler 
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parent stock). These poultry are generally bought cheaply and locally as chicks, are allowed 
to wander freely, are not monitored closely and are fed on household leftovers or other 
cheap and other easily available local inputs or left to scavenge during the day and only 
caged at night (ACI 2006). Poultry tend to either be chicken or ducks, with ducks constituting 
around 10-15% of backyard production in South-east Asia (Dolberg, Guerne-Bleich et al. 
2005). 
As a result, backyard poultry are susceptible to numerous diseases and experience an 
extremely high level of background mortality with reported annual rates of around 50-60% 
(Rushton, Viscarra et al. 2005). Poultry produced in this way are often consumed directly; 
however poorer households often sell birds or eggs in order to purchase cheaper food items 
such as rice and vegetables, clothing or education (Burgos, Hong Hanh et al. 2007).  
 
Figure 2-4|Composition of poultry production and GDP in selected countries in Southeast Asia. 
Bar represent proportion of poultry production by production type with industrial and large-scale commercial 
farms (blue segment), mid-to-small scale commercial farms (red segment), backyard flocks (green segment). 
Percentage of overall number of producers by production type in white type. Black line shows the per-capita 
GDP of each country (data on number of backyard flocks in Indonesia not available). 
Source: Poultry production data adapted from (Rushton, Viscarra et al. 2005), per capita GDP data from the 
World Bank. 
 
Whilst this is uniformly the predominant form of poultry in terms of the number of 
producers, the extent to which backyard production contributes to overall national poultry 
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production varies from country to country and is correlated with various indicators of 
overall development such as GDP and urbanisation (Dolberg, Guerne-Bleich et al. 2005) 
(Figure 2-4). In less developed countries such as Laos and Cambodia backyard systems 
constitute around 80-90% of all production, in the absence of large industrial producers the 
only other type of production comes in the form of small scale commercial broiler (chicken 
raised specifically for meat production), layer (chicken raised specifically for egg 
production), duck and hatchery operations which, whilst only representing a tiny fraction of 
overall producers, are responsible for around 10% of the total poultry produced (Rushton, 
Viscarra et al. 2005; Otte, Hinrichs et al. 2008).   
In Vietnam, the GDP of which roughly represents a median value for the region, backyard 
flocks represent around two-thirds of overall production. Nearly all poultry are purchased 
from local sources, with a Vietnamese government study finding that 90% of farmers 
surveyed obtained their poultry within the district and that all poultry were purchased 
within the province (GSO-Vietnamese General Statistics Office 2004).  If birds are sold, this 
predominantly occurs locally with nearly all sales in the government study talking place 
within the district, half at the farm gate (GSO-Vietnamese General Statistics Office 2004).  
However, prior to the emergence of H5N1, there did exist supply chains of small-scale 
farmers, traders and market vendors which saw the movement of poultry from the farm-
gate to wholesale markets in Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City (ACI 2006). Birds are even traded 
across the border in Cambodia (Van Kerkhove, Vong et al. 2009). Vietnam also has the 
highest concentration of waterfowl in the region especially in low lying regions such as the 
Mekong delta (Dolberg, Guerne-Bleich et al. 2005) where distinct cyclic production sub-
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systems exist with ducks allowed to scavenge on paddies following rice harvests in order to 
remove lost grain (Men, Ogle et al. 2002).  
The remainder of poultry production takes place in a commercial setting. A handful of large-
scale, relatively bio-secure, producers and state breeding farms exist, which tend to sell 
directly to large retailers or hotels and restaurants. However, consumers report a 
preference for local breeds (Ifft, Otte et al. 2007) and the majority of commercial producers 
operate on a small-scale of up to 2000 birds where day old chicks (DOCs) are purchased 
from hatcheries and then reared in a relatively low bio-secure setting (either roaming free 
or with some rudimentary shelter).  The majority of these are then marketed, either taken 
to live markets or sold to buyers at the farm gate. Buyers may also be live poultry traders 
who collect poultry from various farms, often mixing birds from multiple different 
communes and transporting them to and from live bird markets (Agrifood Consulting 
International 2006; Magalhaes, Ortiz-Pelaez et al. 2010).  
Both Indonesia and Thailand, with respective GDPs approximately twice and four times that 
of Vietnam, have more industrialised production systems.  Despite incurring heavy losses 
during a financial crisis in 1997, commercial production in Indonesia had recovered and was 
growing prior to the advent of H5N1 (Katial-Zemany and Rangkuti 2003), partly helped by 
stringent import restrictions sustaining domestic poultry prices at a level 55 percent higher 
than the world price (Fabiosa, Jensen et al. 2004). Indonesia also has a small industrial 
production sector, primarily involving “contract farming”, where a larger company sends 
DOC to a series of smaller farms (Katial-Zemany and Rangkuti 2003). These farms then raise 
the birds for a set price and then return them to the producer. Approximately ten percent of 
poultry in Indonesia are raised this way (Rushton, Viscarra et al. 2005). 
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In contrast, around 70% of poultry in Thailand is produced industrially. Whilst this sector 
was in development, contract farming proved a mutually beneficial form of production, 
giving large poultry farms the flexibility to adjust production volumes to suit demand. The 
fixed price and size of the contract, a legally binding agreement, also protected the smaller 
producer from price and supply fluctuations. However, in order to meet stringent 
international import requirements for food safety and animal welfare and due to 
technological advances such as evaporative-cooling systems which save on production costs, 
large poultry integrators were, even prior to the introduction of H5N1, progressively 
heading towards vertical integration, with all aspects of production increasingly brought in-
house (NaRanong 2007; Burgos, Otte et al. 2008). 
2.5 Controlling the spread of H5N1 in Poultry 
The effectiveness of attempts to control the spread of avian influenza depends on two 
factors: the extent to which outbreaks are prevented and the extent to which outbreaks, 
when they are occur, are prevented from spreading infection onwards. As the early 
outbreaks of H5N1 in Hong Kong and the rapid global proliferation of the “Z” type strain in 
2003 both constituted relatively unexpected events, control strategies were necessarily 
forced to focus on the latter. These involved reactive measures such as mass culling and 
movement restrictions aimed towards limiting spread once infection had become 
established within a locality coupled with the development of surveillance capacity.  
However, over time, the wave-like nature of the spread of infection during the first few 
years of the epizootic, has allowing a re-evaluation of approaches to controlling infection. 
The development of effective vaccines and the realisation that, in many settings, H5N1 is 
unlikely to be eradicated in the short term, has seen national control policies evolve towards 
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more proactive approaches such as the adoption of mass vaccination and the drive towards 
improving bio-security. 
 2.5.1 “Stamping out” H5N1 
The “stamping out” of infection is recognised by the FAO as a proven strategy for the rapid 
elimination of an emergency livestock disease. Implementing this strategy involves the 
designation of infected zones, intense disease surveillance within these zones, the 
immediate slaughter of animals infected, those identified as dangerous contacts or, if 
deemed necessary, all animals regardless of infection status, followed by the disinfection of 
the area, quarantining of remaining animals and biosecure disposal of those slaughtered. 
Prior to the spread of H5N1, this was a recognised strategy for rapid elimination of a 
livestock disease newly introduced into an area (Geering, Penrith et al. 2001). The overall 
aim of this strategy is to eliminate infection from a compartment, region or country and to 
reduce the number of infected or susceptible animals within a population (Sims 2007). 
In countries where the introduction of H5N1 was detected before infection became 
widespread such as in Japan, South Korea and Malaysia, where the predominantly intensive 
poultry production systems make it relatively straightforward to implement the strategy 
promptly and properly, it was possible to eradicate the spread of infection before the 
disease became widespread (Peiris, de Jong et al. 2007; Sims 2007). Before the return of 
infection in 2002, the H5N1 strain which surfaced in Hong Kong in 1997 was also successfully 
controlled by extensive stamping out measures (Sims, Ellis et al. 2003). However, stamping 
out as a strategy to control the spread of infection where the disease has already become 
established, and in countries where extensive poultry production provides large reservoirs 
of infection, has proven less effective. Despite mass culling campaigns, countries such as 
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Vietnam, Thailand and China experienced huge waves of outbreaks and infection often 
returned within a short period of time following the end of an epidemic (Sims 2007). The 
costs of sustaining such a strategy, which have involved culling millions of poultry, is also 
restrictively high (Capua and Marangon 2006). In addition to the resources needed to carry 
out culling on such a widespread scale, poultry owners need to be compensated for their 
losses in order to ensure infection is readily reported and that poultry are not moved 
illegally, which could otherwise even lead to culling becoming counterproductive (Johansen 
and Penrith 2009). In 2005, experts at a joint meeting of the FAO and OIE concluded that, 
due to economic, ethical and ecological considerations, the mass culling of poultry was no 
longer an acceptable strategy to contain the spread of avian influenza in developing 
countries and recommended that vaccination be considered as an alternative (Butler 2005).  
2.5.2 The development and use of H5N1 vaccination 
An ideal vaccine should be safe, induce sterilising immunity whereby infection is completely 
prevented during subsequent challenge by a dose of a wild-type of the pathogen, provide 
long-lasting immunity, be administered via a single dose and be affordable and stable at 
room temperature for the setting in which it is required (Ada 1994). No H5N1 vaccine 
currently licensed for use in the field satisfies all these criteria (Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009). 
H5N1 poultry vaccines fall into two categories:  Inactivated whole virus vaccines and subunit 
recombinant vaccines (Suarez and Schultz-Cherry 2000; Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009). 
Inactivated vaccines are produced by growing a whole avian influenza virus subtype within 
an embryonic chicken egg which is then chemically inactivated and oil-emulsified. The 
specific subtype can either be homologous (i.e. inactivated H5N1 vaccine), which means the 
vaccine has the advantage that the grown strain matches the field strain but does not allow 
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for detection of infection within a flock, or heterologous where infection can be diagnosed 
through the detection of antibodies against the field strain-specific NA (van den Berg, 
Lambrecht et al. 2008). However, in the case of the current strain of H5N1, the virus is too 
pathogenic to grow to sufficient titres within the embryo, necessitating the use of reverse 
genetics, whereby plasmids containing the HA and NA genes of the H5N1 strain and 
plasmids of the six remaining genes from a low-pathogenic high growth strain are inserted 
into animal cells. These are then used to generate a reassortant virus with the requisite HA 
and NA genes which can grow to sufficiently high titres (Chen 2009). Both inactivated and 
recombinant H5N1 vaccines have been used to vaccinate poultry in China, Hong Kong, North 
and South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and Egypt (Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009; Kim, Kayali et 
al. 2010). Other recombinant vaccines which have been licensed for use include 
recombinant fowlpox vaccines, where a gene coding for the HA of an H5 strain is inserted 
into the fowlpox virus, and a Newcastle disease (ND) vaccine which can be used to 
immunise against AI and ND simultaneously (Swayne, Suarez et al. 2003; Veits, Wiesner et 
al. 2006).  
All H5N1 vaccines have been tested within a laboratory setting to ensure that they meet a 
minimum efficacy standard of the level of protection against AI disease in chickens ( 
haemagglutination inhibition (HI) titres > 4 log2) and significantly reduce viral shedding and 
transmissibility following challenge with infection (Tian, Zhang et al. 2005; Swayne, Lee et al. 
2006; Bublot, Pritchard et al. 2007; Ge, Deng et al. 2007; Bouma, Claassen et al. 2009; Peyre, 
Fusheng et al. 2009). However, with the exception of the fowlpox-derived vaccine which 
only requires a single dose but has the disadvantages of not being effective in poultry with a 
history of fowlpox infection as well as being less effective in turkeys and ducks (Swayne, 
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Beck et al. 2000; Steensels, Van Borm et al. 2007), two doses of vaccine are often required 
to achieve adequate protection, especially in longer-living poultry and ducks (Swayne 2006; 
van der Goot, van Boven et al. 2007). Moreover, in order to ensure the vaccine remains 
potent, a cold chain of vaccine delivery is required. As a result, translating efficacy within a 
laboratory setting to effectiveness in a field setting is not straightforward (Swayne and 
Kapczynski 2008; Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009). There is also evidence that current vaccines 
may provide less effective protection from recently evolved strains of H5N1 isolated in 
Southern China compared to the protection provided from older strains (Tian, Zeng et al. 
2010). 
 
Figure 2-5| Annual number of reported human cases in countries using mass vaccination. 
Solid lines and markers show number of cases reported to the WHO, dashed arrows show years during which 
mass vaccination was carried out. 
*Number of cases as of 31 August 2010. 
Source (WHO 2010). 
 
Despite this, field trials of vaccination in Indonesia, Vietnam, Hong Kong and China have 
shown promise in controlling H5N1 outbreaks (Ellis, Leung et al. 2004; To, Bui et al. 2007; 
Bouma, Muljono et al. 2008). Following this, mass vaccination campaigns were initiated in 
Vietnam, China, Indonesia and Egypt and emergency vaccination has been incorporated into 
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outbreak response protocols in Hong Kong (Ellis, Leung et al. 2004; Peyre, Fusheng et al. 
2009). However, whilst the number of human cases in China and Vietnam has subsequently 
declined, the disease has remained entrenched in all of these countries (Figure 2-5). The 
experiences of Vietnam and Indonesia will be discussed further later, whilst in China, 
despite the use of over 40 billion doses of vaccine, rates of protection in waterfowl and 
backyard chicken remain relatively low (Chen 2009). The expense of maintaining nationwide 
campaigns, coupled with the recognition that vaccination is not likely to eradicate infection 
in the short-to-medium term is increasingly leading to the re-evaluation of such strategies. 
In Egypt the widespread presence of maternal antibodies was also identified as a 
contributing factor to the failure of a vaccination campaign which had no positive impact on 
HPAI incidence even after the administration of three doses of vaccine (Peyre, Samaha et al. 
2009; Kim, Kayali et al. 2010).  As a result, in July 2009 the campaign was suspended 
indefinitely (FAO 2010).  
Indeed, it has been suggested that without concerted efforts to improve surveillance 
capacity, especially as incomplete coverage or improperly administered vaccination may 
make circulating disease more difficult to detect (Savill, St Rose et al. 2006),  vaccination will 
never successfully eradicate infection in countries where the extensive production of 
poultry is widespread (Marangon, Cecchinato et al. 2008; Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009). 
2.5.3 Improving surveillance capacity  
The high levels of mortality associated with the presence of HPAI H5N1 within a flock has led 
to the proposal of various mortality thresholds as a fast and simple measure of the presence 
of infection, especially within a commercial flock (Elbers, Fabri et al. 2004; Savill, St Rose et 
al. 2008). However, the high levels of background mortality and small flock sizes in the 
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context of backyard poultry production and the potential for disease to circulate silently in 
waterfowl, live bird markets and vaccinated poultry, necessitate detection methods which, 
though requiring more time and resources, are more sensitive and specific than simple 
mortality thresholds (Sims 2007).  
Traditional methods of assaying for the presence of haemagglutinating agents in inoculated 
chicken embryos require animal facilities and supplies of reference antisera and can take up 
to 2 weeks to complete. However, the development of real-time Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(RT-PCR) methods where H5 specific nucleic acids can be identified directly, allowing 
detection of H5 influenza in as little as 24 hours (Pasick 2008). Subsequently, RT-PCR assays 
have been designed to detect HPAI H5N1 specifically (Hoffmann, Harder et al. 2007). 
Moreover, the recent development of rapid antigen detection kits, whilst both less specific 
and sensitive, now allows the detection of the presence of Influenza A virus within a flock in 
less than an hour without the requirement of laboratory equipment and, whilst the result 
should always be confirmed by other methods, provide an effective early indicative measure 
of the presence of H5N1 in the field (Marche and van den Berg 2010). 
In countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, improvements in veterinary infrastructure and 
allocation of resources to compensation schemes has seen an increase in surveillance 
capacity (Sims 2007).  Moreover, countries such as Thailand and China, have invested 
significant resources in active surveillance, whereby apparently healthy flocks are sampled 
for signs of infection (Tiensin, Nielen et al. 2007; Chen 2009). However, in many countries 
including Vietnam and Indonesia, veterinary services remain highly decentralised. As a result 
key policy directives can become diluted, the flow of information between local authorities 
is often poor and surveillance resources and effort can vary within countries and even 
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provinces (Sims 2007). Movement restrictions and culling of infected birds constitute 
financial disincentives for farmers to report infection within their flock. Thus, in order to 
ensure timely reporting of outbreaks, they should be compensated for these losses. 
However, compensation schemes, where they exist, usually only pay a fraction of the 
market value and accessing compensation is often highly time consuming and  bureaucratic 
(Kanamori and Jimba 2007; Nguyen 2007). The occurrence of human cases in areas where 
no outbreaks of infection in poultry have been reported, even in countries such as China, 
Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia where compensation schemes have already been 
implemented, highlight the extent of this problem (Sims 2007). There have also been 
instances where even suspected human cases have not been reported (Normile 2005). 
2.5.4 Enhancing biosecurity 
Biosecurity refers to the implementation of measures designed to reduce the risk of the 
introduction of infection within a flock and to prevent the spread of infection in the 
situations where an outbreak does occur (FAO, World Bank et al. 2007). These consist of 
three components segregation, cleaning and disinfection. The first involves the creation of 
barriers in order to prevent any opportunities for infected poultry or materials to come into 
contact with the flock, whilst the second and third should be applied to all materials which 
enter or leave a site in order to ensure that any virus is removed (Domenech, Honhold et al. 
2008).  
Whilst this assumption has recently been questioned (Otte, Pfeiffer et al. 2006), it is 
generally thought that industrial production is relatively bio-secure as it is strongly in the 
interests of producers to keep their flocks free from infection using measures such as closed 
housing and disinfectants. However, for small-scale backyard farmers, the scavenging of 
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birds for feed plays an important role in making the operation viable. As a result, in 
countries where such extensive farming is widespread, biosecurity remains poor (Rushton, 
Viscarra et al. 2005; Capua and Marangon 2006). 
Calls to eliminate scavenging poultry in such countries have so far been resisted due to the 
serious socio-economic impact this would have. However control policies aimed towards 
reducing the consequences of such low biosecurity often involve preventing the movement 
of poultry from such small-holdings, either through the selective application of movement 
restrictions or closure of markets to small-holders. Whilst such measures may result in a net 
improvement in biosecurity, they also serve to make the environment in which small-
holders rear poultry even tougher (Otte, Pfeiffer et al. 2006; Sims 2007; Safman 2010).  
2.6 The Impact of HPAI H5N1 in individual countries 
2.6.1 H5N1 in Vietnam and the switch to mass vaccination 
Avian influenza was first recognized in Vietnam on December 23, 2003, when large poultry 
die-offs were reported in the provinces of Tien Giang and Long An and on January 8, 2004 
Vietnam became the first country to officially declare the epidemic. Within 6 weeks, 57 of 
the 64 Vietnamese provinces had been affected and during the 2 months it took to bring the 
outbreaks under control, 44 million birds had been killed, either as a result of infection or 
culling. During this wave of outbreaks fifteen people died as a consequence of human 
infection (Nguyen 2005), with outbreaks centring around two distinct foci, the Mekong delta 
in the South of Vietnam and the Red River delta in the North (Pfeiffer, Minh et al. 2007).  
This first wave of H5N1 was the largest that Vietnam has experienced, causing an estimated 
direct National loss of US$ 200 million and creating a significant reduction in the overall size 
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of the poultry industry due to a decreased demand for poultry (during the height of the 
epidemic poultry prices fell by around 50 to 60 percent) (ACI 2006). 
The economic effects of the outbreaks were felt most sharply by the smallholders of 
poultry. A case study of a village in North Vietnam found that smallholders affected by 
outbreaks suffered losses of between 69 USD and 108 USD (Dolberg, Guerne-Bleich et al. 
2005). As around two-thirds of households in Vietnam earn less than US$2 per capita per 
day, such losses often have serious economic implications for those involved (GSO-
Vietnamese General Statistics Office 2004; Rushton, Viscarra et al. 2005; ACI 2006).  
Subsequently there have been four more major waves of outbreaks, all on a smaller scale 
but, at a micro level, having a similar impact upon those affected. The second wave began a 
year after the first in December 2004, a time of year during which the Vietnamese festival of 
Têt is celebrated, representing a yearly peak in the consumption of poultry. This wave once 
again centred around the same distinct foci in the North and South and resulted in the 
destruction of around two million poultry. The third wave differed in its seasonality, with 
the first outbreaks occurring in October 2005 and the final outbreaks occurring in 
December, a month before the beginning of Têt. This wave centred around the North Red 
River only, affecting 21 provinces and causing the destruction of over 4.2 million poultry 
(Pfeiffer, Minh et al. 2007; Tuan 2007). 
Following this third wave of outbreaks, and an extensive vaccination campaign, Vietnam 
remained disease free for over a year until, in December 2006, outbreaks occurred, 
primarily within duck farms in the southern Mekong provinces and in May 2007 a fifth wave 
occurred primarily in the North. Since the final wave in 2007 sporadic outbreaks have 
continued to occur throughout the remainder of 2007 and into 2008 (FAO 2009)   
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Since the beginning of 2008, sporadic outbreaks have been responsible for 18 human cases, 
resulting in 12 fatalities, bringing the total number of confirmed human infections to 119, 59 
of which have been fatal (WHO 2010). 
2.6.1.1 Control policies implemented prior to vaccination 
Before the first outbreaks in 2003, Vietnam had no systematic surveillance or program to 
monitor the circulation of HPAI and no formal plan as to how to respond to outbreaks 
(Nguyen 2005).  A steering committee was established in January 2004 which recommended 
movement restrictions, the establishment of checkpoints, disinfection of premises, export 
and import quarantine, heightened biosecurity measures in intensive poultry farms and the 
culling of all poultry within a 3km radius (The National Steering Committee for Avian Flu 
Prevention and Control 2005). However, these measures could not be applied until a state 
of emergency was declared within a province. As a result the timeliness of the application of 
control measures varied between provinces (Nguyen 2005).   
The lack of compensation for culled birds at the beginning of the outbreak is also likely to 
have increased the likelihood that outbreaks went unreported. Later in the outbreak the 
government announced the initiation of such a compensation policy. However, the level of 
compensation (around 10 percent of market value) and the inconsistent application of 
provinces is likely to have limited its success in improving reporting and to have encouraged 
the movement of poultry between infected and uninfected, or more effectively 
compensated, areas (Hulse-Post, Sturm-Ramirez et al. 2005; ACI 2006). 
In response to the size of the first wave of outbreaks, and the level of destruction necessary 
to maintain a 3km stamping-out policy, outbreaks between late 2004 and 2005 were 
controlled by more focussed culling. The scope of such culls varied between provinces but 
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generally involved the destruction of all poultry within a 1km radius (ACI 2006). Guidelines 
distributed to para-veterinary professionals advised that all infected flocks should be 
disposed of within 24 hours of an outbreak being reported (FAO 2005).  
In June 2005, between the second and third wave of outbreaks, the level of compensation 
for culled flocks was trebled to represent half of market value and compensation for flocks 
volunteered for culling was introduced (ACI 2006; Tuan 2007). However, for many farmers, 
gaining approval for compensation was a complicated procedure and disbursement of 
payment generally took a period of 2-6 months(Tuan 2007). The time taken to restock 
depleted flocks completely has been estimated to be 12 months within a backyard setting 
and 5-8 months for commercial farms (Dolberg, Guerne-Bleich et al. 2005). 
2.6.1.2 The vaccination campaign 
A field trial of two vaccines, an inactivated H5N2 vaccine previously used to control 
outbreaks in Hong Kong and an inactivated H5N1 vaccine from China, was carried out in 
2005 (To, Bui et al. 2007; Nguyen 2008). The latter vaccine was selected as it was found to 
give effective protection to both chickens and domestic ducks, although not to Muscovy 
ducks which constitute about 20% of the duck population (Men, Ogle et al. 2002). In August 
2005 a pilot vaccination campaign was carried out in two trial provinces, Tien Giang in the 
South Mekong Delta Region and Nam Dinh in the North Red River region.  In November and 
December 2005, occurring contemporaneously with the third wave of outbreaks in the 
North, the first round of an extensive vaccination campaign was carried out throughout the 
entire country, with the exception of a few remote regions. The aim of this campaign was to 
deliver two shots of vaccine, four weeks apart, to all chickens over 8 days old and all ducks 
over 15 days old, although the vaccination of ducks and chickens due for slaughter in less 
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than 70 days was only undertaken on a voluntary basis. Post-vaccine surveillance was 
carried out by randomly selecting one backyard chicken flock, one commercial chicken flock 
and one commercial duck flock in three randomly selected districts in each province. From 
this it has been estimated this campaign achieved a coverage of around 80 percent of 
chickens and 65 percent of ducks in Vietnam. Blood samples of thirty birds from each flock 
(if the backyard flock was too small these were collected from multiple flocks) were also  
collected and it was estimated that effective protection, defined as having a HI titre >1/16,  
had been achieved in approximately 55 percent of each species(Taylor and Dung 2007). 
Subsequent rounds of mass-vaccination were then carried out during March and September 
of 2006 and 2007 (To, Bui et al. 2007; Tuan 2007; Nguyen 2008).  
Following the implementation of the vaccination campaign there was also a change in policy 
regarding the response to outbreaks of avian influenza, moving from ring culling to a 
combination of the culling of infected flocks and ring vaccination around any infected 
premises (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2006). Policies aiming to improve 
bio-security by restructuring the poultry industry, including the upgrading of farming 
practices to more industrialised production and restrictions on free-grazing ducks, were also 
initiated (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2006; Men 2007). 
Vaccination proved successful at preventing outbreaks in the short term, with no outbreaks 
reported for a year following the first round of the campaign, and has substantially reduced 
the number of reported outbreaks and human cases relative to the scale of infection during 
the first years of the epidemic. However, with the disease still remaining widespread and 
firmly entrenched within poultry populations,  it is increasingly being recognised that the 
high costs and resources associated with maintaining twice annual nationwide vaccination, 
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as well as the requisite support from smallholders, are not sustainable in the long term. As a 
result, alternative vaccination strategies are now being trialled in Vietnam as part of the 
Gathering Evidence for a Transitional Strategy (GETS) for HPAI H5N1 Vaccination in Vietnam 
(USAID 2010). This involves targeted vaccination of identified high risk populations such as 
mobile duck flocks in five trial provinces, judged to be at varying levels of disease risk. These 
will then be monitored closely, including active sampling to assess whether infection is 
circulating silently, in order to assess the extent to which the protection this affords each 
province is cost-effective. 
2.6.2 The Control of Avian Influenza in Thailand 
The first confirmed outbreak of H5N1 in domestic poultry in Thailand occurred in late 
January 2004, although subsequent analyses have concluded that the disease had been 
circulating from late 2003 (Tiensin, Chaitaweesub et al. 2005). This led to a large wave of 
outbreaks spreading throughout the country, emanating from an epicentre situated in 
Central Thailand where the majority of poultry is produced (Tiensin, Nielen et al. 2007). 
Both in terms of timing and size this wave was comparable to those occurring in other 
Southeast Asian countries such as China and Vietnam.   
The first wave of outbreaks, lasting until early 2004, was followed by a second large wave 
beginning in mid-2004 which, in terms of the number of outbreaks reported and the 
duration was much larger than any other wave in either Thailand or Vietnam (Gilbert, Xiao 
et al. 2008). The consequences of outbreaks in poultry for both smallholders and large-scale 
producers were severe. Thailand’s main export markets, the EU and Japan, banned the 
importation of Thai poultry products and domestic demand for poultry fell dramatically, 
causing the prices of poultry to drop (Safman 2010). This, coupled with the costs arising 
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from a “stamping-out” policy which involved the culling of all birds within a 5km radius of 
the source of infection and the destruction of all contaminated housing, contributed to 
losses in the private poultry sector which have been estimated at 100 billion Baht (≈ US$3 
billion) during 2004 alone (Burgos, Otte et al. 2008).  
Despite pressure from smallholders (Safman 2010), vaccination of poultry has remained 
illegal in Thailand throughout all outbreaks, a decision which was supported by large export 
poultry producers, due to Japan and the EU’s refusal to accept poultry products from 
vaccinated birds. Instead a policy of upgrading biosecurity was implemented. Industrial 
producers who sent birds to be reared in contracted farms made it a requirement that these 
farms upgrade their poultry housing to closed houses and many switched to more vertically 
integrated production, a pre-existing trend which was intensified by the onset of H5N1. The 
Thai government also announced that chickens should only be raised in closed farms 
(NaRanong 2007; Safman 2010).  
Another noteworthy characteristic of Thailand’s response to H5N1 was that of intense 
active ‘X-ray’ surveillance (Otte, Pfeiffer et al. 2006; NaRanong 2007; Tiensin, Nielen et al. 
2007; Safman 2010). These were nationwide campaigns, the first beginning in October 2004 
and repeated three times in 2005, of 3-4 weeks duration, where thousands of inspectors 
where recruited to search door-to-door with the aim of assessing the infection status of 
every flock in the country and thus obtaining a clearer picture of the scale of outbreaks 
occurring and reducing the opportunity for infection to spread.   
Following the implementation of these measures, a third wave of outbreaks in 2005 was 
much smaller in scale and, since then, outbreaks have been restricted to isolated cases, with 
the last human case reported in 2006 (WHO 2010) and the last reported outbreak in poultry 
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in late 2008 (Pickelsimer and Preechajarn 2008). However, faced with a much tougher 
environment within which they had to operate as a result of the pressure to upgrade, many 
smallholders were forced to leave the industry altogether (NaRanong 2007). 
2.6.3 Endemic spread in Indonesia 
In Indonesia, the disease was first detected in poultry in Java in August 2003 and by January 
2004 had spread to Bali, Kalimantan and southern Sumatra. By mid-2008 all but two of 33 
provinces in Indonesia had been affected (Forster 2010), with the disease considered 
enzootic in Java, Sumatra, Bali and Sulawesi (FAO 2010).  The control strategy implemented 
during the early stages of the epidemic focussed upon culling and compensation. Initially 
this only applied to infected birds but was subsequently extended to include all poultry 
within a 3km radius and testing within 20km. By the end of January 2004, when the first 
wave of outbreaks reached its conclusion, 17 million birds had been killed, either as a result 
of infection or culling, and this was followed by a sharp drop in the price of chicken due to a 
lack of demand due to worries about food safety (Rushton, Viscarra et al. 2005).  
Large commercial enterprises began vaccinating their poultry privately from an early stage 
in the epidemic using a range of imported and locally produced vaccines (Domenech, 
Dauphin et al. 2009). A mass vaccination campaign was instigated by the government in 
June 2004, with the aim of providing 300 million doses of vaccine free of charge to 
smallholders and backyard flocks nationwide (Forster 2010).  However, only 16 million doses 
of vaccine were distributed between 2004 and 2005 (Santhia, Ramy et al. 2009). Due to the 
limited vaccine supply, the decision was taken in mid 2006 to instead focus mass vaccination 
in 12 high-risk provinces with the use of reactive vaccination in other areas (Forster 2010).  
However, with problems such as the de-centralised, locally autonomous Indonesian 
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veterinary infrastructure; wide geographical area and  extensive farming system; large 
number of species and resource and budget limitations (Siregar, Darminto et al. 2007; 
Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009) this failed to bring the epidemic under control. In 2009 
Indonesia reported 21 human cases, 19 of which were fatal (WHO 2010), and more than one 
thousand outbreaks in poultry, higher than any other country (FAO 2010).   
One factor behind the higher number of reported outbreaks in Indonesia is the 
implementation of the Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response (PDSR) approach to 
disease detection (Buranathai, Amonsin et al. 2007). This involves supporting a community-
based response to outbreaks where, by educating and enlisting the help of poultry farmers, 
traders and community leaders through awareness campaigns, local knowledge as to where 
and when outbreaks are occurring is adapted and incorporated into the existing outbreak 
surveillance and prevention framework with rapid tests used to confirm the presence of 
avian influenza whilst in the field. As of mid-2008, the programme had recruited 2112 
officers, operating in 221 of Indonesia’s 448 districts. In the first two and a half years of its 
existence PDSR teams had made nearly 200,000 visits, leading to over 6000 detected 
outbreaks (Forster 2010). 
2.7 Modelling the spread of HPAI 
Mathematical models have long been used in infectious disease epidemiology, providing a 
rigorous framework in which to describe the dynamics of an epidemic and the factors 
influencing the transmission of disease in a parsimonious manner (Heesterbeek 2002). In 
1917 Ronald Ross, the physician responsible for identifying the mosquito as the vector by 
which malaria is transmitted, and Hilda Hudson described a “critical density of mosquitoes” 
below which a malaria epidemic could not be sustained (Ross and Hudson 1917). This 
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concept of a critical population threshold, given a mathematical basis by Kermack and 
McKendrick in 1927 (Kermack and Mckendrick 1927), was then further developed by George 
Macdonald in 1952 to provide the first explicit expression for the basic reproductive number 
(Macdonald 1952), subsequently defined as the average number of secondary infections 
arising from a typical infective in a previously unexposed population and given the symbol 
 (Dietz 1993). However the potential for such a threshold, whereby a major outbreak can 
only occur within a population if   1, to be estimated directly from epidemiological data 
and used to assess the effectiveness of control measures was not fully realised until the 
mid-1980s when brought to prominence, in particular, by the work of Anderson and May 
(Anderson and May 1982). Since then it has remained arguably the most important quantity 
in the study of  the spread of infectious disease, guiding our understanding of the 
transmission dynamics of infection (Anderson and May 1991), the effects of herd immunity 
(Fine 1993) and the role of heterogeneity in driving an epidemic (Yorke, Hethcote et al. 
1978; Woolhouse, Dye et al. 1997). Alongside other key measures of spread such as the 
effective reproductive number (the number of secondary infections arising from a typical 
infective but taking into account events occurring as a reaction to the spread of a pathogen 
within the host population such as the depletion of susceptible individuals during an 
epidemic or the implementation of control measures), the time in which individuals spend 
in given disease states (e.g susceptible, infectious, immune), the distribution of time 
between generations of cases, incidence and overall number of cases, calculating the basic 
reproductive number allows the assessment of the overall effectiveness of control strategies 
such as vaccination campaigns (Nokes and Anderson 1988), screening programmes (Garnett, 
Kim et al. 2006) and the implementation of many other treatment strategies for a wide 
variety of diseases (Woolhouse 1992; Velasco-Hernandez, Gershengorn et al. 2002; Grassly, 
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Fraser et al. 2006; Hallett, Singh et al. 2008; Ross, Penny et al. 2008), which, due to such 
non-linear dynamics of infection, would not otherwise be possible. 
Moreover, in recent times, spurred on by high-profile event such as major disease outbreaks 
including Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the 
spread of resistant bacteria and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, modelling has 
increasing become an accepted part of public health decision making (Temime, Hejblum et 
al. 2008). In each of these examples, as well as numerous others, factors such as the high 
degree of stochasticity and incomplete observation during the initial stages of infection, the 
small-population dynamics and environmental contamination associated with nosocomial 
infection and the evolution of drug-resistance, the apparent high variability in the 
transmissibility of cases characterising the spread of SARS and the unknown distribution of 
the incubation period of CJD have all served to highlight the utility of mathematical models 
in calculating the otherwise unquantifiable uncertainty associated with outcomes of such 
threats (Austin and Anderson 1999; Ghani, Ferguson et al. 2000; Lipsitch, Cohen et al. 2003; 
Li, Yu et al. 2004; Fraser, Donnelly et al. 2009). 
Whilst mathematical models of the dynamics of disease in animals do not have such a 
historical pedigree, the notion that they can be also be used to inform disease control policy 
has become increasingly subscribed to. Models of the spread of diseases such as bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy, scrapie and classical swine fever have all been developed in 
order to address pertinent issues regarding ongoing epidemics such as optimal culling 
strategies, farming restrictions and the impact upon human health (Anderson, Donnelly et 
al. 1996; Ferguson, Ghani et al. 1998; Stringer, Hunter et al. 1998; Woolhouse, Stringer et al. 
1998; Boender, Nodelijk et al. 2008). The 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) epidemic in 
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Great Britain further served to demonstrate that, following advances in computing power 
and given access to the best available data (Levin, Grenfell et al. 1997), mathematical 
models can play an active, even decisive, role in providing policy makers with vital 
information as to the optimal disease control strategy during a rapidly progressing epidemic.  
2.7.1 An example of the potential for mathematical models to aid policy 
making: The 2001 FMD epidemic in Great Britain 
Disease tracing suggests that the first outbreak of Foot and Mouth in the UK for over thirty 
years occurred in Northumberland in February 2001. However, by the time infection was 
detected, the disease had spread as far as South-west Scotland and Devon, as a result of 
long-range sheep movements (Gibbens, Sharpe et al. 2001). Thirty-five days into the 
epidemic, when it became clear the epidemic was out of control and threatening to 
overwhelm resources, a scientific advisory group was set-up, including mathematical 
modellers in order to provide policy makers with guidance as to the best control policies to 
implement (Anderson 2001). Modellers of the 2001 FMD epidemic in the United Kingdom 
were given full access to databases containing: the location and species-specific livestock 
numbers of a great majority of all farm holdings in the UK, including all reported infected 
premises (IP); the date of reporting; the date of slaughter; results of laboratory diagnostic 
testing; estimates of the date of infection from analysis of lesions and estimates of the date 
and source of infection for some IPs from contact tracing (Woolhouse 2003). Following the 
implementation of movement restrictions on the 23rd November, more than 80% of all 
newly infected IPs arose within 3km of one potential source of infection (Gibbens, Sharpe et 
al. 2001; Kao 2002).  
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Before 2001, spatial models of the spread of infectious disease in livestock remained 
relatively rare with the key exception to this being the “InterSpread” model, a complex 
stochastic simulation model which requires the specification of a wide array of different 
parameters or parameter distributions describing the contact structure of farms (including 
animal and transport contacts) and the implementation of various control measures 
(Sanson, Struthers et al. 1993; Jalvingh, Nielen et al. 1999; Nielen, Jalvingh et al. 1999). This 
model was the basis of the analysis of the outbreak conducted by Morris at al. (Morris, 
Wilesmith et al. 2001) The spread of infection in this model was described using a total of 54 
parameters. Whilst this is more likely to represent the level of complex heterogeneity which 
determines a wave of outbreaks in real-life, accurately estimating such values and 
distributions from data is difficult and unlikely to be possible to validate, leading to 
problems associated with misspecification and the complexity of this model makes it 
relatively slow. 
In contrast, Ferguson et al. used a method whereby only the infection status of spatial 
clusters of farms less than 3km away from each other were considered in order to 
determine local spread and a traditional mass action term was used to describe long range 
transmission (Ferguson, Donnelly et al. 2001). The effects of the local depletion of 
susceptible farms during the course of the wave, as well as the effect of spatially targeted 
interventions such as mass culling and ring-vaccination, were then modelled by considering 
the number of pairs of infectious and susceptible farms within this 3km radius (that is, 
susceptible-susceptible, susceptible-infectious and infectious-infectious), which is 
equivalent  to the covariance density of infectious and susceptible farms. This second spatial 
moment of the epidemic, like any moment of a system, in turn depends upon the next 
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higher moment. This was approximated using a “moment closure” approximation of the 
number of triples of each possible configuration of infection types which is defined on the 
basis of the number of pairs, singles and the proportion of triangles (the fraction of the 
possible pairs of contacts of a given farm which are themselves contacts of one another). 
Using such an approximation has been termed moment closure. This model was intended 
primarily to provide rapid insight into the spread of infection and the speed and ease of 
parameterisation allowed an early and detailed analysis of the potential effects of various 
different interventions. A model by Keeling et al. (Keeling, Woolhouse et al. 2001), instead 
used an individual based stochastic model, based around a spatial kernel function which 
described how the probability that any infectious IP infects any susceptible IP decays with 
distance, allowing it to take into account the possibility of more extreme scenarios than the 
mean represented in the moment-closure model and to capture the long tail at the end of 
the epidemic.  
These models all identified a policy of contiguous culling, whereby animals on farms around 
infected foci are culled regardless of whether these farms have shown any clinical signs of 
infection, as being the most effective at reducing the size and overall impact of the epidemic 
(Ferguson, Donnelly et al. 2001; Keeling, Woolhouse et al. 2001; Morris, Wilesmith et al. 
2001; Keeling 2005). The aim of this policy was to shorten the infectious period of infected 
farms yet to be infected and to remove a significant proportion of the potential contact 
neighbourhood of these as-yet undetected infected premises (Kao 2002). Although the mass 
slaughter of apparently healthy animals provoked some opposition from areas within the 
farming community and veterinary profession, shortly after the measures were 
implemented the number of infected farms began to decline, the effective reproductive 
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number fell below unity and the epidemic was brought under control (Ferguson, Donnelly et 
al. 2001). An inquiry held in the aftermath of the epidemic concluded that the contiguous 
cull had played a crucial role in controlling the outbreak (Anderson 2001). 
2.7.2 Simulation models of the spread of avian influenza 
The spread of HPAI in poultry has also led to a surge in interest in the spread of avian 
influenza within the modelling literature over the last decade. In many cases simulation 
studies have been carried out in order to obtain a better understanding of the processes 
likely to affect the spread of infection. These include models exploring how environmental 
transmission, rather than direct bird-to-bird contact, can facilitate the persistence of avian 
influenza in poultry populations (Guberti, Scremin et al. 2007; Breban, Drake et al. 2009; 
Rohani, Breban et al. 2009); evaluation of thresholds for the detection of infection within a 
flock (Carpenter, Thurmond et al. 2004; Savill, St Rose et al. 2006); the design of methods to 
estimate the day of disease introduction into a flock (Bos, Van Boven et al. 2007); 
assessment of the optimum strategies to prevent a pandemic (Jung, Iwami et al. 2009). 
Further models have been developed to investigate direct and indirect effects of control 
measures, including the hypothesis that large-scale culling campaigns may impede the 
evolution of avian host resistance to the virus (Shim and Galvani 2009) and the dynamics of 
waning immunity (Lesnoff, Peyre et al. 2009), the potential for  infection to spread silently, 
as a result of lower levels of clinical signs and flock mortality (Savill, St Rose et al. 2006), and 
the evolution and spread of resistance following rounds of vaccination (Iwami, Suzuki et al. 
2009; Iwami, Takeuchi et al. 2009). Moreover, in order to explore the potential spread of 
disease within a particular country more realistically, outbreaks have also been simulated 
using detailed data on the network of poultry production. This is particularly the case for 
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poultry production in Great Britain where data on all poultry premises holding more than 50 
birds, with details as to the location of the birds and the species and production type these 
consist of, has been made available to modellers. Models of the spread of infection have 
then been chiefly characterised by two modes of transmission, local radial spread and 
infection as a result of long-range movements such as the transport of poultry for slaughter. 
Simulation using these models have highlighted the areas of the country in which an 
introduction of infection would be most likely to cause widespread transmission (Dent, Kao 
et al. 2008), have been used to validate existing control strategies for preventing sustained 
transmission (Sharkey, Bowers et al. 2008) and have investigated the effectiveness of  
contingency plans in the event an epidemic takes off, with the finding that according to 
different measures of cost-effectiveness only nationwide mass vaccination or large radius 
culls are likely to have a large impact upon the spread of infection (Truscott, Garske et al. 
2007). A simulation model has also been used to explore the different pathways of infection 
from a commercial broiler farm in the USA, using detailed data on the movement of people, 
livestock and machinery to and from the farm (Dorea, Vieira et al. 2010).  
2.7.3 Quantifying avian influenza transmission 
As with the models of FMD in 2001, such simulation models, whilst providing useful insight 
into the infection process, do, however, often require the specification of a range model 
parameters. In the absence of context-specific outbreak data, sensitivity analyses can, to a 
certain extent, address issues associated with misspecification of parameter values (Okais, 
Roche et al. 2010). However, modellers are generally reliant upon existing parameter 
estimates in the literature and expert opinion in order to obtain a reasonable indication of 
the ranges of values such inputs may take.  
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In contrast transmission models fitted to outbreak data are generally a lot simpler, using a 
smaller number of parameters. This is partially due to data considerations and because they 
are therefore more straightforward to fit, but also because this provides parsimonious and 
easily interpretable measures by which to quantify the spread of infection and the 
incremental effect of interventions.  
At the level of transmission between birds, such models are often fitted to data obtained 
through laboratory experiments. This is because such controlled environments allow 
relatively detailed data collection, often offer the opportunity to quantify differences in 
transmissibility between host species, viral strains or subtypes and are straightforward to 
model, often as a simple SIR or SEIR process. Methods to fit such models to the 
experimental data then generally fall into two categories, final size methods and the general 
linear model (GLMs) estimator. The former only requires data on the number of birds 
infected throughout the course of the experiment along with an assumption as to the 
overall distribution of the infectious period (discussed further in Chapter 6) whereas the 
GLM method, first developed by Becker (Becker 1989), fits a rate of transmission to the 
number of new infections at each time point using GLM formulated with a log-log link 
function, taking the log of the proportion infected at each time point as an offset variable. 
This, when multiplied by the mean infectious period, often estimated directly by the time it 
takes exposed animals to become infected, provides an estimate of the reproductive 
number. The reproductive number of HPAI H7N7 in chickens, teal, turkey and pheasants 
(van der Goot, Koch et al. 2005; van der Goot, van Boven et al. 2007), as well as the 
reproductive number of LPAI H5N2 in chickens (Meijer, van der Goot et al. 2004), have been 
estimated using these methods (Stegeman, Bouma et al. 2010).  
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With the exception of a single analysis which used Bayesian methods to fit a survival model 
including both a parameter determining transmissibility and the distribution of incubation 
and infectious periods to data on experimentally infected chickens (Bouma, Claassen et al. 
2009), all estimates of the reproductive number of H5N1 within a flock have also been 
obtained in a similar manner. In an experimental context these estimates range from 0.99 to 
9 in chickens and an estimate of 20 in Pekin ducks. There have also been experiments in 
both chickens and ducks where every bird became infected resulting in an unbounded 
estimate of . Such analyses have also been used to quantify the transmissibility of 
infection in flocks inoculated using inactivated H5N1 and H5N2 vaccines. Outside of the 
laboratory it is also possible to estimate the reproductive number within flocks infected in a 
field context, although this involves making the assumptions that transmission occurs 
homogeneously within the flock. In Thailand the flock-level reproductive number was 
calculated using data on daily mortality rates within a flock (Tiensin, Nielen et al. 2007). 
These numbers were back-calculated according to various assumed fixed infectious periods 
in order to obtain daily infection rates which were used to produce a GLM estimate of 2.26-
2.64 depending on the infectious period chosen. In Vietnam, reproductive numbers were 
calculated using flock-level final outbreak sizes. Making the assumption that only one bird 
was infected from a source outside of the flock, it was found that the flock-level 
reproductive number was significantly lower in outbreaks occurring following the initiation 
of mass vaccination (see Table 2-1 for full details of existing estimates of the flock level  
for H5N1).  
 
 
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 60 
 
Table 2-1| Estimates of within flock transmissibility for HPAI H5N1 
Context Method Species Vaccine  [range£]  [range£] Reference 
Experiment Final size Pekin 
ducks 
Inactivated 
H5N2 
[1.5-∞] Single dose: 
[1.5-∞] 
(after 1 week) 
0.6 [0.1-2.2] 
(after 2 weeks) 
Double dose: 
0.2 [0.005-1.5] 
(after 2 weeks) 
(van der 
Goot, van 
Boven et al. 
2008) 
Experiment GLM Pekin 
ducks 
Inactivated 
H5N2 
20¥ Single dose: 9.2¥ 
(after 1 week) 
0.76¥  
(after 2 weeks) 
Double dose: 0* 
(after 2 weeks) 
(van der 
Goot, van 
Boven et al. 
2008) 
Experiment# 
(High dose) 
Final size Chickens Inactivated 
H5N1 
E:1.7 [0.4-6.6] 
F:1.2 [0.37-2.9] 
E:0 [0-0.8] 
F:0 [0-0.67] 
(Bouma, 
Claassen et 
al. 2009) 
Experiment 
(High dose) 
Bayesian  Chickens Inactivated 
H5N1 
0.99  
[0.38-2.1]€ 
0* (Bouma, 
Claassen et 
al. 2009) 
Experiment# 
(Low dose) 
Final size Chickens Inactivated 
H5N1 
E:9 [1.9-86] 
F:3.4 [1.3-7.6] 
E:0 [0-0.8] 
F:0 [0-0.67] 
(Bouma, 
Claassen et 
al. 2009) 
Experiment 
(Low dose) 
Bayesian Chickens Inactivated 
H5N1 
2 [0.96-3.6]€ 0 * (Bouma, 
Claassen et 
al. 2009) 
Experiment GLM Chickens Inactivated 
H5N2 
12 [4.7-28.7] 0 * (Poetri, 
Bouma et 
al. 2009) 
Field GLM Chickens NA 2.26-2.64 
[2.01-3.47]& 
NA (Tiensin, 
Nielen et al. 
2007) 
Field$ Final size Poultry Inactivated 
H5N2 and 
H5N1 
1.99 [1.87-2.1] 1.17 [1.09-1.25] (Magalhaes, 
Pfeiffer et 
al. 2010) 
3
Range refers to the 95% confidence interval unless otherwise indicated 
€
Range refers to 95% credible intervals. 
¥
Only point estimate given 
*
No birds infected in vaccinated flock providing no information about infectious period required to estimate bounds. 
#
Study where experiments are repeated in chickens inoculated with a low inoculation dose and a high inoculation dose of 
challenge H5N1 virus. Final size calculations are carried out assuming both a fixed (F) and an exponential (E) infectious 
period. 
&
Range of values represents different point estimates obtained by assuming different fixed infectious periods.  
$
Study compares final size of outbreaks in flocks before and after the initiation of mass vaccination in Vietnam,  
calculated using outbreaks before the campaign and  using those occurring after. 
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Due to the resource-intensive nature of transmission experiments, transmission between 
flocks is generally only quantifiable in a field setting (Stegeman, Bouma et al. 2010). Using 
non-spatial SIR models, the reproductive number between flocks has been estimated for the 
spread of infection between farms in two affected areas during the 2003 wave of H7N7 in 
the Netherlands, with the effective reproductive number falling significantly following the 
implementation of control measures such as movement restrictions, and for the 1999-2000 
H7N1 epidemic in Italy. Spatial models of the former epidemic have also been fitted using 
both a continuous spatial kernel (Boender, Hagenaars et al. 2007) and a kernel composed of 
short, medium and long-range transmission parameters (Le Menach, Vergu et al. 2006), 
which by calculating local reproductive numbers for each farm, have provided information 
about areas at risk of future sustained transmission.  
However, all of these models make strong assumptions about the underlying infection 
process. In particular, because the dates on which farms first became infected are not 
known, the dates of first infection are calculated as occurring a uniform period of time prior 
to the report of an outbreak (see Table 2-2). Garske et al. avoid this problem by fitting the 
transmissibility and generation time between outbreaks of a non-spatial model to both of 
these epidemics and an epidemic of H7N3 in British Columbia, Canada (Garske, Clarke et al. 
2007). However, this method relies on the assumption of independence of transmission 
events (Wallinga and Teunis 2004). i.e.  that the assignment of the source of infection to any 
given premises is independent of the assignment of the source of all other outbreaks.  Such 
an assumption is not valid if heterogeneity in the transmissibility of infection, including 
spatial dependence, is to be incorporated (Lipsitch and Bergstrom 2004; Griffin, Garske et al. 
2011). To date the only estimate of between flock transmission for H5N1 comes from a non-
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spatial model fitted to a series of outbreaks in Romania in 2006, where, for each farm, the 
infectious period is assumed to have begun seven days prior to the outbreak’s detection. 
Table 2-2| Models of the between farm or flock  AI transmission 
Article Model Characteristics Data and farm-level 
infectious period used 
Selected Parameter Estimates 
and Findings 
(Stegeman, 
Bouma et al. 
2004) 
SIR Survival model 
fitted to time series. 
HPAI H7N7 Netherlands 2003 
farm, infectious for time 
between detection and culling 
+ 4 days 
R =6.5,3.1 in two separate 
regions, in both R reduced 
following movement 
restrictions 
(Le Menach, 
Vergu et al. 
2006) 
Spatial survival model 
fitted to data using 
discretised spatial 
kernel followed by 
simulation of control 
measures. 
HPAI H7N7 Netherlands 2003, 
locations of farms simulated 
from density data, infectious 
period as in Stegeman et al. 
Reduction in R following 
movement restrictions, 
depopulation has greatest 
impact on number of outbreaks. 
(Mannelli, 
Busani et al. 
2007) 
SIR model fitted using 
GLM estimator 
HPAI H7N1 1999/2000, 
infectious from day of 
detection to date of culling 
R=1.8 and 1.5 in two separate 
regions steadily declining 
through course of epidemic 
(Boender, 
Hagenaars 
et al. 2007) 
Spatial model fitted to 
data using continuous 
spatial kernel. 
HPAI H7N7 Netherlands 2003, 
infectious period as in 
Stegeman et al. 
Identified two regions in 
Netherlands as high risk regions 
where R>1. 
(Garske, 
Clarke et al. 
2007) 
SIR model using 
branching process 
estimator to 
HPAI H7N1 Italy 1999/2000, 
H7N7 Netherlands 2003, H7N3 
Canada 2004. Generation time 
Variation in reproductive 
numbers ranging from 1.1-2.4 
and mean generation time 
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 63 
 
simultaneously fit R 
and generation time. 
fitted to data. ranging from 1.9-8.4 in different 
settings. 
(Ward, 
Maftei et al. 
2009) 
SIR model calculating 
R from daily no. of 
transmissions, 
nearest-neighbour and 
doubling time 
algorithms. 
HPAI H5N1 Romania 2006, 
infectious for 7 days before 
outbreak reported. 
Estimates of R ranging from 1.9-
2.7. 
 
2.7.4 Modelling issues for the spread of H5N1 in Southeast Asia 
The transmission dynamics of the waves of H5N1 which spread throughout Southeast Asia 
have yet to be modelled on a national scale. Instead, macro-level analyses have focussed 
almost exclusively on identifying risk-factors associated with the observation of an outbreak. 
These have provided useful insights and hypotheses as to what facilitates transmission, 
including the findings that H5N1 presence appears to be associated with duck populations 
chicken numbers, human population, duration of rice harvest, topographical features such 
as lowlands and areas with high densities of wetland and proximity to roads and 
slaughterhouses (Gilbert, Chaitaweesub et al. 2006; Gilbert, Xiao et al. 2007; Pfeiffer, Minh 
et al. 2007; Tiensin, Nielen et al. 2007; Henning, Pfeiffer et al. 2009; Paul, Tavornpanich et 
al. 2010). These are then used to map the spatial distribution of the relative risks of 
outbreaks (Gilbert, Xiao et al. 2008; Paul, Tavornpanich et al. 2010). However, such analyses 
have two primary limitations. Firstly they do not directly estimate and take into account the 
spatial and temporal dependence of outbreaks. Secondly, they do not provide key 
quantities, such as the period during which outbreaks remain infectious or the absolute risk 
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of outbreaks occurring, which are necessary in order to fully evaluate transmissibility and 
the net impact of control measures. 
The main obstacle to quantifying these factors is that the standard of data collected often 
falls short of that typically required to fit models to the spread of infection. During the initial 
stages of the epidemic, many countries were slow to recognise the spread of infection 
within poultry and many outbreaks are thought to have gone unreported (Nguyen 2005; 
Safman 2010). As a result, it seems unlikely that, using current techniques, modelling can be 
carried out to estimate the dynamics of this first wave of outbreaks. However, whilst 
countries such as Cambodia and Laos still really on informal reporting systems, in Vietnam 
and Thailand attempts at monitoring subsequent waves of H5N1 have proved more 
successful with the use of specifically developed reporting systems (The National Steering 
Committee for Avian Flu Prevention and Control 2005; Team 2006), recording dates of 
detection, locations of outbreaks and, often, other important information such as the 
species and number of poultry involved. Such surveillance data offer the best opportunity 
yet to model and quantify the transmission dynamics of waves of H5N1 in Southeast Asia.  
However, in order to do so a number of important challenges remain. In particular, data are 
generally only collected at a sub-district level, which will generally represent multiple farms 
and neighbourhoods. At this resolution the time it takes for outbreaks to become reported 
following the introduction of infection into a sub-district is likely to be subject to a high 
degree of variability, especially when a large proportion of households own poultry. 
Unfortunately, reliable estimates of this variability do not exist.  
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2.8 Review of research questions 
As stated in the Chapter 1, the overall aim of this thesis is to develop methods in order to 
quantify key transmission parameters for the spread of H5N1 in Southeast Asia. The first 
two research questions, concerned with modelling the spread of outbreaks of H5N1 in 
Vietnam and Thailand, are aimed towards assessing the extent to which transmission 
models can be fitted to routine outbreak report data in the region in order to assess the 
transmissibility of infection and effectiveness of control. One of the key challenges to be 
overcome in order to achieve this is likely to be the uncertainty associated with incomplete 
observation of the epidemic process. 
The quality of data available for outbreak waves in Vietnam and Thailand is likely to be 
unrepresentative of the rest of the region as other countries rely upon more informal 
surveillance and reporting infrastructure. In view of this, the remainder of the work for this 
thesis is focussed upon analysing the spread of infection on a much smaller scale, namely, 
investigating the extent to which observations of the final size of an outbreak at the flock 
level can be used to quantify the transmissibility of infection and the effect of individual 
control measures. 
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Chapter 3 Quantifying the effects of mass H5N1 
vaccination in North Vietnam  
3.1 Introduction 
In any epidemic setting it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of existing policies 
designed to mitigate and prevent the spread of outbreaks in comparison to past control 
strategies and to assess the potential impact of proposed interventions in order to ensure 
that the optimal level of disease protection is being achieved given the available resources. 
This is particularly the case in Vietnam where, in the first year alone, following its 
implementation in mid 2005, 34.6 Billion VND (≈30.4 million USD) were invested in pursuing 
a mass vaccination campaign aimed at eliminating outbreaks of HPAI (Dang Ky 2005). During 
the years prior to the adoption of vaccination, attempts to control the spread of avian 
influenza through mass “stamping-out” campaigns involved the destruction of millions of 
poultry and negatively affected the livelihoods of many smallholders without preventing the 
occurrence of major waves of outbreaks or halting the accumulation of human cases. 
Between late 2005 and late 2006, following the implementation of mass vaccination 
alongside more reactive measures such as the culling of infected flocks and the use of ring 
vaccination (the process of vaccinating uninfected poultry within 5km of a suspected 
outbreak), Vietnam experienced a year during which no outbreaks in poultry or human 
cases were reported. However, in 2007, northern Vietnam experienced another prolonged 
wave of outbreaks and to date sporadic outbreaks and human cases continue to be 
reported (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2006; Magalhaes, Pfeiffer et al. 
2010).   
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Both the inactivated H5N2 vaccine used to vaccinate chickens and the recombinant H5N1 
vaccine used to vaccinate ducks during this campaign have been found to be efficacious in a 
laboratory setting (Tian, Zhang et al. 2005; van der Goot, van Boven et al. 2008; Peyre, 
Fusheng et al. 2009). They have also been shown to be effective within the context of field 
trials (Ellis, Sims et al. 2006; Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009) including a trial of both vaccines in 
two test provinces in Vietnam (To, Bui et al. 2007). 
However, whilst field trials do provide a more reliable indication as to whether an 
intervention is likely to be effective at a population level, there are always factors such as 
logistic considerations which make the outcome of implementing any intervention on a 
much larger scale unpredictable.  The protective effect of vaccination is determined by the 
proportion of birds vaccinated and the degree of protection this vaccination then confers. 
The extensive nature of poultry production in Vietnam and the rapid turnover of poultry 
(Sims 2007), relative to other livestock such as swine or cows, are the main issues faced 
when attempting to ensure the former is sufficiently high. The latter can be subject to a 
degree of heterogeneity due to problems associated with acquiring the technology and 
resources needed to maintain an adequate “cold chain” of vaccine delivery plus the 
requirement that each bird has to be vaccinated twice, since one dose is not sufficient to 
ensure susceptibility and transmissibility are adequately diminished (van der Goot, van 
Boven et al. 2007; Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009).  
Sero-monitoring of over 576 flocks, with samples taken from three districts in each 
province, carried out immediately following the first round of two doses of vaccination 
estimated that the campaign had achieved adequate protection in around 50% of all flocks 
(Taylor and Dung 2007) which, based upon the disease-free year which occurred soon after, 
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appeared temporarily sufficient to prevent the spread of infection. In an attempt to 
maintain control the vaccination campaign was repeated at six month intervals. However 
the level of overall protection which had been achieved immediately before and during the 
wave of outbreaks which occurred in 2007 is not known.   
The length of time during which a typical outbreak remains infectious is another key 
determinant as to whether infection can spread. The effect of vaccination on this infectious 
period at the commune-level (the resolution at which outbreak data is routinely collected in 
Vietnam) has not been assessed and any resultant impact upon the spread of infection is, 
therefore, also unknown. On one hand, reducing the number of susceptible birds and flocks 
within a commune is likely to limit the ability for infection to circulate within the commune, 
reducing the time the outbreak would remain infectious in the absence of additional control 
measures. On the other, if infection can spread undetected, either as a result of 
asymptomatic infection in vaccinated poultry or by virtue of reduced flock or commune 
mortality, vaccination may result in communes transmitting infection for an extended 
duration relative to the time it would take to detect infection in immunologically naïve 
poultry. 
Quantifying the parameters which define the spread of infection in both time and space 
around this change in policy may help to evaluate such key aspects of disease control. 
Modelling separate waves of infection is likely to provide valuable information about 
changes in the dynamics of infection and the underlying susceptibility of the population 
between these waves. From this, an attempt can be made to assess the efficacy of the 
respective interventions implemented during each wave and the risk posed by similar 
outbreaks in the future.  Though more complicated to formulate, when modelling the 
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spread of disease within livestock, spatially explicit models are often used in order to 
incorporate the clustering of cases which occur due to the interdependence of infection 
events (Keeling 2005; Riley 2007). In the case of H5N1 in Vietnam outbreaks tend to cluster 
around two main foci: the Red River delta in the North and the Mekong Delta in the South 
(Pfeiffer, Minh et al. 2007), with smaller clusters of outbreak in the central and northern 
border region.  
A concept featuring heavily in recent disease transmission models in livestock is that of the 
spatial transmission kernel, a set of parameters which provides an estimate of the risk of 
disease transmission as a function of distance from a potential infector (Keeling, Woolhouse 
et al. 2001; Haydon, Chase-Topping et al. 2003; Diggle 2006; Meuwissen, Van Boven et al. 
2006; Boender, Nodelijk et al. 2008). Monitoring how this kernel varies between outbreak 
waves will also provide an indication as to how the potential for infection to spread is 
changing as a consequence of interventions, as well as other biological and social factors, 
and allows the identification of areas at high risk of a major outbreak. 
Until recently such models relied upon the full observation of all temporal aspects of an 
outbreak wave, including the times at which infection events occur and the times at which 
they are removed. However, as is the case in many epidemic settings, such data are not 
available for commune-level outbreaks occurring in Vietnam, making inference regarding 
the transmissibility of infection more challenging. Working within a Bayesian framework, 
which takes into account the uncertainty with regards the missing dates of infection, offers 
the potential to simultaneously fit the spatial infectivity of infection and the time taken for 
outbreaks to be officially reported. This provides the opportunity to assess both 
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interventions aimed at reducing infectiousness and susceptibility and those aimed towards 
improving the detection of infection. 
This chapter introduces a model which uses a spatial kernel to represent the spread of 
infection between communes in Vietnam and then describes a specially tailored MCMC 
algorithm designed to fit the model to commune-level outbreak reports in the absence of 
data on the initial date of infection. This fitting procedure is first validated with simulated 
data and then fitted to the existing outbreak report data for northern Vietnam between 
2004 and 2008, with waves of infection occurring before, during and after the 
implementation of vaccination in order to obtain parameter estimates of the transmissibility 
and commune-level infectious period for each wave. Then, by calculating the local 
reproductive number of each commune, risk maps of areas at high risk of sustaining 
infection were estimated and compared in order to provide an indication of the relative 
effects of control measures during each wave and the incremental progress required to 
prevent transmission. Using the imputed times at which each outbreak became infectious, 
and the other model parameters, the possible chains of infection (the “epidemic tree”) 
leading to each set of outbreaks reports were also explored. This allows estimation of how 
the effective reproduction number varied during each wave, providing an indication of how 
effectively the outbreak was being controlled as each epidemic progressed, and the 
distances over which infection was transmitted.  
Furthermore, by developing an algorithm which prunes branches of the epidemic tree 
according to a given infection-to-report distribution, it was also possible to investigate the 
extent to which improved detection of outbreaks could improve the effectiveness of the 
vaccination campaign. 
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3.2 Materials and Methods 
3.2.1 Description of available outbreak data 
Data on the outbreaks of H5N1 (Figure 3-1) in Vietnam between March 2004 and February 
2008 were obtained from the Vietnam government’s Department of Animal Health’s (DAH) 
disease reporting. The data were processed by the sub-Departments of Animal Health for 
each of 64 provinces and combined into a single database by the Epidemiology Division of 
the Department of Animal Health in Hanoi, Vietnam.  
 
Figure 3-1| Spatial distribution of outbreaks in Viet Nam between November 2004 and February 
2007. 
 
The database contains the smallest administrative unit (hereafter referred to as a commune 
although this can also refer to a town or ward) within which the outbreak occurred, the date 
on which the outbreak was reported and the species of bird, which include chickens, 
domestic ducks, Muscovy ducks and quails, involved in each outbreak.  
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Spatial data were obtained in the form of a shapefile of the geographical boundaries of each 
of the 10811 communes in Vietnam, as well as data on the population of each commune 
according to the 1998 LandScan Global Population Database . This database uses spatial 
data on administrative boundaries, land cover and other factors such as roads and elevation 
in order to estimate 1998 commune-specific population data using population estimates 
from the US Bureau of Census, which, in turn, forms annual sub-national estimates based 
upon the most recent Vietnamese population census. Annual poultry numbers at a 
provincial level resolution were obtained from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
website (GSO-Vietnamese General Statistics Office 2007). 
3.2.3 Model description 
Each commune  was assigned a location , , a date of first infection   and a date of 
removal  from the outbreak wave as a result of control measures. Vectors associated with 
these times  	 , … ,  ! and  	 , … ,  ! were also defined, with " the total number 
of communes in the dataset (including those that never become infected). For ease of 
notation, communes which did not report an outbreak during any of the wave were 
assigned values for   and  arbitrarily larger than the time of the last reported outbreak. 
Communes were also assigned a poultry population #.  
It has been shown that infectivity and susceptibility varies between domestic ducks and 
chickens (Hulse-Post, Sturm-Ramirez et al. 2005). It is also likely that the probability of 
transmission will also vary when outbreaks involve other species of poultry. However, for a 
significant proportion of outbreaks, the species in which disease was reported is not 
available. Moreover, with the data available it is impossible to distinguish between diseased 
and culled poultry and to estimate the denominator susceptible population of each species 
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within a commune. In view of this infectivity is parameterised using a single ‘black box’ per-
capita transmission intensity parameter $. 
Spatial heterogeneity in the transmissibility of infection was incorporated into the model 
using a spatial transmission kernel which describes how the risk of transmission between an 
infectious and susceptible commune scales with distance. This had the functional form: 
 %&'() 	 1 * '( +,  3.1 
 
where '(  is the distance between commune  and commune - and the power α  and offset 
ρ are parameters to be estimated. Normalising this function by all potential transmission 
distances transforms it into a probability distribution whereby changes in either of the 
kernel parameters only affect the relative probability of transmission over varying distances 
and not the overall rate of transmission. Moreover, disentangling the baseline transmission 
rate and the effect of distance on transmission in this way is likely to improve the 
identifiability of these parameters when the model is fitted to the data. Ideally, such 
normalisation should be carried out thus: 
 %.&'() 	 %&'()/ %0 '. 3.2 
However, this integral is only proper when 1  2. Otherwise, it is necessary to approximate 
the normalisation constant using a finite upper bound which is larger than the maximum 
distance between any two points in the dataset. 
From this the instantaneous risk of that commune  is infected at time 2 can be defined: 
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32 	 4 $##(%&'()5 susceptible and - infectious at  2 D,E(
 
3.3 
where  " is  the number of communes in the dataset and 5.  is the indicator function. 
If the time of infection and the time of removal from the outbreak wave of each commune 
are known, and assuming constant infectivity following an incubation period of a day 
(Shortridge, Zhou et al. 1998) until the day of removal, the wave of outbreaks can then be 
modelled as a space-time survival point process, where communes avoid infection until they 
are infected at a rate which depends upon the temporal and spatial distribution of other 
outbreaks. Such models have applications in ecology and geography as well as epidemiology 
(Cressie 1991; Rathbun and Cressie 1994). 
Modelling the outbreak wave this way, using the instantaneous risk of transmission above, 
given the history of the wave and the associated accumulated exposure to infection 
Λ2 	 / 3GG	2G	0 'G, the probability that a commune escapes infection until time 2 is: 
 I2 	 exp&KΛ2) 3.4 
Although the above formulation assumes continuous time, in reality the reporting of 
outbreaks occur on a daily basis. Therefore, in practice, each wave was fitted as a discrete 
approximation of the transmission process with a time-step size of a day. As a result, 
transmissibility was assumed to remain constant throughout each day, with communes 
becoming infectious on the day following infection. As a result, if the commune remains 
susceptible to infection by day 2,  the probability it becomes infected on this day is 
 L2 	 1 K exp&K32). 3.5 
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3.2.2 Data assumptions 
Based upon experimental data on the pathology of H5N1 infection in birds (Shortridge, Zhou 
et al. 1998; Bouma, Claassen et al. 2009), communes were assumed to become infectious on 
the day following infection and, based upon official advice distributed to Vietnamese 
paraveterinary professionals, an infected commune was assumed to be removed from the 
outbreak on the day following its reporting (FAO 2005).  
In an attempt to capture backyard transmission, and in the absence of more precise data, 
this population is calculated as the province-level poultry population multiplied by the 
proportion of the province-level human population residing within the commune. This then 
represents the assumption that, whilst the concentration of poultry with respect to human 
population differs between provinces (this is especially likely when comparing the 
predominantly rural provinces in the North with city provinces such as Ha Noi province), this 
concentration is uniform between communes within the province. 
The analysis of spread of outbreaks was restricted to those occurring in the north of 
Vietnam, with the 18° latitude line defined as a cut-off point. This was chosen in an attempt 
to capture the spread of infection around the Red River Delta outbreak focus whilst easing 
the computational demands of the model and reducing the problems associated with a 
estimating the kernel between communes close to the east coast of Vietnam where 
travelling between communes in a straight line would involve a journey by sea. Moreover,  
this cut-off ensured that  all the virus isolates used in phylogenetic analyses of the outbreaks 
during 2007 (Nguyen, Nguyen et al. 2008), where the virus in the North was identified as a 
different clade to that in the South, were assigned to the correct foci. 
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Figure 3-2| Spatial and temporal distribution of outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry in northern Viet Nam 
Dec 2004-Feb 2008. 
Figure shows, (a), Commune-level spatial distribution of reported outbreaks, (b), Weekly incidence of outbreak 
reports in northern Viet Nam. (As sufficiently accurate data on the timing and location of outbreaks during the 
first wave is not available, figure shows data from the second wave onwards). 
. 
Three outbreak waves in Northern Vietnam were defined (Figure 3-2). The first, which 
involved 129 communes, began in December 2004 and lasted for 84 days, this was followed 
by the second taking place in late 2005, lasting 59 days and affecting 271 communes and a 
third wave taking place in mid-2007, lasting for 126 days and affecting 152 communes (from 
this point onwards these will be referred to, respectively, as 2004/5, 2005 and 2007 waves). 
The beginning and end of each wave were defined, respectively, as the closest period of at 
least 21 days where no outbreaks were reported before the first and after the last reported 
outbreak. 
Commune locations were calculated as the centroid of the polygon representing the area of 
the commune.  A small proportion of infected communes reported more than one outbreak 
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during the course of a single wave. A threshold period of 14 days was defined, loosely based 
upon the first wave of outbreaks during which a maximum time an outbreak could go 
undetected of 21 days was identified (Nguyen 2005). Any two outbreaks which occurred 
within this period of time within the same commune were classed as the same event and 
the commune was assumed to have remained infectious throughout. If a commune was 
reported as having two outbreaks more than 14 days apart, and no other outbreaks were 
reported in the interim, then the possibility that the latter outbreak had an external source 
was allowed and the locations of both the earlier and latter outbreak, rather than being 
calculated as the centroid, were randomly simulated within the commune affected.  
3.2.4 Bayesian framework for inference of model parameters 
If the times of infection and removal were observed then conducting likelihood-based 
inference about the transmission kernel parameters would be relatively straightforward as it 
would be possible to compute the overall likelihood of the epidemic process. This would 
consist of the product of the likelihood that all of the communes which never become 
infected avoid infection on any of the M days during which the outbreak wave takes place, 
the likelihood that infected communes escape infection until the day they are infected and 
the likelihood that they become infected on that day: 
N, |P 	 Q RIM&+STUVW)&I LX K ; Z)STUVW[ D  3.6 
 
here \ is an indicator function,X2; Z is an assumed parametric distribution of the 
duration of time between a commune first becoming infected and the date an outbreak is 
reported (the contribution of which to the likelihood, if infection and removal times were 
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observed, would  be a constant multiplier) and P denotes the set of kernel and infection 
time distribution parameters. From this maximum likelihood estimates of the kernel 
parameters can be obtained (Boender, Hagenaars et al. 2007) or the posterior distribution 
of the parameters can be sampled using various methods, including standard MCMC 
techniques (O'Neill 2002; Chis Ster and Ferguson 2007). 
In Vietnam, it is possible to make rough estimates of the date an outbreak is removed from 
the day of report and other information such as official control policies and guidelines (FAO 
2006). If the infection time of a commune was observed it would also be possible to make 
an estimate of the time a commune becomes infectious from experimental data (Shortridge, 
Zhou et al. 1998; Bouma, Claassen et al. 2009). However, the time between the infection of 
a commune and the report of an outbreak is likely to vary widely between each outbreak 
and depend upon a multitude of factors including the type of farm involved, the size of the 
flock, the species of bird involved, the background mortality previously experienced, the 
willingness to report disease and the level of infection in the vicinity of the infected 
premises. 
Without observing these infection times, in order to write down the fully conditional 
likelihood it would be necessary to integrate the above likelihood with respect to the vector 
of times of infection:                                                    
 N|P 	 ] N, |P'^ . 3.7 
This likelihood has very high dimensionality and would be very computationally intensive to 
work with.  
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To overcome this problem a data augmentation approach was used, with unobserved 
infection times treated as extra model parameters (O'Neill and Roberts 1999; Streftaris and 
Gibson 2004; Chis Ster, Singh et al. 2008). Conditioning on the existence of a unique first 
infection  and using Bayes theorem (noting that N, , P| 	 N, |P, NP 	
NP, |, N), assuming that all outbreaks are eventually reported, the appropriate 
joint posterior distribution of the model and infection time parameters is: 
 NP, |,  	 N, |P, NPN _ N, |P, NP 3.8 
Here N does not depend upon the unknown parameters and so can be treated as a 
constant. 
Table 3-1| Prior distributions of the model parameters 
Parameter Description Prior distribution 
` Transmission intensity 0,10000 
a Spatial kernel offset 0,10000 
b Spatial kernel power 0,10000 
c Shape of infection to report distribution 0,10000 
d Shape of infection to report distribution 0,10000 
e Timing of first infection f K 30,  K 1h 
 
The duration between communes becoming infected and the report of an outbreak within a 
commune were assumed to follow a Gamma distribution and the parameters of this 
distribution, as well as the infectivity and spatial kernel and model parameters, were given 
uniform bounded prior distributions (Table 3-1), whilst the timing of the first infection  
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was given a uniform prior bounded in the interval [ K 30,  K 1], where  is the day this 
outbreak was reported.  
3.2.5 An MCMC algorithm to fit the model to the data 
One way of integrating over such high dimensional probability distributions is then to use 
MCMC methods. This involves designing a Markov chain which converges to the required 
distribution, which can then be approximated through Monte Carlo integration (Gilks, 
Richardson S et al. 1996). The following describes one such algorithm which provides 
samples of the posterior distribution of model parameters described above:  
For ease of notation  will be used to denote the set of infection times at any given stage of 
the Markov chain and i j  to denote the set of imputed infection times for the 
communes in which outbreaks were reported, initial values for all  k l, were calculated 
according to the duration between infection to report which was drawn from a uniform 
proposal distribution bounded between 1 and 30 days. Setting  	 min  k i, these 
were repeatedly sampled until a set of infection times was obtained which satisfied the 
criteria of a unique time of first infection  &∑ 5 	 !TUk^i 	 1) and that, on the day 
each other outbreak was infected, there was at least one ongoing, infectious outbreak: 
 ∑ 5&(  ). 5&( o ) (D  0, for all  k i/, 3.9 
Beginning with the obtained starting set of imputed infection times, the posterior 
distributions of the model parameters were then sampled by proceeding according to the 
following two-step algorithm:  
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(1). For each of the kernel and time to report parameters, Pr P, a new parameter value 
P. is drawn on a log-scale from a Normal distribution centred on the logarithm of 
the existing parameter: 
 log P. ~"log P , σv. 3.10 
Denoting the set of current values of all the remaining model parameters P+, the 
proposed value is then accepted with probability 
 min wN, |P., P+N, |P . P
.
P , 1x. 3.11 
The variance of  the proposal distribution of each parameter,  σv, was calibrated by 
assessing the ratio of proposed moves of the parameter which are accepted so as to 
achieve good MCMC mixing (ideally as close to the ‘golden’ acceptance ratio of 23% 
(Roberts, Gelman et al. 1997) but a ratio of 10-35% was judged to represent 
adequate mixing). 
(2). The duration between infection and report, and thus the infection time itself, of 
individual outbreaks are updated using a Metropolis-Hastings independence sampler 
(Tierney 1994) with the same proposal distribution of the time between infection 
and report as those used to obtain the starting set of infection times. Using  now to 
denote the set of current infection times, the current infection time (  of a randomly 
selected commune - is replaced with the proposed infection time (. with probability 
 min wN& K (! * (.!, yP)N, |P , 1x 3.12 
where  K (! * (.! denotes the set of infection times with the proposed 
replacing the current infection time. In order to achieve faster convergence it is 
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desirable to update more than one infection time during this step (updating 10% of 
infection times appears to be a reasonably good rule of thumb). Evaluating the entire 
likelihood for each of these proposed times results in the algorithm becoming 
computationally intensive. In view of this, the sampler was designed to calculate the 
acceptance probability by comparing the existing and proposed likelihood in the 
intervalzmin&( , (.) , max&( , (.){, the only section of the likelihood affected by the 
proposed move.  
Both steps are repeated for a ‘burn in’ period of 20000 moves, determined by examining 
parameter traces from different starting parameter values, at which point the MCMC is 
deemed to have converged to its stationary distribution and subsequent moves are treated 
as samples of the posterior distribution of each of the parameters. The chain is then run 
until its stopping time 250000 moves later, which was assessed to be suitable by checking 
that the Monte Carlo standard error of each of the five main parameters was less than 5% of 
its posterior standard deviation and by determining that the posterior distribution was 
invariant to different starting values (see Figure3-3).  
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Figure 3-3| Sample MCMC output.  
Plots show the log likelihood and power kernel parameter b traces of the 2007 outbreak data under the 
baseline model assumption for two sets of initial parameter values: b 	 |, d 	 |, ` 	 |+},  K e~~,  
(blue lines) and b 	 |, d 	 |, ` 	 |+|,  K e~~, |. 
  
3.2.5 Fitting the model to simulated datasets 
To assess the ability of the fitting procedure to estimate transmission parameters 
accurately, outbreaks of HPAI were simulated over the spatial distribution of communes in 
Vietnam. This was done by seeding an outbreak within a commune in the high-risk Red River 
Delta region with an infectious period drawn from a predefined Gamma distribution 
(communes were assumed to become infectious the day following infection and to have 
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been reported the day before removal thus the infectious period and the duration between 
infection and report are of equal length).  Secondary infections were then selected with an 
infection probability as described in the model, calculated using a preselected set of 
parameter values and commune level poultry populations calculated using annual province-
level poultry data from 2005. Infectious periods for these communes were drawn from the 
same gamma distribution as before. This procedure was repeated at each time-step, 
representing a day of the outbreak wave, and infected communes were removed from the 
dataset at the end of their infectious periods. The simulation was continued until no 
infectious communes remained. Once simulated datasets had been obtained the fitting 
procedure was applied, using only the spatial location and date of report of each outbreak 
(entered as the day before the outbreak was removed). 
3.2.6 Quantifying the change in infectivity between waves 
In order to obtain insight as to the adequacy of the different control measures implemented 
during each of the three waves it is important to obtain estimates of the relative ease with 
which infection spread between communes. To begin with, this was assessed by calculating 
the difference between the posterior distributions of the transmissibility of infection at 
varying distances between each wave, according to the joint posterior distributions of the 
infectivity and kernel parameters obtained from fitting each wave independently. Then, in 
order to take into the fact that, in terms of replicating the spatial pattern of outbreaks 
during each wave, estimates of transmissibility at some distances may be more important 
than others, an overall estimate of the relative transmissibility of infection between two 
waves was calculated by fitting both waves simultaneously and constraining the changes in 
the spatial kernel for the latter wave to match the changes occurring as a result of fitting the 
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spatial kernel to the former wave.  Denoting the respective estimates of $ in each likelihood 
as $and $( , the protective effect of the control policies applied during wave - compared to 
those during wave  can then be calculated using the proportional change in infectivity 
occurring during the wave: 
  ( 	  $($ . 3.13 
It should, however, be noted that this estimate does not directly take into account 
differences between the individual fitted kernels of the two waves in the same way as fitting 
an unconstrained kernel, therefore the two methods were compared to assess the extent to 
which the two methods agree about the change in transmissibility over distances at which 
transmission was estimated to occur, as calculated by reconstructing the epidemic tree 
(subsection 3.2.8). 
3.2.7 Calculating risk maps 
The local reproduction number of a commune estimated from an outbreak wave is defined 
as the number of secondary infections which could have been expected to occur had the 
first outbreak of the wave occurred in that particular commune, assuming that all other 
communes are susceptible to infection. Within a large population, where it can be assumed 
there are no local saturation effects caused by tertiary infection, this can be calculated by 
summing the probabilities that a given commune infects all other communes to produce the 
expected number of secondary infections. It should be noted that in this analysis, due to the 
spatial dependence between infection events, such an assumption is not valid. However, 
summing such probabilities has become an accepted measure of assessing regions most at 
risk of sustained transmission (Ferguson, Donnelly et al. 2001; Boender, Hagenaars et al. 
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2007; Truscott, Garske et al. 2007) and, for the sake of simplicity, values calculated in this 
manner will still be referred to as local reproduction numbers. When the infectivity kernel 
and distribution of the infectious period M are available, such estimates can be obtained 
analytically (Boender, Hagenaars et al. 2007) using the expression: 
 
                   	  4 L&'()U  	 41 K z+&U)W{ (E       	 4 R1 K W K%&'()[(E
	 4 1 K   * %'(
(E . 
3.14 
Here L&'() is the probability that transmission occurs between an infectious and 
susceptible commune '(km apart and the infectious period is assumed to take the form of 
a Gamma distribution, M~Γ, , with W the moment generating function of this 
distribution.  
Thus, using the posterior distribution of the model parameters it is possible to obtain the 
posterior distribution of each commune-level local reproduction number. Then, plotting 
these on a map, it is possible to highlight geographical areas which are most at risk of 
experiencing sustained inter-commune transmission in the event of an outbreak.  
Another easily obtainable statistic which can illustrate how changes in the spatial 
transmission kernel translate to the spatial distribution of risk within communes is the 
expected number of infections which would occur on the first day of an outbreak, denoted 
Λ: 
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  Λ 	 4 z1 K exp &K$##(%'(){ (D,(E . 3.15 
Although these maps only provide information about the second generation of outbreaks 
and not the eventual size or spread of the outbreak wave, which is determined by the 
extent to which an outbreak accesses these spatial pockets of high risk communes, 
comparing risk maps may provide an indication as to how likely it was that sustained 
onward spread of any size occurred. Where risk maps are being used to estimate the effects 
of control policies it is necessary to standardise the risk maps by using the same 
denominator poultry population for the each set of parameter posterior distributions. 
3.2.8 Reconstructing the epidemic tree 
If the times at which each commune became infected and the duration they remained 
infectious were observed the effective local reproduction number and the expected 
distance over which infection was transmitted could by estimated by reconstructing the 
epidemic tree (Haydon, Chase-Topping et al. 2003). Conditional on such data, the 
probability that commune  is infected by - is then 
 ( 	 $##(%&'()5- infectious on day  infected ∑ $##%' D 5% infectious on day  infected . 3.16 
However, when the times of infection are not available, a sufficiently large number of 
samples of ( have to be drawn at regular intervals during the MCMC.  The probability that 
 infects - is then estimated by: 
 (. 	  3.17 
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where  is the posterior mean of ( estimated by calculating the mean of the obtained 
samples. 
From this the expected distance   of an infected commune  from its parent can then be 
defined as 
 
  	 4 (.(k '( . 3.18 
The effective local reproduction number, ., of any outbreak commune   (here defined as 
the number of secondary infections arising from a given commune when it is infected during 
the wave) can also be calculated by summing the infection probabilities between the 
commune and all other outbreak communes which were infected during its infectious 
period: 
 
. 	 4 (.(k . 3.19 
Monitoring how the average of these local effective reproductive numbers varies during a 
wave of outbreaks provides an indication of the extent to which transmission is being 
effectively contained due to factors such as changes in the application of control measures, 
the depletion of susceptible flocks and the extent to which a wave stochastically infects 
areas at high risk of sustained transmission (Lipsitch, Cohen et al. 2003; Wallinga and Teunis 
2004; Cauchemez, Bhattarai et al. 2011). During any wave, if the average local effective 
reproduction number of outbreak communes remains below unity for a sufficiently long 
period of time the wave will come to an end. 
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3.2.9 Evaluating the effects of more rapid detection and culling 
Once the epidemic process has been reconstructed, the effect of detecting and removing an 
outbreak at an earlier time-point can be assessed. First a sample epidemic tree is drawn by 
assigning a source of infection for each outbreak probabilistically from the list of communes 
which were infectious on the day the outbreak commune was first infected. From this, 
secondary infections which arose between the “real-life” removal time of an outbreak and a 
putative earlier removal time, occurring as a result of improved surveillance, are identified, 
according to the assumed impact of this surveillance. Then, by pruning clades of outbreaks 
attributed to these secondary infections, where a clade is defined to consist of all future 
generations of outbreaks arising from an individual infection, the epidemic tree which 
would have occurred as a result of the earlier removal time is obtained, although it should 
be noted that this makes the assumption that pruned outbreaks would not have been 
infected from alternative sources at a latter stage of the wave.  Sampling epidemic trees 
repeatedly (100000 draws in this analysis) provides an estimate of the effects of the earlier 
detection for a given set of parameters and infection times and, in turn, repeating this for 
the sets of infection times and model parameters at regular intervals during the MCMC 
provides an estimate of the posterior distribution of the impact of this earlier detection. 
This approach was also used to estimate the size and duration of the wave which would 
have occurred in 2007 had the rate of detection been maintained to that estimated for 
either of the earlier waves in my analysis.  At regular intervals during the MCMC the 
cumulative distribution function of the time to report distribution fitted to the 2007 wave, 
the parameters of which are here denoted Z, was evaluated at  K , the individual 
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imputed time to report, for each outbreak commune. The time the outbreak would have 
been detected during a previous wave was then calculated as the . which satisfies 
 NM   K |Z 	 NM  . K |Z.,  3.20 
where Z. is a randomly drawn sample from the posterior distribution of the infection-to-
report distribution of the earlier wave. The epidemic tree was then pruned according to this 
new set of removal times. This was repeated 100000 times at each interval during the 
MCMC, randomly sampling a different Z. each time. 
3.2.10 Hypothesis testing using the Bayes Factor 
In this chapter (and at various points throughout the thesis), Bayes Factor (BFs) are used to 
judge the evidence for or against a given hypothesis , relative to that of an alternative 
hypothesis v, given the data . This is defined as  
 BF 	 N|NvNv|N, 3.21 
which is equivalent to the ratio of the posterior odds of  to its prior odds. The extent to 
which this provides evidence in favour of  is then judged according to the subjective scale 
developed by Jeffreys, namely, if BF varies between 1 and 3, the evidence for a given 
hypothesis is poor; if it is between 3 and 10, this evidence is substantial; if it is between 10 
and 30, it is strong; if it is between 30 and 100, it is very strong; and if it is above 100 it is 
decisive (Jeffreys 1961). When such an approach is used to test for the level of evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that the value of a parameter for a given model fitted to one 
dataset is greater than the equivalent parameter from the same model fitted to another 
dataset, provided the prior distributions of the two sets of model parameters are specified 
 to be equal, the BF will be 
hypothesis are even.   
3.3.1 Simulation Study
50 datasets were generated using the transmission ke
by the black lines in Figure 3-
20 communes were selected. 
within the fitted 95% credible interval and t
recaptured the simulated kernel and infection
Figure 3-4| Simulation study results. 
Parameters used during simulation of outbreaks waves (black line), estimates from the posterior mean of the 
model parameters estimated from fitting the model to each simulated wave (dashed grey lines) and
mean of each of these estimates (dashed red line) for 
estimated spatial kernel multiplied by the fitted value of 
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For all the simulations the simulated parameter values fell 
he overall mean values from all the fits 
-to-report distribution well (
 
(a), infectiousness over space as described by the 
 and (b), the commune-level infectious period
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3.3.2 Fitting the model to outbreaks in northern Vietnam 
The Markov chains used in fitting the model converged adequately for all three outbreak 
waves, providing posterior distributions of both the spatial transmissibility and infectious 
period parameters (Table 3-1, Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6). 
Table 3-1| Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals for the baseline model fitted to each of the 
three outbreak waves. 
Model Parameters Posterior mean (95% C.I.) 
Parameter Description 2004/5 2005 2007 
Spatial Transmissibility 
` . | Intensity 3.96 (0.45-14.5) 1.85 (0.75-4.88) 2.06 (0.57-6.02) 
a Offset 4.49 (0.36-13.68) 1.45 (0.22-3.42) 0.77 (0.04-2.21) 
b Power 2.14 (1.57-3.07) 2.02 (1.75-2.35) 1.81 (1.60-2.08) 
Duration between infection and report 
φ Shape 1.81 (1.24-2.75) 2.33 (1.71-3.21) 2.45 (1.49-4.54) 
γ  Scale 3.37 (2.04-5.01) 2.09 (1.33-3.12) 3.98 (2.11-6.15) 
φγ Mean 5.87 (4.59-7.40) 4.74 (3.84-5.91) 9.10 (7.29-11.21) 
2φγ  Variance 20.04 (10.25-34.82) 10.09 (5.29-17.80) 36.29 (18.69-60.14) 
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Figure 3-5| Posterior probability density plots of the fitted infectivity, spatial kernel and infection–
to-report distribution model parameters for each of the three waves. 
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Figure 3-6| Bivariate plots of the joint posterior distributions of the fitted spatial kernel and 
infectivity parameters for each of the three waves. 
 
The fitted spatial kernel varied little between the waves occurring before and during the 
first round of the vaccination campaign. However, the posterior mean per-bird probability 
of transmission during the 2007 wave appears to have lowered, especially over long-range 
distances (Figure 3-7(b)). As a result the expected daily number of secondary outbreaks 
2004/5 2005 2007
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generated by one infected commune was, in general, substantially reduced (Figure 3-7(a) 
and (c)), suggesting that, whilst a commune remained infectious, transmission would take 
place at much slower rate compared to the previous two waves. 
 
Figure 3-7| Between-commune infectivity.  
(a), Risk map of the expected daily number of secondary infections arising from infected commune during each 
of the three waves, under the assumption all other communes remain susceptible. (b), Plot of how the daily 
probability of between-commune transmission scales with distance, (c), Histogram of commune-specific daily 
rate of infection (only those over 0.5 plotted), (d), Relative changes in per-capita infectivity parameter 
between waves with associated 95% credible intervals. 
 
Estimates of the change in infectivity occurring between each wave appear to suggest, when 
either unconstrained or constrained spatial kernels are used, that infectivity did not change 
significantly between the 2004/5 and 2005 wave. However, relative to both these waves, 
over distances where the vast majority of transmission was estimated to occur, both 
estimates suggest that infectivity was substantially lower in 2007. When this change was 
fitted as a proportional reduction, there was decisive evidence (BF>100) for such a reduction 
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with a posterior mean reduction of 55% relative to that during the 2004/5 wave and of 48% 
relative to that during the 2005 wave (Figure 3-6(d)). Making the assumption that changes in 
infectivity are caused by vaccination and not influenced by other factors including changes 
in the effectiveness of other control measures such as bio-security or movement restriction, 
this can then be compared to the effects of a vaccination campaign achieving, respectively, 
45% and 52% uniform effective coverage (where effective coverage refers to the overall 
vaccination coverage multiplied by the protective efficacy of the vaccine). 
 
Figure 3-8| Estimates of the difference in spatial transmissibility between waves, both when the 
kernel of the latter wave is unconstrained and when it is constrained to match that of the earlier 
wave. 
Solid black line shows how the posterior mean proportional difference in transmissibility varies with distance 
when the shape of the kernel is allowed to differ between waves, dotted lines show the associated 95% 
credible intervals, dashed line shows the posterior mean proportional difference when the kernel of the latter 
wave is constrained to match that of the earlier wave. Bars show the proportion of transmission events 
occurring over these distances as estimated by the reconstructed expected mean distance  ¡. 
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The posterior distribution of the infection-to-report parameters of the 2004/5 and 2005 
outbreaks provide substantial evidence for the hypothesis that there was a contraction in 
the mean infectious period between these two waves (Bayes factor (BF)=7.88), with a point 
estimate of a reduction from around 6 days to 5 days (Table 3-1). As a result despite the fact 
infection spread more rapidly in the initial stages, the wave was brought under control more 
rapidly than during the 2004/5 and 2007 waves (Figure 3-11(b)).  In contrast, relative to 
both previous waves, the average infectious period of an outbreak commune increased 
significantly during the 2007 wave (Table 3-1) to around 9 days, with some outbreak 
communes estimated to remain infectious for over 20 days (Figure 3-9(b)).  This pattern can 
also be seen when examining the posterior mean imputed infection-to-report of individual 
outbreaks, with an overall imputed mean of 5.8 days in 2004/5, 4.3 days in 2005 and 8.6 
days in 2007 (Figure 3-11(a)). 
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Figure 3-9| The infectious period and local reproductive numbers.  
Figure shows, (a), Spatial distribution of local reproductive numbers calculated analytically using the infectivity 
and infectious period estimates, (b), Estimate of probability (assumed gamma) distribution of the infectious 
period during each of the three waves,(c), Histogram of local reproductive numbers for the three waves (only 
those with values greater than 0.8 plotted). 
 
This reduction in the rate at which infection was reported during the 2007 wave relative to 
the previous two waves, when used to translate the daily rate of transmission into local 
reproduction numbers, highlights why, despite the coincident reduction in the daily 
transmission probability, a wave of outbreaks could be sustained, with the increased 
opportunity to spread infection making transmission likely in a similar number of communes 
as in the previous waves (Figure 3-9(c)). Once again, the majority of transmissibility focussed 
around the RRD region (Figure 3-9(a)). This also may explain why, despite the relatively low 
intensity of transmission during the early stages of the wave, the 2007 wave was more 
prolonged than the preceding waves. 
 Overall, accounting for changes in the distribution of poultry between the 2004/5 and 2007 
waves, there was an 11% reduction in the number of communes with esti
reproduction numbers above unity (
Figure 3-10| Comparing local reproductive numbers before and after vaccination. 
Map highlighting communes where the mean posterior estimate of R 
only in 2007, with poultry populations standardised to those caluclated for 2007. Map shows an 11% (191 
communes) reduction in number of communes with R>1 and a 14.1% (79 communes) reduction in those with 
R>2. 
 
Transmission was more localised during the wave which took place concurrently with the 
vaccination campaign, with the mean transmission distance contracting by 2.5km relative to 
the 36.8kms estimated for the 2004/5 wave and a much higher proportion of transmissio
occurring over less than 20km than in either other wave. Outbreaks were most spatially 
dispersed during the 2007 wave where the estimated mean transmission distance was 40km 
with the around 5% of outbreaks estimated to have occurred more than 150km from 
source of infection (Figure 3-11
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Figure 3-11| Reconstructing the epidemic tree. 
(a), Density of posterior mean imputed infection to report durations, (b) Temporal pattern of 
average local reproductive numbers (see equation (3.19)) throughout the three waves, (c), 
Proportion of transmissions occurring at different distances for each of the three waves. 
 
Treating each outbreak as the root of a separate sub-epidemic it was found that, had all 
outbreaks been identified and successfully removed within two weeks of the initial 
infection, and had all subsequent outbreaks within the clade avoided infection for the 
remainder of the wave, the expected eventual size of the wave would have been reduced by 
39% and the wave would have been eliminated 41% more quickly, with a 14% probability 
that the wave would have become extinct within the first 10 outbreaks. Moreover, if the 
rate of detection had been maintained to that estimated for the wave preceding mass 
vaccination, this probability rises to around 23%, with a 61% reduction in the size of the 
wave, and 42%, with an 76% reduction in the size of the wave, based upon the infection-to-
report distribution of the 2005 wave (Table 3-2).  
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Table 3-2| Impact upon the 2007 wave of truncating the infectious period according to a shorter 
distribution of the time between infection and report.  
Modified infectious 
period 
Mean number of 
outbreaks averted 
(% of wave) 
Mean reduction in 
length of wave  (% of 
wave) 
Probability of 
extinction within first 
10 outbreaks 
Truncated at 21 days 12.05 (7.6%) 17.72 days (14.0%) 0.8% 
Truncated at 14 days 60.62 (38.6%) 51.71 days (40.7%) 13.8% 
Truncated at 10 days 122.95 (78.3%) 86.02 days (67.7%) 49.9% 
2004/5 infectious period 104.88 (60.8%) 65.83 days (51.8%) 23.4% 
2005 infectious period 120.02 (76.4%) 83.24 days(65.5%) 42.6% 
 
3.4 Sensitivity analysis of the changes in dynamics post-
vaccination 
The underlying assumptions made by any model about an epidemic are likely to influence 
the quantitative estimates of the transmission dynamics of an epidemic. As a result it is 
always worth assessing the sensitivity of such estimates to as wide a range of assumptions 
as possible. Moreover, when these estimates suggest a particular qualitative conclusion it is 
important to ensure that such a conclusion is not simply an artefact of the modelled 
assumptions. Therefore, an assessment of the sensitivity of the finding that, following 
vaccination, infectivity had been reduced but that outbreaks during the 2007 wave were 
reported less quickly, to a number of the basic underlying modelling assumptions was 
carried out.  
3.4.1 24 hour duration between report and removal 
Thus far the modelled assumption was that outbreaks in all three of the waves are removed 
according to the guidelines distributed to veterinary paraprofessionals in the field (FAO 
2006). Thus, using a combination of movement restrictions, quarantine measures and the 
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immediate culling of flocks within which infection has been detected, an outbreak is 
removed from the wave successfully within 24 hours of the outbreak being reported. In 
reality, it is possible that it takes a longer time to achieve effective control in some, or even 
all, cases. The sensitivity of the model to this uncertainty was investigated by repeating the 
analysis with different report to cull durations. It was found that the estimated infection-to-
report duration was negatively correlated with time between report and removal. However, 
as Figure 3-12 illustrates, if the duration between report and removal remains constant 
across all three waves, our estimates still suggest that outbreaks were not detected as 
rapidly during the 2007 wave. 
 
Figure 3-12| Sensitivity analysis of the time between the report of an outbreak within a commune 
and the removal time of the outbreak.  
Estimated probability distribution of the duration between the beginning of an outbreak and the date it is 
reported (plotted values are the posterior mean parameter estimates) for the 2004/5 wave (red lines), 2005 
wave (blue lines) and 2007 wave (green lines) under the assumption that communes remain infectious for at a 
constant level for 1 day (solid lines), 3 days (dashed lines) and 8 days (dotted lines). 
 
Moreover, whilst the estimate of the reduction in per-capita infectivity following 
vaccination, obtained by once again fixing the kernel slope across all waves, is incrementally 
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muted as the duration between reporting and removal is increased across the three waves 
(arising from the disproportionate increase in the estimated infectious period of the two 
earlier waves relative to that in 2007 (Figure 3-12)), these estimates are still consistent with 
a decisive reduction in infectivity until the report-to-removal delay reaches approximately 
ten days (Table 3-3). 
Another plausible scenario tested was that, as a possible consequence of the intervention 
being more time-consuming to implement or due to the time needed for vaccine-induced 
immunity to be acquired (Peyre, Fusheng et al. 2009), outbreaks in 2007 took a longer time 
to be effectively controlled by ring vaccination in comparison to the mass culling campaigns 
during the 2004/5 and 2005 waves. However, it was found that even if outbreaks took over 
a week longer to control in 2007, the estimated mean detection time remained greater than 
during the previous two waves (Figure 3-12), whereas the reduction in infectivity, calculated 
similarly as before by holding the kernel slope fixed across each of the waves, became more 
pronounced (Table 3-3).  
Table 3-3| Sensitivity analysis of the assumed duration between the report and the removal of an 
outbreak. 
Time between report and 
removal during 2004/5 wave 
Time between report and 
removal during 2007 wave 
Relative infectivity 
(95% C.I.s) 
1 day 1 day 0.55 (0.37-0.8) 
1 day 6 days 0.41 (0.28-0.58) 
3 days 3 days 0.65 (0.45-0.91) 
3 days 6 days 0.58 (0.38-7.5) 
6 days 6 days 0.7 (0.53-0.96) 
11 days 11 days 0.82 (0.63-1.01) 
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3.4.2 Constant infectivity profile 
As an alternative to the assumption that the infectivity of a commune remained constant 
throughout the duration of the infectious period, a second scenario was explored whereby 
infectiousness increases monotonically until the outbreak is detected, growing rapidly 
during the early stages of infection but saturating quickly. For this the cumulative 
distribution function of an exponential distribution was used, with parameter ¢ 	 2.5 
calibrated so as to level off by the 10th day of the outbreak: 
  $2 K  _ 1 K exp £K 2 K ¢ ¤ 3.22 
Following the reporting of an outbreak the infectivity of the commune was then assumed to 
decay exponentially for the following week, with a 24 hour ‘half-life’. 
Fitting this infectivity curve to the outbreak data it was once again found that the model 
estimated that, for the average duration of infection of the earlier waves, infectivity was 
lower following vaccination but that this was offset by a longer infectious period (Figure 3-
13).  
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Figure 3-13| Modelling non-constant infectivity throughout the infectious period.  
Estimates of infectivity for the 2004/5 (red line), 2005 (blue line) and 2007 (green line) waves. Values shown 
correspond to an outbreak with wave specific mean infectious period and show the per-bird instantaneous 
probability of transmission to a susceptible commune 25km away (corresponding to the estimated median 
transmission distance calculated for the 2007 wave). 
 
  
3.4.3 Impact of unobserved outbreaks 
Applying the fitting procedure to a wave where some outbreaks remain unobserved and 
unreported throughout the duration of infection would result in connecting outbreaks 
which are further apart in both time and space. As a result, especially at a high level of 
unreported outbreaks, the fitting procedure is likely to overestimate the commune-level 
infectious period. As this factor is of particular concern following a vaccination campaign 
where ‘silent spread’ may be an issue (Savill, St Rose et al. 2006; Webster, Peiris et al. 2006), 
the effect this has upon the estimate of the spatial kernel was investigated. 
To do this the model was fitted to simulated data where a proportion of outbreaks were 
selected at random and relabelled as susceptible for the duration of the wave. As expected, 
it was found that the estimate of infectious period increases as the proportion of detected 
outbreaks decreases (Figure 3-14(a)). However, as the wave is increasingly ‘thinned out’ in 
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this way, the fitting procedure increasingly estimates transmission over longer distances. 
This produces a kernel which underestimates short range and overestimates long range 
transmissibility (Figure 3-14(b)). These results suggests that it is unlikely that an increased 
proportion of unobserved outbreaks during the 2007 wave could fully explain the kernel 
estimate for that wave, where the proportional reduction in inter-commune transmissibility 
increased with distance (Figure 3-6(b)). Moreover, any increase in the level of unobserved 
outbreaks obviously supports the conclusion that there has been a decrease in overall 
detection capacity. It should be noted, however, that this assumes that the ability to detect 
outbreaks is uniform throughout Vietnam and throughout the wave of outbreaks and also 
that the infectious period of an outbreak would not affect, or be affected by, whether or not 
the outbreak was reported. In reality it is highly probable that this will not be the case. For 
example, short-lived outbreaks may be less likely to be detected and unreported outbreaks 
may remain infectious for a longer length of time than would have been the case had they 
been detected.  
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Figure 3-14| Simulation study of the effect upon model estimates of underreporting.  
(a), fitted commune level infectious period, (b), fitted spatial kernel. Plotted values are those used to generate 
the simulated outbreak (dashed grey lines), those calculated using the posterior mean model parameter 
estimates obtained from the complete simulated dataset (solid black lines), the overall mean posterior 
parameter estimates from fitting the model to five datasets where 20% of outbreak are randomly not 
observed and therefore treated as susceptible throughout the wave (dashed black lines) and five datasets 
where 50% of outbreaks are randomly not observed. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
This analysis demonstrates the application of data augmentation techniques to existing 
livestock disease modelling methodologies in order to quantify the spatial and temporal 
spread of disease in a setting where the times of infection are unobserved.  It was found 
that, following the implementation of vaccination, the day-to-day probability of infection 
spreading between communes was significantly reduced, with the estimate of effect 
comparable to 45% effective vaccination coverage suggesting that population immunity may 
not have fallen too far below the level estimated from post-campaign sero-surveillance 
(Taylor and Dung 2007). However, the duration of time taken to report outbreaks had also 
increased significantly, allowing infection to spread. This result appears to support the 
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hypothesis that mass vaccination can make outbreaks harder to detect. One way in which it 
has been suggested this could occur is if a small proportion of birds in a flock go 
unvaccinated as the lower level of mortality may make outbreaks harder to detect or if 
vaccination leads to the asymptomatic transmission of infection between birds (Savill, St 
Rose et al. 2006). In Vietnam, where backyard poultry already experience high degree of 
background mortality, any reduction in mortality due to infection with H5N1 within an 
infectious flock is likely to have strong implications for the ability to detect signs of 
circulating infection, especially if farmers believe their birds are protected. Moreover, at a 
commune-level scale, it may also be the case that outbreaks are only likely to be reported 
when a high number of flocks have been affected by the disease. As a result, even if 
vaccination is completely effective at providing protection from infection within a flock, if a 
sufficient proportion of flocks remain unvaccinated in order to sustain transmission within 
the commune with a lower number of affected flocks, infection may become more difficult 
to detect. Such “silent spread” has been demonstrated in experiments where, as a result of 
a single inoculation, birds were only partially protected and infection could transmit 
asymptomatically (van der Goot, van Boven et al. 2007). However, whilst it was suggested 
by outbreak investigators that infection was harder to detect in 2007 (To, Bui et al. 2007), 
this is the first quantitative evidence of a reduction in detection capacity on a macroscopic 
scale.  
Although the finding of a reduction in infectivity coupled with a decrease in the rate at 
which outbreaks were reported following the introduction of infection into a commune 
proved robust to different assumptions about the infectivity profile of a commune and the 
rate at which outbreaks where controlled following detection, there are other potential 
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factors which could not be controlled for in the analysis. In particular, it wasn’t possible to 
quantify the extent to which the model estimates may have been affected by unobserved 
outbreaks occurring outside the dataset. It was found that, if uniformly distributed in space 
and time, unobserved outbreaks have the affect of inflating the estimated infectious period 
and underestimating short range transmission whilst overestimating long range 
transmission. However, it was not possible to assess the extent to which clusters of 
unreported outbreaks may have affected the obtained result. Future work could potentially 
address the issue of unreported outbreaks within the study region by allowing the data 
augmentation algorithm to also impute entire outbreaks (O'Neill and Roberts 1999; Chis 
Ster, Singh et al. 2008; Jewell, Keeling et al. 2008). However, this would not address the 
issues associated with the potential for infection to be imported from outside the study 
region, in particular in neighbouring countries such as Laos, Cambodia and China where data 
on both the prevalence of infection and the population of poultry at risk were not available.  
Similarly, whilst these qualitative findings were also robust to an increase in the time 
between the report of an outbreak and its removal from a wave, the assumption that this 
duration is constant across all outbreaks is unlikely to be realistic. Future work could focus 
upon estimating this distribution by including the time between the report and the removal 
of each outbreak as additional model parameters. This may also provide insight as to 
whether the speed and effectiveness of the response to reported outbreaks varied between 
the three waves. Such an analysis would, however, add to the already high computational 
demands of the model fitting procedure. 
It may also be the case that the assumption that transmissibility between communes is a 
function of Euclidean distance may not realistically represent the spread of infection in 
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Vietnam, particularly over long ranges where the risk of infection may also depend upon 
measures of accessibility such as the provision of roads or transport. If these data were 
available it may have been possible to find a better fitting model which incorporates a more 
realistic measure of the shortest effective distance between communes, although the 
reliability of such a measure based upon distance by road could equally be affected by 
factors such as the distribution of live bird markets or slaughterhouse facilities which are 
likely to act as key nodes in the spread of infection (Fournie, Guitian et al.).  
Inferring the exact mechanism by which outbreaks remained unreported for longer is not 
straightforward from the existing data. For example, there does appear to have been a shift 
in the distribution of host species involved in reported outbreaks. During the 2004/5 wave, 
of outbreaks were there were data on the species involved, only 30% were identified as 
ducks whereas in 2007 this figure rose to 77% (Minh, Morris et al. 2009). This change has 
previously been attributed to the lifting of a duck-hatching ban in February 2007 with 
outbreaks also coinciding with the end of rice-harvest season when ducks are allowed to 
graze freely on rice paddies and are therefore harder to vaccinate (Peyre, Fusheng et al. 
2009). This, combined with the fact the wave did not follow the seasonal pattern associated 
with previous epidemics and the lower level of pathogenicity associated with H5N1 infection 
in waterfowl, makes it tempting to conclude that ducks may be acting as a reservoir of 
infection which is difficult to detect, thus contributing to a longer commune-level infectious 
period. However, the longer ranges over which transmission was estimated to take place 
during 2007 wave may suggest that some outbreaks went completely reported and, even 
within communes where outbreaks are reported there is no way to confirm that the flock in 
which disease is reported was responsible for introducing infection into the commune. In 
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fact, if silent spread was occurring, it seems plausible that flocks reported in outbreaks, 
many of which had not been vaccinated, may have been subject to an ascertainment bias 
based upon higher pathogenicity of infection relative to vaccinated flocks within which 
infection was circulating. Changes in the transmissibility or reporting rates of outbreaks may 
also be linked with other factors such as differential vaccine efficacy or observed changes in 
the genotype of the virus (Nguyen, Nguyen et al. 2008).  
It was estimated that a large proportion of transmission during the wave occurring 
concurrently with the first round of vaccination took place over relatively short distances. 
Such an localised infection could be due to the movement of vaccinators who, it has been 
suggested, may have acted as carriers of infection from one commune to another (Pfeiffer, 
Minh et al. 2007). It is also interesting that the obtained estimates didn’t suggest a 
reduction in the daily per-capita poultry transmissibility during the 2005 wave, despite the 
concurrent vaccination campaign which was taking place. This may suggest that outbreaks 
predominantly occurred within large regions yet to be vaccinated or in areas where 
vaccinated poultry had yet to develop effective immunity.  
It was also demonstrated how imputed infection times can be used to explore all possible 
chains of infection and to assess the range of possible effects which can be achieved by 
‘pruning’ an outbreak from the epidemic tree. Applying this to outbreaks occurring during 
the 2007 wave, it was found that if the reporting rates had been maintained to those 
achieved during the previous waves, the size and the duration of wave would have been 
considerably diminished. It should, however, be noted that this analysis made the strong 
assumption that, having avoided the transmission event which led to it becoming initially 
infected, the “pruned” outbreak commune remained uninfected for the remainder of the 
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wave. As a result, this is likely to represent an over-estimate of the impact such improved 
surveillance would constitute. One method which avoids this issue which could be used in 
future analyses would be to adopt the approach of Cook et al which uses the Sellke 
construction whereby individuals are assigned a threshold which, when passed by the 
infectious pressure accumulated during the wave, results in infection. It is then possible to 
use this concept of infectious pressure to infer both the infectious status of such a pruned 
outbreak throughout the remainder of the wave and the resultant effect this has upon the 
trajectory of the epidemic (Sellke 1983; Cook, Gibson et al. 2008). 
The finding that, despite a sizeable reduction in infectivity, infection was still able to spread 
following a decrease in the rate at which outbreaks were reported does, however, highlight 
the fact that, in order to ensure that such reductions in infectivity achieved through 
vaccination are translated into a noticeable impact on outbreak size, it is essential that rates 
of reporting are maintained through adequate surveillance. Measures towards this have 
already been attempted in Vietnam with the trial of a pro-active surveillance programme 
whereby resources are allocated according to known risk factors such as the presence of live 
bird markets and high semi-commercial farm density and a prior history of outbreaks 
(Desvaux, Do et al. 2007). The programme also included an awareness campaign informing 
stakeholders about how outbreak detection criteria should change following the vaccination 
of a flock. An alternative approach is to use unvaccinated birds, or those vaccinated with an 
inactivated heterologous strain of avian influenza, as sentinels for the detection of the 
spread of infection. This has been implemented under the Differentiating Infected from 
Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) guidelines in industrial production systems such as those in Italy 
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and the U.S. and has been successful in helping to control outbreaks of low pathogenic avian 
influenza (LPAI) (Capua, Cattoli et al. 2004; Suarez 2005).  
The current GETS project in Vietnam, which includes a trial of the use of sentinel birds in 
vaccinated flocks, age-based vaccination of ducks and active surveillance of mobile duck 
flocks in five high and low risk provinces(FAO 2010), may provide valuable insight as to how 
increasing detection capacity can be achieved and, as Vietnam enters a period of transition 
towards targeted vaccination in the ongoing attempts to control the spread of H5N1, how 
this may be harnessed in order to manage the spread of infection in a sustainable way. 
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Chapter 4 Outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry in 
Thailand: The relative role of poultry production 
types in sustaining transmission and the impact 
of active surveillance in control.   
4.1 Introduction 
Outbreaks of H5N1 spread widely throughout Thailand, with two large waves occurring 
between late 2003 and mid-2005 (Tiensin, Nielen et al. 2007). However, in terms of the level 
of control currently achieved relative to the scale of the epidemic during these years and the 
measures employed to obtain this, the Thai experience of H5N1 is unique to the region. 
Unlike other countries and territories including China, Hong Kong, Vietnam and Indonesia 
where large-scale waves of outbreaks resulted in the adoption of mass vaccination 
strategies, the use of vaccination has remained prohibited in Thailand, a decision which has 
been strongly supported by the large industrial exporters (Safman 2010). Instead Thailand 
pursued a policy of stringent movement restrictions, including 90-day bans on movement 
from or through affected areas unless a permit had been obtained from local authorities, 
and a campaign to restrict chicken production to closed farms. These policies were aimed 
towards enhancing bio-security and preventing the circulation of infection in small-holder 
flocks (NaRanong 2007), the type of flock reported as infected in the majority of recorded 
outbreaks (Tiensin, Chaitaweesub et al. 2005).  
The implementation of these measures also coincided with a concerted effort by industrial 
producers to bring aspects of the supply chain such as hatching and slaughtering ‘in-house’, 
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with this trend towards such vertically integrated production fuelled by a desire to reduce 
the risk of infection and improve access to overseas markets (NaRanong 2007; Safman 
2010). Since the second wave of outbreaks came to a conclusion in mid-2005, the spread of 
infection has successfully been reduced to low levels. However, the extent to which the 
measures aimed towards improving the bio-security of small-holders were responsible for 
achieving this level of control can only be assessed accurately if the extent to which small-
holders played a role in driving the transmission of infection is known. 
Poultry production in Thailand differs markedly from that in neighbouring countries. Rather 
than a system where the majority of poultry are raised extensively by smallholders and 
consumed locally (both in terms of the number of poultry produced and income generated) 
production is dominated by relatively few large-scale industrial integrators, many of whom 
play a role in Thailand’s large poultry export market (Rushton, Viscarra et al. 2005).  
It has been estimated that the overall odds of an outbreak being reported in backyard flocks 
were significantly lower than within commercial layer flocks in Thailand, apart from 
southern provinces where there was no significant difference, and lower than within 
commercial broiler flocks in northern and central provinces (Otte, Pfeiffer et al. 2006). This 
challenges the general assumption that the epidemic had been primarily spread by small-
holders. However, to date, no attempt has been made to quantify the respective roles of 
these two sectors in propagating the spread of infection directly.  
As part of the ‘X-ray’ surveillance campaigns deployed by the Thai authorities in response to 
the developing second wave of infection, detailed data were collected at a sub-district 
(otherwise known as “tambon”) level. As a result the composition of poultry production in 
both tambons which experienced infection and those which remained uninfected at the 
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time of the wave are available, not only in terms of the number of poultry or flock, but also 
the composition of these poultry in terms of production type and species (Tiensin, 
Chaitaweesub et al. 2005). 
In this chapter data from outbreak reports obtained from these surveillance campaigns and 
those from the existing surveillance infrastructure are used to fit a model of the spatial 
spread of the second wave of H5N1 in 2004/5 similar to that of the previous chapter but 
incorporating large-scale industrial production. From this the relative roles of commercial 
and backyard chickens, as well as those of ducks and geese, in the transmission of infection 
are investigated to assess whether the control policies implemented, with the severe 
implications for smallholders they entailed, are likely to have been effective. Particular focus 
is also paid as to whether ‘X-ray’ surveillance was successful at increasing the extent to 
which outbreaks were rapidly detected.    
4.2 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1 Description of data 
Spatial information in the form of a shape-file with the administrative boundaries at the 
tambon level was obtained from the Geo-informatics and Space Technology Development 
Agency and the Department of Land Development, Thailand. Data on the outbreaks and 
poultry population were obtained from the Department of Livestock Development. 
Poultry census data were collected as part of the first ‘X-ray’ survey between October and 
mid-November 2004. The data included the number of backyard chickens, broilers, layers, 
quails, turkeys, geese, meat and free-grazing ducks and the number of flocks of each type 
within each tambon.  
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Data on H5N1 outbreaks reported between January 2004 and November 2005 were 
compiled by the Department of Livestock Development and comprise the date at which the 
outbreak was reported, the tambon within which the outbreak was detected and the 
species and production type of the flock in which disease was detected (Figure 4-1a). 
 
Figure 4-1| Outbreak and poultry population data.  
(a), Outbreak report data by date of report and production type: Commercial chicken (blue), ducks and geese 
(red), backyard chicken and other (green), (b), tambon-level susceptibility histogram: Tambon poultry 
population corresponding to linear assumption (blue columns) and logarithm of mean flock size within tambon 
multiplied by number of flocks in tambon corresponding to logarithmic assumption (red columns). 
 
4.2.2 Data assumptions 
Outbreak locations were calculated as the tambon centroid. Whilst uninfected, all poultry 
within the tambon were assumed to be susceptible to infection. In the absence of data on 
the size of flocks in which infection occurred, infection was assumed to occur independent 
of flock size with the number of infectious birds during an outbreak calculated as the 
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number of flocks within which infection was detected multiplied by the average size of a 
flock within the tambon. In three instances an outbreak was reported within a tambon 
which, according to the census, contained no poultry. In this case the number of poultry was 
calculated as the average number of backyard birds in all adjacent tambons, making the 
assumption that the presence of commercial premises would have been recorded. 
Fitting of a model using a Euclidean spatial kernel to all outbreaks in Thailand would involve 
measuring transmissibility between country borders and over long stretches of ocean. The 
study region was therefore confined to the 6403 northernmost tambons in order to produce 
a more convex area. As a result, outbreaks and poultry data in Southern Thailand were not 
included in the analysis. 
The lengthy duration of the wave resulted in a high number of tambons experiencing 
outbreaks during multiple distinct time periods. As in the previous chapter, outbreak reports 
within 14 days of each other in the same tambon were treated as being part of the same 
outbreak, leaving a total of 136 tambons where there was a period of more than 14 days 
between outbreaks. In these instances outbreaks were classified according to the Thai 
control policies prohibiting movement and restocking of birds in infected areas for 90 days 
following the confirmation of an outbreak (NaRanong 2007; Safman 2010). Tambons with 
outbreaks re-occurring later than 14 and less than 90 days following the previous report 
were assumed to have remained susceptible throughout, with the number of susceptible 
birds halved following the controlling of the earlier outbreak. Outbreaks occurring more 
than 90 days following a previous outbreak were assumed to be the result of restocking and 
the tambon was assumed not to be susceptible to infection during those 90 days. All 
tambons were assumed to become re-susceptible to infection 90 days following an outbreak 
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with the susceptibility to infection equal to that estimated before the tambon was first 
infected. 
4.2.3 Modelling homogenous infectivity and susceptibility 
To begin with, all heterogeneity in the type of poultry production was ignored and two 
assumptions as to how infectivity and susceptibility scale with the number of poultry within 
a tambon were explored. The first is that they both scale linearly, i.e. the instantaneous 
force of infection exerted upon a susceptible tambon  by an infectious tambon - is: 
  3( 	 $(%.&'() 4.1 
where $ is the transmission intensity parameter and %.&'() is the normalised spatial 
kernel, parameterised in the same way as in the previous chapters, evaluated at distance 
'( ,   	 #, the number of birds in tambon , and ( is the estimated number of infectious 
birds in tambon -. For the linear scaling assumption this is calculated by multiplying the 
average flock size, ¥ 	 #-/X(¦ (where X(¦ is the number of flocks within the tambon) by the 
number of flocks in which an outbreak was reported, X(§. The second assumption explored 
was that the infectivity and susceptibility of each individual bird within a flock saturates as 
the flock becomes large and, as a result, the flock-level risk of infection scales 
logarithmically with the size of a flock. With this assumption the natural logarithm was 
taken of the average flock size within the tambon and  and   were calculated by 
multiplying this by, respectively, the number of infectious and susceptible flocks within the 
tambon (see Table 4-1). 
The outbreak wave was modelled at a sub-district (tambon) level resolution as in the 
previous chapter for Vietnam. However, here the likelihood of an infection event occurring 
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between tambons at time at   (equation (3.8)) was altered to additionally utilise data on 
number of flocks within the tambon in which infection was observed. Whilst the dynamics 
of infection within the tambon were not explicitly modelled, the modification takes into 
account the fact that flocks in which infection was not reported would have remained 
susceptible to infection from other infectious tambons until the date the outbreak was 
removed. Thus the likelihood that tambon  is infected at time   and removed (culled) at 
time  is given by: 
 L ,  	 ¨1 K exp ©K 4 $(%.&'()\- infectious on  (D  ª«
¬ exp ©K ] 4 $ K (%.&'()\- infectious on 2 (D '2
­U
®DTU
ª 
Here the term in square brackets represents the likelihood that the tambon became 
infected at time   and the second exponential term represents the likelihood that the 
non-infected flocks avoided infection from any infectious source outside of the tambon
until the tambon was culled at time  . 
(4.2)
As a result, the likelihood of the overall epidemic becomes 
N, |P 	 Q RIM&+STUVW)&IL , X K ; 1)STUVW[ D  (4.3)
Where I and X K ; 1 are, respectively, the likelihood of tambon  avoiding 
infection until the time of infection   (as defined in equation 3.4) and that the outbreak is 
subsequently reported  K   days later according to a Gamma-distributed infection-to-
report distribution (as described in chapter 3).  
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4.2.4 Introducing heterogeneity in production type 
Outbreak reports and poultry population data were disaggregated into three separate 
production types (Figure 4-1(a)):  
1. commercial chicken  
2. ducks and geese (classed together due to their similar methods of production (Otte, 
Pfeiffer et al. 2006)) 
3. backyard chickens and any other species including wild birds. 
Heterogeneous between-tambon transmissibility with regards to these types of poultry 
production was then incorporated into the model using type-specific infectivity and 
susceptibility parameters (Chis Ster and Ferguson 2007). This involved modelling the force 
of infection with five additional infectivity parameters: 
  3( 	 ¯ * ¯vv * ° &±( * ±v(v * ±°(°)%.&'(). (4.4) 
Here the three ± are infectivity parameters for commercial chicken, duck and geese and 
backyard flocks respectively and the two ¯ are the susceptibility of commercial chicken and 
duck and geese flocks relative to backyard flocks. The   and ( terms represent the number 
of infectious and susceptible birds of each type within the tambon which was estimated in 
the same way as for the basic model but using the type-specific number of poultry, poultry 
flocks and outbreak reports (#, X¦ and X§ respectively for % 	 1,2,3). 
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Table 4-1| Characteristics of the four transmission models fitted to the data 
Model Production-type parameters  Calculation of susceptible and infectious poultry 
Model 1 No  	 X§¥   	 # 
Model 2 No  	 X§ln 1 *   	 X¦ln 1 *  
Model 3 Yes  	 X§  	 # 
Model 4 Yes  	 X§ln 1 *   	 X¦ln 1 *  
 
Once these parameters have been fitted to the outbreak data the relative roles of each 
production type in driving transmission during the wave can be investigated by 
reconstructing the epidemic tree. From a given set of infection times, the probability 
(conditional on these infection times, the observed outbreak data and values of the other 
model parameters) that tambon  is infected by infectious poultry of type ² in tambon - is  
 (³ 	 ±³(³´(∑ ± * ±vv * ±°°´ D , (4.5) 
where ² 	 1,2,3 refers to, respectively, commercial chicken, backyard chicken and ducks 
and geese and the total susceptibility to infection from tambon - of the flocks eventually 
infected in tambon  on the day they were infected 
  ´( 	 ¯ * ¯vv * °%.&'()5- infectious on day  infected. (4.6) 
These type-specific infection probabilities can then be summed to obtain the number of 
tambons infected by tambon  which are the result of infected flocks of production type ²: 
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  M³ 	 4 (³µ¶D . (4.7) 
4.2.5 Model fitting procedure and assessment of model adequacy 
A similar MCMC algorithm to that used in the previous chapters was implemented with the 
model parameters sampled on a logarithmic scale and updated according to a classical 
random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and infection-to-report durations updated 
according to an independence sampler with a uniform proposal distribution between 1 and 
30 days. Convergence was determined visually by running the chain from different initial 
values. For the basic model a burn-in period of 10000 steps followed by 100000 steps was 
deemed adequate. Acceptance probabilities of 10-35% were deemed adequate. 
The two possible assumptions about the way in which infectivity and susceptibility scale 
(linearly or logarithmically) and the choice as to whether production-type-specific infectivity 
and susceptibility parameters were included in the model led to a total of four separate 
models being fitted to the data. These were labelled Models 1-4 according to their 
characteristics as described in Table 4-1.  
Poultry type-specific model parameters were given the prior distributions listed in Table 4-2 
and all other model parameters were given the same priors as those used in Chapter 3. The 
relative susceptibility ¯ and ¯v were given log-normally-distributed priors in order to 
ensure adequate prior probability was assigned to the possibility that the values of these are 
between 0 and 1. An analysis of the sensitivity of these parameters to the chosen standard 
deviation of their prior distributions was also conducted (Table 4-2). 
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 Table 4-2| Prior distributions of the model parameters 
Parameter Description Prior distribution 
·| Infectivity of commercial chicken 0,10000 
·¸ Infectivity of ducks and geese  0,10000 
· Infectivity of backyard chicken 0,10000 
c| Susceptibility of commercial chicken 
relative to backyard 
¹"0,3 
(Baseline) ¹"0,1 ¹"0,5 
c¸ Susceptibility of ducks and geese relative 
to backyard 
¹"0,3 
(Baseline) ¹"0,1 ¹"0,5 
 For both ¯ parameters, all prior distributions tested have been listed and the chosen 
baseline prior has been specified. 
 
The data augmentation techniques used to fit these models to the data, which avoid directly 
integrating the entire likelihood with respect to the uncertainty in the date at which 
infection was introduced into a tambon, make it difficult to calculate established measures 
of model fit such as the deviance information criterion. Instead, using an approach 
formulated by Cauchemez et al (Cauchemez, Bhattarai et al. 2011), an exploratory 
procedure was carried out, comparing the predictive distribution of the times of infection 
on each day of the wave with next-step-ahead predictions based upon the predictive 
distribution of infection times prior to that day, in an attempt to assess whether, for any of 
the models, there are any stages of the wave where the fitted parameters predict an 
abnormal level of transmission.  
Denoting º+ the dates of infection of tambons infected before day 2 and  
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  #º 	  4 5 	 2 (D  (4.8) 
 the number of tambons infected on day 2, the predictive distribution #º| can be  sampled 
directly using the imputed infection times at regular stages of the MCMC. Samples of the 
joint posterior distribution of the model parameters and imputed infection times can then 
be used to simulate a prediction of the number of newly infected tambons on each day 
given the imputed history of the infection process up to that day, providing a sample of the 
next-step-ahead distribution #»º|º+, P.  The probability that the “reconstructed” 
predictive value of #º is less than or equal to the “expected” next-step ahead prediction is 
then  
 N¼ 	 ] 5#º ½ #»ºN#»º|º+, PN, P|'#»º''P. (4.9) 
The probability that the reconstructed value of #º is greater than or equal to the next-step 
ahead prediction, N¾ can be similarly obtained. The assumption of adequacy for the model 
fit on this day was then rejected if N¼ or N¾ was less than 10% (Cauchemez, Bhattarai et al. 
2011). 
4.2.6 Investigating the effects of ‘X-ray’ surveillance 
The stated aim of ‘X-ray’ surveillance is to provide a cross-sectional view of the H5N1 status 
of poultry throughout Thailand. This involved implementing measures such as sampling all 
sick poultry and assessing every household for poultry die-offs aimed at providing additional 
detection capacity during that period. As a result, one measure of whether this policy was 
effective is likely to be the speed at which outbreaks were reported following the 
introduction of infection. In order to investigate this a supplementary analysis was 
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implemented where two separate Gamma-distributed infection-to-report distributions were 
fitted, one to outbreaks reported during periods where ‘X-ray’ surveillance was taking place 
(1-31 October 2004 and 1-28 February 2005) and a second to outbreaks reported outside 
these periods. 
4.3 Results 
Each model was successfully fitted to the data, with estimates of the mean infectious period 
varying between 7.8 and 8.8 days (Table 4-2). The estimates of production-type-specific 
relative susceptibility parameters, in particular the susceptibility parameter for commercial 
flocks ¯, proved to be quite sensitive to the choice of prior distribution. However, the 
choice of prior had no effect upon the overall estimate of the respective role of each 
production type in propagating the epidemic, estimated using the reconstructed epidemic 
tree (Table 4-3). 
Table 4-2| Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals for each of the 4 fitted models 
For Model 3 and Model 4 values shown are from the model fitted using baseline priors. 
 
 
Parameter 
Posterior Mean (95% Credible Intervals) 
Model 1 
(Basic linear) 
Model 2 
(Basic logarithmic) 
Model 3 
(Type-specific linear) 
Model 4 
(Type-specific log) 
Kernel power 
1.88 
(1.69-2.08) 
2.80 
(2.53-3.15) 
2.88 
(2.55-3.32) 
3.11 
(2.76-3.58) 
Kernel offset 
6.34 
(3.28-10.34) 
11.07 
(6.93-17.10) 
13.25 
(7.69-21.49) 
14.87 
(9.07-23.13) 
Infectivity 
0.044 
(0.040-0.048) 
48.79 
(44.60-53.65) 
see Table 4-3 see Table 4-3 
Mean infectious 
period 
8.77 
(7.78-9.81) 
8.37 
(7.15-9.70) 
8.43 
(7.38-9.61) 
7.79 
(6.85-8.66) 
Infectious period 
variance 
33.45 
(25.84-40.80) 
26.07 
(17.06-33.78) 
27.25 
(20.91-34.03) 
23.66 
(17.53-30.62) 
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Table 4-3| Analysis of the sensitivity of the production-type-specific transmission parameters and 
role in transmission to the choice of relative susceptibility prior distributions. 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Prior LN(0,1) LN(0,3) 
(baseline) 
LN(0,5)  LN(0,1) LN(0,3) 
(baseline) 
LN(0,5) 
·| 0.018[0.012-
0.24] 
0.018[0.013-
0.25] 
0.019[0.013-
0.26] 
65.5[44.6-
90.3] 
65.3[44.6-
90.3] 
64.5 [42.7-
89.1] ·¸ 0.009[0.001-
0.02] 
0.009[0.001-
0.02] 
0.009[0.002-
0.02] 
6.1[1.6-
12.05] 
6.80[2.0-
12.5] 
6.11[1.73-
11.94] · 2.89[2.53-
3.28] 
2.9[2.53-
2.30] 
2.92[2.53-
3.34] 
74.2 [59.7-
90.2] 
75.71[61.7-
90.5] 
73.09[58.79-
89.41] c| 0.006[0.002-
0.011] 
0.003[0.0006-
0.007] 
0.002[0.0001-
0.0016] 
0.84[0.12-
2.06] 
0.63[0.06-
1.81] 
0.53 [0.01-
1.7] c¸ 0.18[0.13-
0.23] 
0.17[0.12-
0.22] 
0.17[0.12-
0.22] 
3.55[2.28-
5.18] 
3.63[2.38-
5.32] 
3.72[2.40-
5.4] ¿À| 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.28 
¿À¸ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 
¿À 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Table displays posterior means of each parameter with 95% credible intervals in brackets. ¿À|, ¿À¸ and ¿À 
denote the number of outbreaks caused by infectious poultry of each production type averaged over the total 
number of outbreak tambons. 
 
4.3.1 Comparing model fit 
Making the assumption that the infectivity and susceptibility of a tambon scale linearly with 
the poultry population (and assuming these birds mix homogeneously within the tambon 
itself) necessitates, due to the high concentrations of poultry associated with areas with 
industrial production, fitting the model to a highly dispersed distribution of poultry 
populations (Figure 4-1(b)). This provides little space within which to find a set of parameter 
values which allows a realistic spatial distribution of outbreaks whilst ensuring that the risks 
of infection and transmission in those areas with high densities of poultry are not overly 
represented. As a result, the parameter estimates obtained from the model suggest a 
scenario where only a relatively small number of tambons contained a sufficient number of 
birds to transmit infection (Figure 4-2) with the wave being driven by a few isolated, 
extremely high risk, tambons (including local reproduction numbers in excess of 40). There 
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were also 5 days when based upon the next-step-ahead distribution, the predictive 
distribution of Model 1 estimated abnormal levels of transmission.  Whilst the addition of 
poultry-type-specific parameters (Model 3) reduced the number of instances where this 
occurred, there were still days during the early stages of the wave where the model 
predicted a lower number of outbreaks than would be expected from the next-step ahead 
predictions (Figure 4-3). 
 
Figure 4-2| Risk maps of local reproductive numbers.  
Estimates are based an outbreak involving 1.66 infected flocks (the average for outbreak communes in the 
dataset), with each infected flock size calculated as the average flock size within the tambon. Figure shows 
both linear ((a) and (b)) and logarithmic assumptions ((c) and (d)). Figures (a) and (c) shows tambons where 
R>2 (white dots), R>1 (red dots), R>0.75 (yellow dots) and R>0.5 (green dots). Figures (b) and (d) compare 
spatial locations of outbreak reports (blue circles) with the distribution of tambons where R>0.5 (green dots). 
 
a b
c d
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In contrast if, as in Model 2, the infectivity and susceptibility of a flock is assumed to scale 
logarithmically, the fitted parameters provide a scenario where a much larger number of 
tambons are capable of transmitting infection. As a result, the burden of transmission is 
aggregated over a much larger amount of space, producing a risk map which more closely 
resembles the observed distribution of outbreaks (sustained transmission throughout 
central Thailand with sporadic transmission in the north-eastern Khorat Plateau) and the 
inputted epidemic curve does not feature any days with abnormal levels of transmission.  
 
Figure 4-3|Model consistency throughout the wave.  
Red lines show  Á¼ the posterior probability that the “reconstructed” number of infections per day are less 
than or equal to the number of infections predicted by the next-step ahead distribution. Blue lines show Á¾, 
the posterior probability the equivalent values are greater than or equal to the next-step ahead prediction and 
the dashed black lines show the 10% rejection threshold. 
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4.3.3 Respective roles of commercial and non-commercial poultry 
The results suggest that, overall, the majority of transmission occurred as a result of 
infectious backyard poultry. However, backyard poultry constitutes by far the largest 
category both in terms of the number of flocks infected and the number of flocks in total. As 
a result, for both Models 3 and 4, when averaged over the total number of flocks in the 
region, commercial flocks were over ten times more likely to transmit infection. Moreover, 
when only considering flocks which were reported infected during the wave, of which 
commercial chicken flocks constitute 11% of the total number, the fact that infected 
commercial chickens were the source of an estimated 22% of between tambon transmission 
according to Model 3 and 28% according to Model 4 also suggests that they played a 
disproportionate role in spreading infection during the wave. In contrast, infectious ducks 
and geese were estimated to contribute least to the spread of infection and, per flock, were 
the least likely to transmit (Table 4-4). 
Table 4-4| Number of transmissions and transmissibility by production type according to the 
reconstructed epidemic tree. 
Source of infection Linear model  Logarithmic model 
Commercial 
chicken  
Ducks and 
Geese 
Backyard 
 
Commercial 
chicken  
Ducks and 
Geese 
Backyard 
 
Total number of 
transmissions 
207.54 38.40 702.06 263.37 63.89 620.74 
Transmissions per 
infectious flock 
1.19 0.088 0.72 1.51 0.15 0.64 
Transmissions per  
flock (¬ |) 
2.41 0.060 0.19 2.83 0.13 0.17 
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4.3.2 Effect of enhanced ‘X-ray’ surveillance 
 
Figure 4-4| Distribution of infection-to-report inside and outside of ‘X-ray’ periods.  
Figure shows posterior distribution of the mean infection-to-report  inside and outside of X-ray surveillance 
periods according to the time to infection-to-report distributions fitted to Model 4. Points represent posterior 
mean estimates and bars represent 95% credible intervals. 
 
The results from fitting a separate infection-to-report distribution to outbreaks reported 
during periods of ‘X-ray’ surveillance suggest that such measures were successful at 
enhancing the reporting of outbreaks. When carried out for Model 4 this resulted in an 
estimated infection-to-report duration of 4.8 days for outbreaks reported during an ‘X-ray’ 
period and 10.7 days for outbreaks reported outside this (Figure 4-4). This would suggest 
that the reporting of outbreaks was improved as a result of such active surveillance, 
probably as a result of a combination of detecting outbreaks more rapidly than those 
reported as a result of the existing surveillance structure and by combating any 
underreporting of outbreaks. The latter factor would mean, however, that it isn’t possible to 
make the simple conclusion that ‘X-ray’ surveillance reduced the mean time between 
infection and report by 6 days as the underreporting occurring outside ‘X-ray’ is likely to 
lead to an overestimation of the time to report during these periods. This is because the 
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fitting algorithm is forced to join outbreaks occurring further apart in time (as demonstrated 
by the simulation study in subsection 4.3.4). 
4.4 Discussion 
The nature of poultry production and differences in control and surveillance infrastructure 
and policy can be important determinants of the spread of H5N1. The commercial poultry 
sector in Thailand creates localised areas of extremely high concentrations of poultry. As a 
result, according to an analysis of the predictive distribution of outbreaks, a model which 
assumes the risk of infection scales linearly with the population of poultry within a tambon, 
when fitted to the outbreak data, is forced to impute abnormal levels of transmission at 
different stages of the wave. In order to avoid such inconsistencies, it was necessary to 
introduce some form of heterogeneity in per-bird transmissibility, either in the form of a 
model which makes the assumption that the risk of infection saturates as flock size 
increases or that the susceptibility and infectivity of flocks varies by production type. Whilst 
the number of days tested and the relatively conservative rejection threshold of 10% make 
it feasible that the finding that there were some days where abnormal transmission may 
have arisen by chance, the suggestion that additional heterogeneity in the transmissibility of 
infection needs to be incorporated into any tambon-level transmission model is supported 
by the risk map produced when Model 1 was fitted to the data. In particular, this model 
could not replicate the levels of sustained transmission observed in the central region of 
Thailand. 
Considering the challenges associated with the assessment of models fitted using 
augmented data (Cauchemez, Bhattarai et al. 2011), an analysis comparing the overall 
predictive distribution of the model to next-step ahead predictions provides a valuable 
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indicator as to whether, for each day of the wave, the fitted model is able to adequately 
replicate the observed data. Moreover, as the 10% rejection threshold is likely to be 
conservative given the number of days of the wave tested, the finding that this threshold 
wasn’t reached for models 2 and 4 suggests there is good agreement between the next-
step-ahead and predictive distributions of these models. It does not, however provide a 
direct measure of the extent to which simulations of the model would replicate the dataset 
in the same way as a deviance statistic would, nor does it provide any measure of the 
complexity of the model in order to assess the extent to which the model may be over-
fitted, making inference about which was the best of the fitted models difficult.  
The results obtained from fitting production-type-specific transmissibility parameters 
appear to support the use of a multi-sectoral approach such as that used to control the 
spread of infection in Thailand. Due to their large numbers, it was estimated that the 
majority of transmission occurred as a result of infectious backyard poultry flocks, 
suggesting that any measures which successfully reduced the susceptibility of these flocks to 
infection are likely to have had a large impact on the ability of the disease to spread. 
However, the finding that, per-flock, backyard flocks had a low relative risk of transmission 
compared to commercial flocks supplements previous analyses which found evidence they 
were also at a low relative risk of infection (Otte, Pfeiffer et al. 2006; Tiensin, Ahmed et al. 
2009; Paul, Tavornpanich et al. 2010). Moreover, the estimated disproportionate role 
played by commercial poultry in spreading infection between tambons appears to support 
the assertion that once infected, large-scale commercial operations can spread infection 
more effectively over longer distances (Otte, Pfeiffer et al. 2006; Tiensin, Ahmed et al. 
2009). This suggests that measures to reduce the risks of this occurring, such as the drive 
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towards vertical integration (NaRanong 2007), are also likely to have had a significant effect 
on transmission. 
In contrast, based upon those outbreaks that were reported, these results would appear to 
suggest that ducks and geese play a relatively minor role in spreading infection. However, 
field studies have shown that ducks can act as silent carriers of infection (Chen, Deng et al. 
2004; Hulse-Post, Sturm-Ramirez et al. 2005). It has also been shown that the relative risk of 
an outbreak occurring within a tambon increases with both density of free-grazing and 
commercial duck production (Gilbert, Chaitaweesub et al. 2006; Gilbert, Xiao et al. 2008; 
Paul, Tavornpanich et al. 2010), suggesting that this analysis may be underestimating the 
contribution of ducks in the spread of infection. 
The estimates of the relative roles of each production type are also likely to be sensitive to 
differences in the proportion of outbreaks reported between production types and the 
nature and extent of any such ascertainment bias is difficult to assess. For example, the 
shorter infection-to-report fitted during ‘X-ray’ surveillance, where officials go door-to-door 
looking for signs of infection, may suggest that a proportion of outbreaks in backyard flocks 
went undetected outside of ‘X-ray’, whereas the presence of HPAI may be more easily 
detected in large-scale commercial operations (Otte, Pfeiffer et al. 2006). It may also be the 
case that the relative reporting rates in backyard and commercial operations change during 
such periods of active surveillance, causing the extent of such a bias to vary as the wave 
progresses. The nature of this kind of surveillance may also result in clusters of outbreak 
reports, correlated in both space and time, which will distort both the estimated infectious 
period of outbreaks during this period and their contribution to the estimate of the other 
spatial infectivity parameters. On the other hand, from the perspective of evaluating control 
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policies, the finding of a shorter infection-to-report distribution for outbreaks reported 
during “X-ray” surveillance does at least suggest that such campaigns are effective at 
providing surveillance capacity in excess of that achieved by relying upon the existing 
passive surveillance infrastructure alone. It should also be noted that, as the poultry census 
data were collected as part of the first of these campaigns, it is possible that the number of 
poultry involved in outbreaks occurring before this time was underestimated due to 
depopulation via culling which may have had an impact upon this result.  Ensuring such data 
are collected regularly in the absence of outbreaks could prevent this being an issue for the 
analysis of future outbreaks. Data on the distribution of infected flock sizes would also allow 
assessment of the validity of the assumption that infection was independent of flock size 
and, if this is not the case, provide added insight into the relationship between the size of a 
flock and the risk of infection.  
The formulation of the production-type-specific transmissibility parameters used in this 
analysis also makes the assumption that poultry mix randomly according to production type. 
In reality there may be interactions between the type of poultry within a susceptible flock 
and the type of poultry within an infectious flock which affects the transmissibility between 
these flocks. Such interactions could be parameterised using a 3x3 matrix with each element 
determining the transmissibility of infection between a different poultry-type-specific 
configuration of infectious and susceptible flocks (Chis Ster, Singh et al. 2008). Such a model 
would, however, require the fitting of additional transmission parameters, making the 
fitting procedure more computationally intensive to run, and in the absence of a more 
precise measure of model fit, it would not be possible to determine the extent to which this 
model was an improvement upon the fitting models used in this analysis. The results would 
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also still be subject to the same caveats with regards to ascertainment bias and the 
differences in surveillance capacity at different stages of the wave. 
Despite the limitations discussed above, this analysis, through the identification of the 
different roles of the poultry sectors and species composition in the transmission of 
infection throughout Thailand, does highlight the need to ensure that the response to, and 
the analysis of, the transmission of avian influenza within a country is tailored to the specific 
poultry production systems within which disease is spreading. This is especially true when 
the respective consequences of both infection and the application of stringent control 
measures can be severe. Moreover, the finding that the rate of reporting increased during 
“X-ray” surveillance, also suggests that, in addition to providing a more accurate snapshot of 
the disease status of a country at the time when such information is most important, 
resources aimed towards actively detecting outbreaks are also likely to contribute strongly 
to the level of control achieved. 
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Chapter 5 Estimating heterogeneous vaccine 
efficacy from animal transmission experiments 
using final size distributions 
5.1 Introduction 
The work presented in the previous chapters concerned the dynamics of infection in 
Vietnam and Thailand with administrative areas equivalent to a group of a few rural 
communities or an urban centre treated as the epidemiologic unit of interest. This involved 
making the assumption that, at such low-level resolution, transmissibility could be assumed 
to scale with distance. Quantifying the dynamics of infection at a higher resolution such as 
the transmission between or within flocks is likely to provide more nuanced insight into the 
factors which may drive an epidemic or influence the effectiveness of control measures.  
Animal transmission experiments have been proven to be an important tool by which to 
assess the impact of individual factors such as vaccination, strain type or host species within 
a controlled environment. When assessing the impact of control measures aimed at 
reducing transmission, such as vaccination or anti-viral therapy, these experiments generally 
follow a well-established template (De Jong and Kimman 1994; Velthuis, Bouma et al. 2007). 
Animals are first partitioned into control and intervention groups. For diseases in poultry, 
resource constraints often mean that the sizes of these groups are rarely greater than 10-40 
birds.  Within each of these groups a set number of birds (half the total in each group has 
been suggested as good rule of thumb (Velthuis, Bouma et al. 2007)) are randomly selected, 
separated and infected with the disease in question at a set titre, whilst the remaining birds 
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in the intervention group receive the appropriate treatment. Both groups may be further 
divided in order to carry out multiple experiments and, at a set time post-inoculation, the 
infected birds are introduced into the uninfected flocks and the progression of disease is 
monitored. 
Methods to fit the reproduction number to the final outbreak sizes (calculated from the 
number of birds susceptible at the start of the outbreak and the number left once it reaches 
its conclusion) from such experiments have been used to quantify aspects of the 
transmission of various diseases in animals (De Jong and Kimman 1994; De Jong and Bouma 
2001). This includes, for avian influenza, the relative transmissibility of low and high 
pathogenic strains (Van der Goot, De Jong et al. 2003), the relative effects of different anti-
viral drugs (Meijer, van der Goot et al. 2004) and the effects of vaccination for a range of 
disease and vaccine strains and host species (van der Goot, Koch et al. 2005; van der Goot, 
van Boven et al. 2007). In particular, they have been used to explore the transmissibility of 
H5N1 between chickens (Bouma, Claassen et al. 2009) and the effects of an inactivated 
H5N2 vaccine upon its spread within Peking ducks (van der Goot, van Boven et al. 2007). 
In an initially wholly susceptible population, the relationship between the reproduction 
number, , and the final number of individuals who ever become infected was first 
explored by Kermack and McKendrick (Kermack and Mckendrick 1927) who derived a 
relation for a homogeneously mixing deterministic SIR model with an exponentially 
distributed infectious period. However, when an experiment only involves small flocks of 
poultry, or when only a small number of poultry are initially infected, stochastic effects are 
likely to play a large role in the number of birds who ever become infected especially as, 
when assessing the effects of interventions aimed at reducing flock-level transmission, it is 
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desirable to allow for the possibility that, despite the presence of limited transmission,  
has actually been brought below unity. Derivation of estimators of the reproduction number 
from the final size of an outbreak using stochastic models of transmission have principally 
been based on the general stochastic epidemic, a model which fulfils the Markovian 
property that the future state of the epidemic depends only on its current state, requiring 
that the infectious period is exponentially distributed (Bartlett 1949). Many useful results 
can be obtained from this model construction, including approximations of the entire 
trajectory and duration of an outbreak (Andersson and Britton 2000) and, in particular, 
using martingale methods, an estimator of the reproduction number from the final size of 
an outbreak which is straightforward to implement (Becker 1989) and has previously been 
applied to animal transmission experiments (De Jong and Kimman 1994; Bouma, De Smit et 
al. 2000; Orsel, Dekker et al. 2005). However, the use of an exponentially distributed 
infectious period, whilst analytically convenient, is not always a realistic representation of 
how long hosts remain infectious before they are removed from an epidemic. In the case of 
poultry infected with H5N1, results from recent transmission experiments which estimated 
very low variability in the length of time chickens remain infectious (Bouma, Claassen et al. 
2009) suggest that this assumption is very unlikely to be appropriate. As a result the 
methods used in this analysis are based on a construction proposed by Ball (Ball 1986) which 
allows calculation of the final size distribution of the generalised stochastic epidemic (GSE), 
in which the infectious period can take any given form.  
Generally, in such analyses of the effects of vaccination, all the non-infected poultry within 
both the intervention and the control flocks are assumed to have homogenous susceptibility 
and the respective estimates of $ in each of the flocks are compared with particular focus as 
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to whether the reproduction number in the intervention flocks has been successfully 
brought below unity. This approach is then equivalent to the assumption that the 
intervention reduces the susceptibility of each bird by a factor r, as a result  
 r 	 $$ 	  5.1 
where $ and   are the transmission intensity and associated reproduction number in the 
intervention flock. Often, this is then used to determine whether the herd immunity 
induced by the vaccine is sufficient to prevent sustained transmission (when   1) (Van 
der Goot, De Jong et al. 2003; van der Goot, Koch et al. 2005). 
This assumption of a homogenous immune response to vaccination is often described as a 
“leaky vaccine” model and is only one of many other possible vaccine actions whereby 
heterogeneous individual immune responses can combine to induce herd immunity 
(Halloran, Haber et al. 1992). The simplest and most widely used alternative to this is an “all 
or nothing” model of vaccine action where individuals either acquire full or no protection. In 
this model the same efficacy and reduction in the reproduction number is achieved when 
individuals who receive the vaccine acquire full immunity to infection with probability r and 
remain fully susceptible otherwise. 
This chapter extends existing final size methods for modes of vaccine action and for 
intermediate models. Using simulation, the extent to which the choice of model of vaccine 
action is likely to influence estimates of the impact of vaccination during transmission 
experiments and the consequences this may have upon any assessment of vaccine efficacy 
are then investigated. The possibility that there are scenarios in which the correct model of 
vaccine action can be distinguished from final size outbreak data is also explored.  
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5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Model comparison using the deviance information criterion (DIC). 
DIC is a method of model comparison which can be calculated as the posterior mean 
deviance of a fitted model penalised by the addition of a measure of the effective number 
of model parameters (calculated as the difference between the posterior mean deviance 
and deviance calculated at the mean of the parameters). As such, it is intended as a 
measurement of how well the model would reproduce the observed data, balanced by the 
desire to ensure the model is not over-fitted (Spiegelhalter, Best et al. 2002). Exact rules by 
which to judge whether a difference in DIC is important do not exist, however, a reasonable 
rule of thumb is to view a difference greater than 5 as evidence that the model with the 
lowest DIC is a substantially better fit (Spiegelhalter, Best et al. 2002; Bolker 2008). 
5.2.2 The final outbreak probabilities of the GSE 
The general stochastic epidemic is a standard S-I-R model in a closed population of # 
individuals, with  initially infectious individuals and ´ initially susceptible. Once infected, 
infectives remain infectious for a period of time according to a given distribution \, which 
can take any form within reasonable limits. These individuals then transmit infection 
according to the points of a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity $/#. Once an 
individual reaches the end of their infectious period they are removed and play no further 
role in the epidemic. This is then a mass-action transmission model whereby the rate of 
transmission is independent of population size and, therefore, an infectious individual 
infects a susceptible individual at a rate inversely proportional to the size of the population. 
The validity of this assumption has not been tested for the spread of H5N1 in poultry. 
However it was shown to be a relatively realistic approximation of the transmission of 
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pseudorabies virus in swine (Bouma, Dejong et al. 1995). The assumption also results in an 
 independent of population size which provides an easily interpretable measure of the 
spread of infection when analysing flocks of different sizes.  Under this mass-action 
assumption the basic reproduction number is then 
   	 $f\h. 5.2 
Using this construction, Ball (Ball 1986) derived the following relation between the final size 
outbreak probabilities L§,Â¦ %, the transmission parameter $ and the infectious period 
distribution \: 
 4 ´ K %Ã K % L§,Â¦ % ÄÅ £$´ K Ã# ¤Æ»§
Ç
D 	 Ã´ ,      0 ½ Ã ½ % ½ #. 5.3 
Here, Å 	 fexpK\h, is the Laplace transformation of the assumed probability 
distribution of the infectious period \ and L§,Â¦  	 NÈ 	 |´, , #, $, \ is the probability 
that È 	  initially uninfected individuals are infected during the course of the outbreak 
given an initial susceptible population ´, infectious population , population size #, 
transmission parameter $ and infectious period distribution \ . These probabilities can then 
be rewritten as a triangular set of equations which can be solved recursively      
 L§,Â¦ % 	 1 K ´ ,     ´ 	 4 ÇL§,Â¦ Ã
+
ÇD ,     % 	 0, … , ", 5.4 
where  
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 Ç 	 ´ K %Ã K %Ã´ ÄÅ £$´ K Ã# ¤Æ»§
. 5.5 
5.2.3 Quantifying the impact of vaccination 
To assess how well different models of vaccine action can explain observed outbreak sizes, 
two different scenarios, with the following assumptions about available data, were first 
explored:  
(i) A “leaky” vaccine where all individuals of the population are assumed to be 
equally susceptible and thus  can be calculated independently of . 
(ii) An “all or nothing” vaccine where  is known (perhaps through analysis of 
outbreaks in a control group) but the fraction of individuals who have been 
protected as a result of vaccination, X, is not. 
Whilst the two models of vaccine action described above have the same impact upon the 
reproduction number within a flock, they affect the final outbreak size probabilities quite 
differently. For a “leaky” vaccine, the outbreak probabilities can be calculated in the same 
way as for an unvaccinated flock but with transmission intensity r$/#. However, for an “all-
or-nothing” vaccine, the outbreak can be seen as a multitype epidemic (Ball 1986; 
Andersson and Britton 2000), in a large population this would result in a situation where 
r# K  individuals have no chance of acquiring infection, thus the outbreak probabilities 
of the remaining 1 K r# K  become: 
 L§,+É¦+§¦ , 5.6 
These two models constitute only two of many possible assumptions about the distribution 
of vaccine response within a flock. In order to explore a wider range of assumptions, a beta 
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 144 
 
distribution was used to model the proportional reduction in the susceptibility of each 
individual bird, Ê, with the following parameterisation: 
 NΕ 	 Ê; ,  	 1Β, 1 K  ÊÍÎ+1 K Ê+ÍÎ+. 5.7 
Here  can be interpreted as the overall efficacy of the vaccine (i.e. the proportional 
reduction in the reproduction number) and  as a measure of the extent to which the 
reduction in overall susceptibility is distributed evenly between individuals. “All or nothing” 
and “leaky” distributions can be obtained by, respectively, letting  Ï 0 and  Ï ∞ (Figure 
5-1) (Maire, Aponte et al. 2006). 
 
Figure 5-1| Cumulative probability distribution of a 50% reduction in susceptibility according to 
different values of a.  
In all cases a 50% reduction in susceptibility is achieved by setting Ð 	 . Ñ. Examples shown are a =0.001 
(solid grey line), 0.4 (dashed grey line), 2 (dotted black line), 10 (dashed black line), 4000 (solid black line). 
 
If the reduction in susceptibility of each individual is drawn from such a distribution, the 
final size distribution of the outbreak then has the form of a multi-type epidemic with # 
types, each with population size 1: 
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4 L§,¦+§¦ &Ò)∏ Å w∑ $Ê(&1 K %()#¦+§(D x
§»ÇU¦+§D
Ô
ÒD 	 1,     ½ Ô ½ Õ. 5.8 
 
Here  Ô and Ò are vectors representing a possible outbreak configuration (%=1 if the th 
individual is infected in the course of the outbreak and 0 otherwise) and Ö ½ × means 
 ½ ,   	 1, … , % and ∑ 	Ö×D ∑ … ∑ .ØÙØDÚÙÚD  With this formulation the infectious period 
distribution can be allowed to vary for each bird. However, for the scenario considered 
throughout this chapter, when only the total number of birds infected within the flock, 
rather than the final infection status of the bird in each specific category, is known, allowing 
such variation is difficult to justify. Therefore, where this formulation is used in this analysis 
the infectious period distribution is assumed to be equal for all birds. 
The probability of an outbreak of size % occurring is then: 
 L§,¦+§¦ % 	 4 L§,¦+§¦ &Ò)5||Ò|| 	 %
Õ
ÒD , 5.9 
where 5.  is the indicator function.  
Simulated data for any flock size, number of initial infectives, value of  and overall vaccine 
efficacy can then be obtained for any of the above models of vaccination simply by 
randomly drawing outbreak sizes according to the outbreak size probability distribution 
these generate. 
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5.2.4 Bayesian estimation of the reproduction number 
Given the probability distribution of \, the infectious period distribution (although, for 
simplicity, this is assumed to be a constant throughout the analysis), it is possible to obtain 
the likelihood of any set of " final outbreak sizes, number of initial infectives and population 
sizes , , # 	 , , #, … ,  ,  , # ! for any chosen value of $ in an unvaccinated 
population:  
 
Û $Ü , , # , \ _ Û £, , # Ý$, \¤ Û$ 
with   Û , , #Ü$, \ 	 ∏ L§U,¦U+§U¦U  D  
 
5.10 
This likelihood can then be explored using a standard random-walk Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm to reach and draw from the posterior distribution of $ and thus . This method 
can also be applied to estimate  in a vaccinated population under the assumption of a 
“leaky” vaccine. Unless otherwise specified, in each analysis $ was assigned a uniform prior 
distribution bounded between 0 and 10000. 
In order to quantify the protection achieved by an “all or nothing” vaccine when , and 
therefore $, is known, it is necessary to calculate  Û rÜ , , # , $, \ , where r is the 
proportion of individuals who are successfully protected by vaccination. For a single 
experiment this can be estimated by obtaining the posterior distribution of the number of 
initially susceptible individuals, ´, and calculating the efficacy as  ¦+§+Â¦+§  . However, when the 
data consists of multiple outbreaks, the likelihood has to be integrated over the distribution 
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of the number of individuals who achieve full immunity for a given “all or nothing” coverage 
and efficacy (Ball and Lyne 2002; Becker, Britton et al. 2003): 
 
Û r| , , # , $ _ Q ] N|´ ,  , # , $, \
¦U+§U
ÂUD
 
D N´|r'´                                                   
	 Q 4 #K´  ´É#K K ´+ÉLÂU,§U¦U 
¦U+§U
ÞD
 
D . 
5.11 
When vaccine response is assumed to follow a beta distribution with given heterogeneity , 
as described in equation (5.7), the likelihood of any overall vaccine efficacy r 	 , for any 
set of outbreak sizes can be written as: 
 Û | , , # , $,  _ Q ] N&|ßà,  , # , $, \)ßà
 
D N&ßà|, )'ßà, 5.12 
where ßà is an ordered vector of vaccine responses in the th population. Integrating this 
likelihood directly would be computationally intensive. Instead the likelihood was integrated 
using stochastic methods, with each individual response treated as a nuisance parameter to 
be estimated. An uniform prior bounded between 0 and 10000 was assumed for  and each 
unobserved vaccine response was assigned a uniform prior bounded between 0 and 1. The 
set of vaccine responses r( k ß 	 ß|, … , ßá! and the overall mean vaccine efficacy , 
initially set to values randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 were 
then updated according to the following two step MCMC algorithm: 
(1) Proposed values of the mean overall efficacy, . were drawn from a normal 
distribution truncated and centred at the current value of  with variance â 
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calibrated to ensure adequate acceptance and updated according to a standard 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, with proposed values not within the interval [0,1] 
assigned zero likelihood. 
(2) An experiment  and individual within this flock - was chosen randomly and a new 
value for this individual’s response to the vaccine, rã~f0,1h, was proposed. 
This process was repeated  times. Denoting {äå, … äå } the full set of vaccine 
responses this generates, these proposed responses are then accepted with 
probability: 
 1 	 min ©1, Q N|äæà ,  , # , $, \Näæà |, N&|ß¡,  , # , $, \)N&ßà|, )
 
D  ª, 5.13 
with  calibrated so as to ensure adequate acceptance. This process was then 
repeated ¢ times, with ¢ calibrated to ensure the chain mixed adequately. 
These steps were repeated until the algorithm had converged and a sufficient sample of the 
posterior distribution of  has been obtained. 
5.2.5 Calculating the minimum flock size needed to reject   | for an “all-
or-nothing” vaccine 
The best case scenario, in terms of the vaccine efficacy achieved during a transmission 
experiment, is that all vaccinated birds become effectively protected. However, with the all-
or-nothing” vaccine action model described above, there will always be a possibility that 
such an event can occur despite an underlying failure rate of the vaccine which is not 
sufficiently low to bring the effective reproductive number below unity. However, if the 
basic reproductive number is known, it is possible to calculate the upper bound of the 
confidence interval, with associated significance level τ, of this failure rate, X. This would be 
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the largest value of Xè which satisfies Né 	 0  G where é~ê#&#, Xè), with # the total 
number of vaccinated birds used in the experiment.  
Similarly, if  is known, it is possible, even before the experiment has been conducted, to 
calculate the minimum number of vaccinated birds required in order to have any prospect 
of demonstrating that, under the assumption of an “all-or-nothing” vaccine,   1. This 
number would be the smallest value of #³¦ which satisfies 
 Né 	 0  G, é~ê# £#³¦, 1¤. 5.14 
5.2.6 The final size distribution and reproduction number when both 
challenge and non-challenged birds are vaccinated. 
One of the assumptions implicit in the types of experiment and analyses described above is 
that, once infected, vaccinated birds are as infectious as non-vaccinated birds. However, an 
effective vaccine may inhibit transmission within a flock by reducing the infectivity of any 
infected vaccinated bird. In an attempt to account for this possibility and thus more 
accurately capture transmission within a flock of vaccinated birds, final size estimates of the 
effects of HPAI vaccines upon the reproduction number are often applied to experiments 
where both the birds challenged with infection and the flock they are subsequently 
introduced to have received vaccination (van der Goot, van Boven et al. 2007; van der Goot, 
van Boven et al. 2008; Bouma, Claassen et al. 2009). In such analyses all challenged birds are 
assumed to have become infected and be equally infectious, regardless of the results of any 
cloacal or tracheal swabs taken, and all non-challenge birds are assumed to be equally 
susceptible, with positive swabs assumed to indicate the presence of infection.  When a 
vaccine is leaky and, as a result, all challenged vaccinated birds are equally infectious, the 
average number of infections arising from a single challenged bird is equivalent to the 
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reproduction number and such an analysis would provide a valid estimate of the 
reproduction number within a wholly vaccinated flock. However, when vaccine response is 
not homogenous, these two values are no longer equivalent. As a result, the average 
number of infections arising from a challenged bird no longer provides a threshold indicator 
as to whether a major outbreak can occur and the estimate of the reproduction potential of 
infection within a flock is subject to further potential bias. Instead, when vaccine responses 
are distributed into a finite number of compartments, the reproduction number can be 
calculated as the dominant eigenvalue of the next generation matrix this creates 
(Diekmann, Heesterbeek et al. 2010). In the case of an all-or-nothing vaccine (or indeed an 
“all-or-something” vaccine where the vaccine fully protects a proportion of birds and 
reduces the transmissibility and susceptibility of the remainder by uniform amounts), as 
they are the only birds which become infected, the overall effective reproduction number 
(remembering that this is the average number of secondary cases arising from a single 
infectious bird) is simply the number of cases arising from a bird in which vaccination has 
not been fully effective. The final size probabilities in this scenario then become 
 LÂ+Âë,§+§ë¦  5.15 
where  is the number of challenged and ´ the number of non-challenged birds protected 
by the vaccine. 
5.3 Results 
As shown by others, holding the overall efficacy of the vaccine fixed, the expected final size 
of an outbreak following vaccination with an “all or nothing” vaccine is lower than that of a 
“leaky” vaccine (Ball, Britton et al. 2004). Essentially this is because, whilst both vaccines 
increase the probability that the outbreak will die out within the first few infections, the “all 
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or nothing” vaccine also reduces the eventual size of any major outbreak that may occur 
(Figure 5-2). 
 
Figure 5-2| Different final outbreak distribution for  	 ì for different models of vaccine action 
in a population size 50. 
 No vaccination (black line), leaky vaccination with efficacy 0.5 (red line), all or nothing vaccination with 
efficacy 0.5 (blue line). 
 
5.3.1 Fitting vaccine models to data from one experiment 
In order to assess the extent to which data from a single experiment within a vaccinated 
flock can provide information about the likely action of a vaccine, the relative fit of the 
“leaky” and “all-or-nothing” assumptions of vaccine action to all possible outbreak sizes in a 
flock of 50 birds were calculated, with the exception of the scenario where all birds become 
infected which, as Figure 5-3 shows, results in a posterior distribution of the leaky vaccine 
estimate which is highly sensitive to changes in the prior distribution (the posterior 
distribution of all other outbreak sizes were invariant to these choices of prior).  
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Figure 5-3| Sensitivity of the leaky vaccine model to the choice of prior in the scenario where all 
birds become infected.  
Results shown are for a single flock of 50 birds where all 50 become infected during the experiment, 
circle represent posterior means and bars represent 95% credible intervals. 
 
 With the exception of scenarios where the vaccine proves counter-productive (i.e. the 
fitted effective number within the vaccinated flock is greater than the known basic 
reproduction number), such data would always favour an all-or-nothing vaccine, with the 
difference in DICs between the models increasing rapidly as the size of the outbreak passes 
/#, the susceptible population size at which, under the all-or-nothing assumption,  
reaches unity (Figure 5-4).  
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Figure 5-4| Fitting different models of vaccine action to all possible outbreak sizes in a population 
of 50 birds.  
(a) Difference between DICs of leaky and all-or-nothing models for different  and outbreak sizes.(b) 
Estimated fraction vaccinated for  all-or-nothing models with different  (c) Estimated  for all- or-nothing 
models with different  and “leaky” vaccine model (dashed grey line). 
 
This is because, as illustrated in Figure 5-5, it becomes possible to fit a fraction completely 
immune sufficient to prevent larger outbreaks whilst allowing the effective reproduction 
number to remain above unity, readily infecting the remaining susceptible individuals. This 
results in much higher values of the likelihood of the particular outbreak size than for the 
equivalent fitted leaky vaccine estimator. 
 
Figure 5-5| Posterior mean final size distribution fitted to an outbreak involving 29 birds in a flock 
of 50. 
 
D
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 D
IC
s
(L
e
a
k
y
-
A
o
N
)
-10
-5
0
5
10
0 10 20 30 40 50
Outbreak size
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 10 20 30 40 50
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
 p
ro
te
c
te
d
Outbreak size
Series2
Series3
Series4
Series5
Series6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 10 20 30 40 50
R
e
p
ro
d
u
c
ti
v
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r
Outbreak size
05.1
0
=R
5.1
0
=R
3
0
=R
5
0
=R
10
0
=R
a b c
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 154 
 
When an outbreak infects either a majority or a minority of the flock, it becomes more 
difficult to differentiate between the two models as the bimodal outbreak probabilities 
which characterise the “leaky” vaccine model are more easily fitted. At smaller flock sizes, 
such as those used during vaccine experiments, this bimodality becomes compressed to the 
extent that it proves impossible to differentiate between vaccine actions with any 
confidence based upon a single  experiment. However, when an all-or-nothing vaccine 
reduces the mean size of an outbreak it also results in a lower variance in the size of an 
outbreak than a leaky vaccine of the same overall efficacy (Figure 5-6). This suggests that, if 
multiple experiments are carried out, the variation in the size of outbreaks, rather than the 
mean outbreak size, may, using a measure of the ability of a fitted model to reproduce the 
observed data such as DIC, make it possible to differentiate between the fit of the two 
models.   
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Figure 5-6| Plot of variance in the size of outbreaks against average outbreak size in flocks of ten 
vaccinated birds for “leaky” and “all-or-nothing” vaccination scenarios.  
Grey line shows the mean and variance for the distribution of final outbreak sizes as the basic reproductive 
number (or equivalently the effective reproductive number under a leaky vaccine) increases from 0 to 5, the 
remaining lines then show the mean and variance for the distribution of final outbreak sizes for an all-or-
nothing vaccine as vaccine efficacy decreases (moving from left to right on the figure) from 1 to 0.05 for the 
situations where  =1.1 (black line), 1.5 (purple line), 2 (blue line), 5 (green line), 10 (orange line) and 20 (red 
line). The dashed segment of each line highlights scenarios where   1.(a) shows the possible combinations 
of mean and variances when a single infected bird is introduced to a vaccinated flock of ten birds and (b) 
shows the same figure when 10 infected birds are introduced to the a vaccinated flock of ten birds. (c) and (d) 
show the same two figures but where the mean outbreak size axis has been truncated to show the most 
important scenarios (where  is near 1) more clearly. 
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5.3.2 Fitting vaccine models to data from multiple experiments 
With higher values of , the difference between the variance in outbreak sizes resulting 
from the use of an all-or-nothing vaccine and that of a leaky vaccine increases (Figure 5-6), 
thus the number of outbreaks needed to differentiate between the two models decreases. 
As a result, if  is known and is sufficiently high, it may be possible to identify which model 
fits the observed final outbreak sizes from a relatively low number of transmission 
experiments. However, this is likely to hold only when a vaccine fails to reduce the 
reproduction number below unity (Figure 5-7).  In such a scenario, if experiments are 
repeated a sufficient number of times, an all-or-nothing vaccine is likely to generate a high 
number of mid-sized outbreaks which would be difficult to reproduce using a model of leaky 
efficacy (Figure 5-7(a)). In contrast, only scenarios where a leaky vaccine reduces 
susceptibility substantially, but not to the extent that large scale outbreaks can never occur, 
give rise to sets of outbreaks sizes which are not possible to reproduce using an all-or-
nothing vaccine model of any efficacy. As a result, the range of efficacies where a leaky 
vaccine can be correctly identified within a plausible number of experiments is relatively 
narrow (Figure 5-6(b)).  
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Figure 5-7| Scenario analysis of the ability to correctly favour a leaky or all-or-nothing vaccine 
model. 
For both the leaky and all-or-nothing vaccine models, 100 datasets were simulated for each combination of , vaccine efficacy and number of experiments. Experiments involved a single infectious bird introduced into 
a vaccinated flock of ten birds. Scenarios where í  1 are highlighted in red. The DICs  of the leaky vaccine 
model and the all-or-nothing model were fitted to each of these simulations were then recorded. (a) shows 
the percentage of simulated all-or-nothing datasets which were correctly identified as being generated by an 
all-or-nothing model (when the fitted model had a DIC value at least 5 lower than the fitted leaky model), 
similarly (b) shows the percentage of simulated leaky datasets which were correcty identified as being 
generated by a leaky vaccine model. 
 
 
5.3.3 The effect of misspecification of vaccine action upon estimates of 
vaccine efficacy. 
Figure 5-8(a) illustrates that, of all possible assumptions regarding the distribution of 
vaccine response within a flock, the all-or-nothing and leaky models produce extreme 
estimates of . The all-or-nothing vaccine assumption is the most conservative assumption 
regarding the level of control achieved whilst the leaky vaccine assumption is the most 
optimistic. The extent to which the leaky model will underestimate the reproduction 
number depends upon the degree to which it overestimates the level of homogeneity in 
vaccine response (Figure 5-8(a)). Importantly, this may lead to scenarios where, as result of 
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assuming a leaky mode of action of the vaccine and thus underestimating the level of 
heterogeneity in vaccine response, a vaccine may be wrongly estimated to have brought the 
effective reproduction number below unity (Figure 5-8(a) and (b)). 
 
Figure 5-8| The effect of misspecification of the level of heterogeneity in vaccine response.  
Figure shows (a) the posterior mean and 95% credible intervals of  when different values of a are fitted to a 
set of 10 experiments where 5 infected birds are introduced to 5 vaccinated birds, =10, Ð 	 . |Ñ, a 	 |.   
(b) and (c) show results obtained from fitting a leaky vaccine model using different values of a. For each choice 
of a, 10 sets of 10 experiments with 5 infected birds introduced to 5 vaccinated birds where simulated with 
the parameters =10 and Ð 	 . . In (a) and (b) the dotted line represents the true value of  used to 
simulate outbreaks. 
 
As an example, the likelihood of making such an erroneous conclusion for an all-or-nothing 
vaccine which only reduces the effective reproduction number within a flock to 1.25 was 
assessed for different values of  and study sizes (Figure 5-9). When a leaky vaccine model 
was fitted to simulated experiments which involved introducing a single initially infected 
bird into a flock, the reproduction number was only wrongly estimated to be below unity 
when the basic reproduction number was relatively high, with the evidence for such a 
conclusion increasing with the number of experiments performed. However, in such 
scenarios, if the basic reproduction number had previously been estimated, it would often 
be possible to ascertain that an all-or-nothing estimate produced a better fit to the data 
(Figure 5-9).  
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Figure 5-9| Effect of assuming a leaky vaccine for experiments where an all-or-nothing vaccine 
results in  	 |. ¸Ñ.  
100 sets of experiments involving ten vaccinated birds are simulated for each combination of study size and 
reproductive number using the all-or-nothing vaccine outbreak probabilities with efficacy adjusted to ensure  	 |. ¸Ñ. Both the leaky and all-or-nothing vaccine models were then fitted to each of these sets. (a) shows 
the percentage of simulations where the one-tailed 95% credible interval of the leaky vaccine estimator did 
not include 1, (b) shows the percentage of simulations where the difference in DIC was greater than five in 
favour of the all-or-nothing model. For both (a) and (b) the left hand column shows the results for scenarios 
where 1 infected bird is introduced to a flock of 10 vaccinated birds and the right hand column shows the 
results for the equivalent scenarios but with 10 infected birds introduced to 10 vaccinated birds. Blue, green, 
orange and red lines correspond to scenarios where  =1.5, 3, 5 and 10 respectively.  
 
In contrast, when, as has been recommended, multiple infected birds are introduced into 
the vaccinated flock, the likelihood of mistakenly concluding that the critical vaccine 
threshold has been reached increases dramatically and there is little chance of detecting any 
difference between the fit of the different actions of vaccine (Figure 5-9). Using  	 5, a 
value well within the distribution of estimates for the  of H5N1 (Table 2-1), as an example, 
a leaky vaccine model to pairs of experiments produced an estimate of   1 in 43% of the 
scenarios tested. For the tested scenarios involving a larger number of experiments or a 
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higher  this occurred more often than not and, with a sufficient number of experiments, 
became inevitable for all scenarios except for those where, if   1, the vaccine had not 
actually had much effect (e.g.  	 1.5).  Moreover, with multiple initial infected birds, it is 
possible to choose a reproduction number which generates final size distributions which are 
more similar to those of any given all-or-nothing vaccine (Figure 5-6). This makes it 
extremely difficult to distinguish between the final outbreak size distribution of a leaky 
vaccine reducing the reproduction number below unity and that occurring as a result of 
infection spreading readily between birds not protected by an all-or-nothing vaccine (Figure 
5-9(d)). 
If a high  is estimated, smaller transmission experiments may not have the power to 
establish that   1, under the conservative assumption of an “all or nothing” vaccine. For 
example, a study involving 20 vaccinated birds, all of which avoid infection, would only be 
sufficient, making the assumption that all birds avoided infection as a result of being fully 
protected, to conclude, at a 5% significance level, that the critical vaccine threshold had 
been reached for   7.2 (Figure 5-10). 
 
Figure 5-10| Minimum number of vaccinated birds required to reject   1 under the assumption 
of an all-or-nothing vaccine.  
Significance level: 5% (solid line), 1% (dotted line) and 10% (dashed line). 
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5.3.4 Effect of the misspecification of vaccine action when both challenge 
and non-challenged birds are vaccinated. 
Vaccinating both challenge and non-challenge birds further exacerbates the extent to which 
a leaky vaccine model will underestimate the reproduction number from experimental data 
using an all-or-nothing (or all-or-something) vaccine. This is because the leaky model 
overestimates the number of infected birds, as well as the number of susceptible birds, 
within the flock. As a result, for many scenarios where an all-or-nothing vaccine is not 
sufficient to bring the reproduction number below unity, there would be the distinct 
possibility of mistakenly inferring that   1. This probability decreases, for a fixed ,  
with both a lower  and when fewer experiments are conducted. However, even at levels 
of  within the lower range of those estimated for H5N1 (Table 2-1) and at study sizes 
equivalent to those conducted to estimate the efficacy of H5N1 vaccines (van der Goot, van 
Boven et al. 2008; Bouma, Claassen et al. 2009), there exist scenarios where wrongly 
inferring   1 would be the most likely outcome when using a leaky vaccine estimator 
(Figure 5-10).  
Figure 5-11| Probability of wrongly inferring   1 based upon the assumption of a leaky vaccine 
when both challenged and unchallenged birds are vaccinated with an all-or-nothing vaccine.  
All-or-nothing vaccine efficacy was adjusted for each value of   to ensure the correct . For each 
combination the result shown is percentage of 500 simulations where the estimated one-sided 95% credible 
interval of the leaky vaccine estimate was below unity. (a) shows the results when fitted to pairs of 
experiments and (b) for sets of five experiments. Black lines represent  	    and grey lines  	 , dashed 
lines show the equivalent values when only unchallenged birds are vaccinated. 
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For example, in an analysis by Van der Goot et al (van der Goot, van Boven et al. 2008), virus 
was isolated from only four out of nine Pekin ducks inoculated with H5N1 virus following a 
double dose of an inactivated H5N2 vaccine, suggesting the existence of some 
heterogeneity in vaccine response.  These birds were then separated into a group of four 
and a group of five and introduced into two unchallenged flocks of five birds which had 
previously received the same vaccine regimen. Making the assumption that this 
heterogeneity can be characterised by an all-or-nothing or all-or-something vaccine and 
using the maximum likelihood estimate of the efficacy of this vaccine (4/9=0.44), it was 
found that for a basic reproduction number of 2.3 (so that  would be slightly above unity), 
the probability that a leaky vaccine estimator would wrongly find strong evidence that the 
reproduction number had been brought below unity was around 41%. This probability then 
decays relatively slowly with increasing , saturating at around 5% for values of   10 
(Figure 5-12). The real-life result of this experiment resulted in virus being isolated from one 
unchallenged duck, resulting in a leaky vaccine estimate of  	 0.2 which was below unity 
at the 10% significance level. 
 
 
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 163 
 
 
Figure 5-12| Probability of wrongly inferring   1 from two experiments when assuming an all-
or-nothing vaccine with 44% efficacy which is leaky.  
A leaky vaccine model was fitted to 1000 simulated datasets for experiments with 4 and 5 challenged 
vaccinated birds introduced to two sets of 5 unchallenged vaccinated birds for reproductive numbers between 
2.3 and 10 and the proportion which resulted in an estimate of strong evidence for   1 was calculated. 
5.4 Discussion 
Final outbreak size distributions provide a framework for inference about the spread of 
infection within a flock which have the advantage of requiring data which is very often 
readily available, especially within an experimental context. However, implementing these 
methods generally require assumptions are made about the infection process, with regards 
to the infectious period distribution and the nature of mixing within a flock. When using 
these methods to compare the spread of infection within a vaccinated and control flock the 
action by which vaccination achieves protection becomes an additional unknown.  
As this analysis shows, the assumption made regarding this factor can have a large effect 
upon the estimate of reproduction number within the vaccinated flock. In the existing 
literature, estimates of this from the final outbreak size within the context of transmission 
experiments tend to make the implicit assumption of a “leaky” vaccine. This has the 
advantage of not requiring any knowledge about the basic reproduction number. However, 
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in terms of the estimate of the level of control achieved by the vaccine, it represents the 
most optimistic assumption possible. Moreover, various scenarios were found where, if 
flock sizes or the number of repeat experiments are sufficiently large, alternative models of 
vaccine action may provide a significantly better fit. In particular, when  is sufficiently 
high, medium-sized outbreaks within relatively large vaccinated flocks and a lower level of 
variance in the size of outbreaks than that expected from a “leaky” vaccine may indicate 
that observed outbreak sizes are more easily explained by a model which incorporates 
heterogeneity in individual response to the vaccine and, therefore, a higher . 
The benefits and drawbacks of introducing different numbers of infected birds at the 
beginning of an experiment need to be more carefully evaluated when establishing the 
protocol of any transmission experiment and are likely to depend upon the size of the study. 
Vaccine experiments often introduce multiple infected birds into a vaccinated flock in order 
to challenge the level of herd immunity that has been achieved robustly and reduce the 
chances that a minor outbreak would occur stochastically despite an ineffective vaccine 
(Velthuis, Bouma et al. 2007). However, this will further bias the estimate of   as a result 
of any misspecification of the level of heterogeneity in individual response to vaccination 
and may directly lead to the mistaken conclusion that the level of immunity within the flock 
has passed the critical vaccination threshold. Thus simply fitting an effective reproduction 
number to final size data from such experiments, in the absence of information with regards 
to the action of a given vaccine, is not an adequate measure of vaccine efficacy. Reducing 
the number of initially infected birds is also likely to make it easier to choose between 
competing models of vaccine action and, as it also reduces the probability that the entire 
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flock becomes infected during the experiment, may make estimation of  from the control 
group using final size methods more straightforward.  
As well as having an effect on susceptibility to infection, vaccines may also reduce the 
onwards transmission of disease when a vaccinated bird becomes infected. Attempts to 
quantify the transmission of HPAI in vaccinated flocks have involved analysing the final size 
of outbreaks within flocks where challenged birds also receive vaccination. However, this 
compounds the extent to which the assumption of a leaky vaccine will underestimate the 
true reproduction number within the flock. Within the current literature there are examples 
of transmission experiments involving H5N1 vaccines where not all vaccinated birds 
challenged with infection became infected, suggesting that the level of heterogeneity in 
vaccine response was under-represented by the leaky vaccine final size estimator which was 
applied (van der Goot, van Boven et al. 2008; Bouma, Claassen et al. 2009). This may suggest 
that some vaccines are less effective at reducing the transmission potential of HPAI within a 
flock than these studies would appear to suggest. This highlights the fact that in order 
estimate transmission and the adequacy of any vaccine accurately, the distribution of 
vaccine response, both in terms of the susceptibility to infection and infectiousness of 
vaccinated birds, need to be better understood. In the absence of such data, assessing the 
transmissibility and susceptibility of vaccinated birds in separate experiments may produce 
a more reliable estimate of the effects of a vaccine and provide greater insight as to the 
action by which the vaccine confers protection. The resources necessary to conduct such 
analyses may, however, be prohibitive.  
An alternative, more robust way to ensure the efficacy of a vaccine is adequate would be to 
establish a range of plausible basic reproduction numbers, perhaps based upon the 
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experiments conducted on the control group, use this to estimate the minimum number of 
birds required, using the method described in this chapter, and then challenge this number 
of vaccinated birds to infection, either directly or through a transmission experiment with a 
sufficiently high number of initially infected birds. This method would also, provided it is 
safe to assume that vaccination does not enhance transmissibility once infected, be 
conservative with respect to assumptions regarding the extent to which vaccination reduces 
infectivity. However, in the context of H5N1, very high reproduction numbers have been 
estimated from transmission experiments involving flocks of both chickens and ducks (van 
der Goot, van Boven et al. 2007; Poetri, Bouma et al. 2009).  Taking the most recent as an 
example, an  of 12 was estimated for the transmission of H5N1 between chickens with a 
lower 95% confidence interval of 4.7. This estimate is well within the region where 
misspecification of the action of the vaccine can lead to an important underestimation of 
. To reject the hypothesis >1 using the method described above would require that the 
experiment involves a minimum of 35 vaccinated birds, suggesting that typical vaccine 
experiment sizes may not be sufficient.  
Wrongly inferring that  has been brought below unity as a result of a leaky vaccine would 
be of little consequence if all outbreaks occurred within the context of a small closed 
population, with the high coverage achieved by an all-or-nothing vaccine having a similar 
effect in reducing transmission as the reduction in susceptibility induced by the leaky 
vaccine. However, in larger flocks an all-or-nothing vaccine which fails to induce sufficient 
herd immunity may still lead to a sizeable outbreak within the remaining susceptible sub-
population. This is likely to have consequences during real life epidemics with larger flock 
sizes and where transmission routes exist between flocks and could feasibly lead to a 
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situation where infection is sustained within a flock but mortality is reduced to a level which 
makes outbreaks difficult to detect. Such “silent spread” may have serious implications for 
the overall effectiveness of any large-scale vaccination campaign (Savill, St Rose et al. 2006), 
where any prolonging of the time it takes to detect outbreaks may offset the reduction in 
infectivity and susceptibility induced by the vaccine. This suggests that for H5N1, and other 
pathogens with similar transmissibility, further trials may be necessary to establish that, 
even in the controlled context of a transmission experiment, vaccines are sufficiently 
efficacious to prevent sustained transmission within a flock. 
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Chapter 6 An estimate of the effect of H5N1 
vaccination upon within and between flock 
transmission in Indonesia 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the use of final size methods to estimate the reproduction number 
within the context of animal transmission experiments were explored. In this chapter the 
same methods are applied to data collected from field investigations into outbreaks of 
H5N1 in Indonesia. These investigations were carried out in areas where the Operational 
Research in Indonesia for more effective control of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(ORIHPAI) study was taking place. This study was undertaken within 16 districts on the 
island of Java where the Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response (PDSR) programme 
(a reporting network which covers much of Indonesia and combines active and reactive 
surveillance as well as rapid testing for the presence of Influenza A and the collection of 
samples for laboratory confirmation is well established (Forster 2010). ORIHPAI was a year 
long study designed to assess whether mass vaccination can feasibly reduce the incidence 
and intensity of outbreaks within populations of small scale commercial and backyard 
poultry which characterise the majority of poultry production in Indonesia. It involves 
randomly selected sub-districts which are then randomly allocated either treatment or 
control status. Those sub-districts allocated treatment status are then further separated 
into two categories: 1) PDSR with mass vaccination with an inactivated Indonesian H5N1 
avian influenza (AI) strain (A/Ck/Legok/2003) and 2) PDSR with mass vaccination with both 
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AI and Newcastle Disease vaccine. In both treatment arms AI vaccination was then offered 
to small-scale commercial and backyard farms free of charge and on a voluntary basis, with 
the aim of vaccinating each flock with an initial inoculation and 3 week booster 4 times over 
the study period. Sero-monitoring following the first round of vaccination found 11% of 
poultry in the control sub-districts with antibody titre >0, 55% in zones which received AI 
vaccination alone and 47% in areas which received AI and ND vaccination, suggesting that 
the programme had achieved partial coverage. Vaccination was re-administered every six 
months with three rounds occurring between July 2008 and July 2009. 
 Here the data obtained from these field investigation are used to estimate the reproduction 
number for outbreaks which arose during the study period, both at a within and between 
flock level. The aim of this analysis was to assess whether outbreaks in vaccinated areas 
differed substantially from those within control measures and, if so, attempt to infer to 
what extent this can be attributable to the impact of vaccination.   
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Data collection 
Data were collected in the form of field outbreak investigations within each of the 16 
ORIHPAI districts between February and November 2009. In each of these districts a list of 
confirmed outbreaks was generated, with only those verified by either a positive PDSR rapid 
antigen test, laboratory PCR and/or virus typing included. Depending on available time and 
the number of outbreaks which had occurred within the district, 1-4 outbreaks were then 
randomly selected and investigated with the constraint that at least one of the outbreaks 
was from a vaccination (either AI or AI and ND) zone and at least one from an area where 
only standard PDSR control was implemented, provided such outbreaks existed. In each of 
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these districts data on the number of birds affected in individual flocks and the size of these 
flocks, as well as data on the timing of first and last observed signs of infection where 
possible, were obtained via in-depth interviews with poultry-holders within the rukun 
tetangga (RT- the smallest administrative unit in Indonesia and roughly translated as 
“neighbourhood”) in which the outbreak occurred. The total number of households within 
the RT, confirmed by a transept walk through the study RT, and the number of households 
which had experienced infected poultry was also recorded. 
In total, within the 16 selected sub-districts, field investigations were carried out in 41 RTs 
where outbreaks had been reported, with 16 of these within sub-districts which had been 
allocated treatment status (either AI or AI and ND vaccination) within ORIHPAI. The 
remaining 25 were in sub-districts which only received PDSR as an intervention.  During 
these field investigations, data on the flock size and total number of birds infected was 
collected from a total of 109 farmers, 40 in vaccination zones and 69 in control zones, as 
well as data on whether any birds were the sold and slaughtered during the course of the 
outbreak.  In total 43 of the farmers reported they had sold or slaughtered poultry in the 
face of an outbreak. As the infection status of these birds, and thus the likely impact selling 
or slaughtering had upon the final outbreak size, could not be established, the outbreaks 
within these flocks were excluded from the analysis. This left 25 flock-level outbreaks in 
vaccination zones and 41 in the control zone (Figure 6-1). 
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Figure 6-1| Flock and RT sizes and proportion infected.  
Figure shows (a) Flock level outbreaks, (b) RT level outbreaks, height of bars represent, respectively, the total 
number of birds within each flock and the total number of flocks within the RT, with the proportion infected 
represented by the coloured proportion of each bar.  
6.2.2 Reproduction number estimation 
Analysis was conducted at two different resolutions, that of within-flock transmission where 
each flock was treated as a closed population and transmission takes place between 
individual birds, and between-flock transmission where each RT was treated as a closed 
population and transmission takes place between flocks. At both of these levels outbreaks 
were modelled as GSEs (see previous Chapter), with a single initial infective, and the 
posterior distribution of the reproduction numbers was obtained using the methods as 
described in the previous chapter, with the likelihood of each final outbreak size calculated 
using the construction proposed by Ball (Ball 1986). For each estimate, uniform priors 
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bounded between 0 and 10000 were used for the parameter $, a burn-in period of 3000 
steps of the MCMC was used and the posterior distribution was sampled every 5 steps for a 
total of 30000.  
Estimation of the reproductive number from the data required a separate estimate of the 
infectious period distribution. within- and between-flock transmission. For within-flock 
transmission, an estimate from a recent analysis within the existing literature (Bouma, 
Claassen et al. 2009) of a mean infectious period of 2.5 days with a variance of 0.16 was 
used (Figure 6-3(b)). For between-flock transmission the distribution was fitted to the 
observed outbreak durations (estimated from the dates at which infection was first and last 
observed within a flock and assuming there was a day of infectivity before infection was first 
observed). 
6.2.3 Dealing with larger population sizes 
For values of   1,  outbreaks can be expected to die out within the first few infections, 
whilst for   1 outbreak probabilities are bimodal in nature, with outbreaks either dying 
out stochastically within the first few infections or taking off and infecting a large proportion 
of the population (Figure 6-2(b)). As a result, extreme scenarios such as large outbreaks 
when   1 and, more importantly due to the recursive way of calculating the outbreaks 
probabilities, the intermediate outbreak sizes between the plausible “major” and “minor” 
outbreak scenarios for   1 can become numerically unstable (Demiris and O'Neill 2006). 
This is because the recursive calculation of small outbreak probabilities leads to rounding 
errors and negative outbreak probabilities when the required accuracy exceeds the 
precision available for the standard data types used in many programming languages (Figure 
6-2(a)). For double precision arithmetic these errors tend to occur in populations of around 
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50 or more. In order to avoid such problems calculations for larger outbreaks were carried 
out using the arbitrary precision floating point classes available from the Number Theory 
Library (NTL) package (Shoup 2003).  
 
Figure 6-2| Dealing with numerical instabilities.  
Figure shows (a)  Outbreak probabilities for =2 in a population size 200 as calculated using 
standard double precision. (b) Outbreak probabilities for =2 (red line) and =0.5 (blue line) as 
calculated using 150 bit precision. 
 
6.2.4 Estimating the protective effect of vaccination 
As discussed in the previous chapter, any estimate of the effective reproduction number in 
birds which have received vaccination depends upon the assumption made about the 
distribution of vaccine response within individual birds. However, when vaccination 
coverage is unknown, directly calculating the likelihood of an outbreak size for any given 
assumption about the action of the vaccine involves both integrating over all possible 
vaccine coverages and, as the vaccination status of the birds which were infected is also 
unknown, all possible combinations of infections within vaccinated and unvaccinated birds 
which could produce the observed outbreak size, making the likelihood overly 
computationally intensive. When attempting to estimate the coverage of the vaccine, the 
only assumption about the action of the vaccine which eliminates the latter uncertainty is 
that of an “all-or-nothing” vaccine where vaccinated birds are either totally immune (and 
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therefore don’t feature within the number of infections) or totally susceptible. With regards 
to the action of the vaccine, this assumption constitutes the least optimistic estimate of the 
proportion of birds protected by vaccination. This is because, for any other assumption, 
larger outbreaks would be expected for the same coverage. Therefore, as shown in Chapter 
5, for any given , a higher estimated protective coverage would be required to fit the 
observed outbreak sizes.  
If  is known then, using the notation introduced in the previous chapter for final size 
probabilities, the number of individuals (birds for within flock transmission, whole flocks for 
between flock transmission) vaccinated within the population, ï, can be modelled by a beta 
distribution with shape parameters P and . This provides the likelihood: 
 Û&P, |&, #), , \) _ Q ] N|ï , # , $, \
¦U+
UD
 
D Nï|P, 'ï 6.1 
Integrating over all possible levels of vaccine coverage can then also be avoided by treating 
each ï  as a nuisance parameter to be augmented. Using uniform priors, bounded between 
0 and 10000 for the P and  parameters of the beta distribution and between 0 and 1 for 
each unobserved vaccine coverage, a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm similar to that used to 
update individual susceptibilities in the previous chapter was implemented in order to 
estimate the posterior distribution of P and . 
Whilst this will only provide an estimate of the protective coverage, and not the overall 
number of birds actually vaccinated, from the perspective of assessing the effectiveness of a 
vaccination programme, a lower-bound of the overall coverage achieved with regards to 
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assumptions about the action of the vaccine can be obtained by assuming a perfect or 
wholly effective vaccine. 
6.3 Results 
When all outbreaks were analysed together at the within-flock level (Figure 6-3(a)), using 
the infectious period based upon the results of a transmission experiment (Figure 6-3(b)), 
 was estimated as 2.54 with 95% credible interval (95% CrI) (2.35-2.74). Disaggregating 
outbreaks in control and vaccination zones produced reproduction numbers of 2.79, 95% CrI 
(2.52-3.10) within flocks in control zones and of 2.23, 95% CrI (1.96-2.51) in vaccination 
zones (Fig 7-3(a)). This difference is decisive according to Jeffreys’ scale of evidence (Jeffreys 
1961) (a Bayes factor (BF)> 100 see subsection 3.2.10).  
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Figure 6-3| Reproductive numbers for a variable infectious period.  
Figure shows (a) Posterior distribution of within-flock reproductive number outbreaks in vaccination zones 
(blue lines), control zones (red lines) and the aggregated data (black lines). (b) Within-flock infectious period 
distribution used in analysis. (c) Posterior distribution of between-flock reproductive number for outbreaks in 
vaccination zones (blue lines) and control zones (red lines) and the aggregated data (black lines). (d) Histogram 
of observed outbreak durations (red bars) and between-flock infectious period distribution fitted to those 
outbreaks (black line). 
 
Carrying out the same analysis for the final size data at the RT level produced a lower 
between-flock reproduction number of 2.01, 95% CrI (1.81-2.23). The reproduction number 
of outbreaks in the vaccinated zone (1.9, 95 % CrI(1.59,2.26)) were, again, estimated to be 
lower than that in the control zone (2.07, 95% CrI(1.82,2.35)), with the posterior 
distributions providing substantial evidence of a lower level of transmissibility in the 
outbreaks within the vaccination zone (BF=7.69) (Fig 3(c)). 
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Figure 6-4| Comparison of the posterior predictive probability of outbreak sizes and the data. 
Posterior predictive probabilities are calculated as the mean outbreak size probability generated by sampling 
the posterior 1000 times. Outbreak sizes are then coloured according to this probability: red >0.1, orange 
>0.01, yellow >0.001, green > 0.0001, blue >0. Figure shows (a) within-flock transmission for outbreaks in 
vaccination zones, (b) within-flock transmission for outbreaks in control zones, (c) between-flock transmission 
for outbreaks in vaccination zones, (d) between-flock transmission for outbreaks in control zones. In each 
figure observed outbreak sizes are displayed using black squares. 
 
Figure 6-4 shows that, whilst the model was able to fit a lot of outbreaks reasonably well, 
there are a few noticeable outliers, with the two worst fitting within-flock level outbreaks 
(an outbreak of 12 in a flock of 100 and an outbreak of 13 in a flock of 28) occurring within 
non-vaccination areas. Moreover, both the fitted within-flock and between-flock 
O
u
tb
re
a
k 
si
ze
O
u
tb
re
a
k 
si
ze
O
u
tb
re
a
k 
si
ze
O
u
tb
re
a
k 
si
ze
RT size RT size
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Flock size Flock size
v v
vv
Imperial College London| Walker PGT PhD Thesis 178 
 
transmission outbreak probabilities suggest a greater number of low-level outbreaks than 
were observed within the dataset. In particular, whilst the dataset contained no flocks 
where only a single bird was infected and only a single RT where only one flock reported 
infected birds, from the fitted outbreak probabilities, it would be expected that this would 
be the case in 11% of flocks and 17% of outbreak RTs in vaccination zones and 6% of flocks 
and 14% of outbreak RTs in control zones.  
 
Figure 6-5| Probability density function of fitted vaccination coverage using posterior mean . 
Within-flock coverage (grey line) and between-flock coverage (black dashed line). 
 
When fitted with the posterior mean estimate of  from the outbreaks which occurred in 
control zones, similar distributions of vaccine coverage were estimated for between and 
within flock transmission (Figure 6-5). In both cases the estimated mean vaccination 
coverage was significantly lower than the approximately 50% coverage estimated from the 
post-vaccination sero-monitoring (Table 6-1).  
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Table 6-1| Posterior distribution of vaccination coverage using posterior mean  
Measure of 
coverage 
Within Flock posterior mean 
(95% CrI) 
Between Flock posterior mean 
(95% CrI) 
Shape ð 0.61 (0.15-1.54) 0.53 (0.19-1.24) 
Shape d 5.42 (1.49-17.41) 3.63 (1.12-10.63) 
Mean coverage 11% (5%-19%) 14% (5%-27%) 
 2.45 (2.22-2.63) 1.71 (1.47-1.89) 
 
6.4 Discussion 
This analysis provides the first quantitative estimates of the transmissibility of H5N1 
between and within small-holdings of poultry in Indonesia and one of only a handful of 
estimates of the reproduction number of H5N1 in poultry from outbreak data (Tiensin, 
Nielen et al. 2007; Ward, Maftei et al. 2009; Magalhaes, Pfeiffer et al. 2010).  The estimate 
of a within flock reproduction number of 2.52 agrees closely with that estimated for 
outbreaks in Thailand (Tiensin, Nielen et al. 2007) and the finding of a significant reduction 
in the reproduction number following vaccination found for outbreaks in Vietnam (although 
that analysis found a lower reproduction number than that estimated in Thailand 
(Magalhaes, Pfeiffer et al. 2010)). The between-flock reproduction number obtained in this 
analysis is also well within the distribution of the only existing estimate, that of outbreaks of 
H5N1 in Romania (Ward, Maftei et al. 2009) and the finding that this was significantly lower 
than that for within-flock transmission is important because it highlights the potential 
impact that measures which reduce between flock transmission such as heightened 
biosecurity can have upon the spread of infection. The estimate from this analysis suggests 
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that if half the flocks in an RT can be fully protected, the level of spread within an RT may be 
significantly diminished.  
The fact that it was not possible to fit all outbreaks using a generalised stochastic epidemic, 
even within areas not receiving vaccination, may suggest that either one of the modelling 
assumptions, such as that of a closed population or a single initial infective, may be 
inadequate or that heterogeneity in transmissibility needs to be incorporated into the 
model. Potential factors causing this may include species of poultry, the method by which 
poultry are kept or housing density. Modelling such heterogeneity would require more 
detailed data. In particular, data would be needed on those households within the RT which 
avoid infection.  
Assuming surveillance effort is equally distributed, the design of this study, where outbreaks 
are investigated retrospectively, is always likely to result in investigations taking place in 
areas where control measures are having the least success in preventing transmission, as 
these are the areas where outbreaks are most likely to occur and be detected. In fact, out of 
the sixteen RTs investigated in vaccination zones only four had officially received vaccination 
sufficiently early to ensure immunity could develop whilst, of the remaining twelve RTs, 
three received vaccination within a week of an outbreak occurring and the remaining RTs 
had yet to be vaccinated as part of the most recent round of the vaccination campaign The 
estimate in this analysis of vaccine coverage was also significantly below the coverage 
estimate obtained from sero-surveillance which was carried out within the entire vaccine 
zone, appearing to support the suggestion that poorly vaccinated areas are over-
represented in the data. It should, however, be noted that sero-conversion is not necessarily 
an accurate representation of protective coverage if some birds sero-convert but are not 
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fully protected or of the overall coverage of the vaccination campaign if there are instances 
where vaccination fails to induce sero-conversion. Moreover, the coverage estimate 
obtained from the model was calculated assuming a fully effective vaccine. This was 
because, as neither the vaccination status of infected or uninfected birds was available, this 
was the only assumption which was computationally feasible to fit. If such data were 
available it would have been possible to assess the sensitivity of this estimated coverage to 
the assumption of vaccine action by fitting different vaccine response profiles to the data as 
discussed in Chapter 5. However, given that outbreaks were studied using retrospective 
field investigations, data on the vaccination status of any birds, independent of whether 
they were infected, at the time of the outbreak is likely to be impossible to collect. 
For similar reasons regarding the design of the study, these results also provide no 
information as to the number of RTs which have been protected from infection within 
vaccinated areas, especially as the estimates of the between-flock reproduction number 
suggest that a reasonable proportion of unprotected RTs could be expected to avoid any 
outbreaks following the introduction of infection. As a result, the estimated reproduction 
numbers of investigated outbreaks cannot be viewed as an estimate of the overall 
reproduction number within ORIHPAI vaccination zones.  
The estimate of outbreaks occurring in some areas despite a partial reduction in the 
reproduction number of infection agrees with recent modelling work which found that, four 
months following vaccination, in a typical tropical free range poultry population, that the 
level of population immunity would fall below the critical vaccination threshold required to 
prevent sustained transmission due to population turnover (Lesnoff, Peyre et al. 2009). 
Therefore, in light of the dynamism of small-scale poultry production in Indonesia where 
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approximately 80% of traded poultry are sold alive (Sumiarto and Arifin 2008), it is perhaps 
not surprising that there were reported outbreaks in the vaccination and control zones 
where despite some residual level of immunity, the reproduction number had once again 
risen above unity. 
 Another factor contributing to the lower estimate of the reproduction number in outbreaks 
in the vaccination zones may be that vaccination has been successful in preventing 
outbreaks in areas within which infection was most intense and   is highest. As a result, 
this study may be sampling traditionally lower-risk areas where, on average, a lower level of 
between and within flock transmission takes place. It could also be the case that, as the 
observed level was higher, but not significantly so, within the vaccination zone, the selling 
and slaughtering of infected flocks also had some impact on the results of the analysis, 
especially if this occurs to a greater extent in flocks in which the burden of infection is 
heaviest. 
Whilst it would be tempting to view the smaller number of outbreaks investigated in 
vaccination zones as evidence of a lower incidence of outbreaks than in non-vaccinated 
areas, the stated aim to investigate at least one outbreak in a vaccination zone and one 
outbreak in a control zone would seem to suggest that surveillance effort was not in fact 
equally distributed across the different treatment groups. The extent to which this may have 
biased the distribution of observed outbreaks sizes across treatment groups in the data is 
also not clear. More detailed data on the overall and treatment group and district specific 
incidence of outbreaks, as well as the respective resources allocated to investigate 
outbreaks, would help to assess this factor. 
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These results suggest that there are still areas within designated ORIHPAI vaccination zones 
where infection is able to spread and vaccination coverage hasn’t been maintained 
sufficiently to keep the reproduction number below unity. However, our estimates may 
imply that, even within these areas, incremental progress has been made towards 
controlling the spread of infection or that the programme has been effective at curtailing 
the most intense outbreaks which had been previously occurring. In order to achieve full 
control within areas where poultry turnover occurs so rapidly, a programme where the time 
between repeated campaigns of vaccination is reduced may be the only way to ensure that 
sufficient population level immunity is maintained. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and limitations 
7.1 Key Findings 
The research conducted towards my PhD focussed upon evaluating and applying 
methodologies for calculating key transmission parameters from the forms of outbreak data 
likely to be collected for the H5N1 subtypes currently circulating in Southeast Asia and 
determining the extent to which these can be used as measures of the effectiveness of 
different control measures. 
In Vietnam and Thailand nationwide surveillance data has been collected and collated at a 
sub-district resolution for waves of outbreaks occurring since 2004. As a result, using 
Bayesian techniques to deal with the uncertainty inherent in partially observed infection 
processes, it was possible, using MCMC, to fit spatial models which provided the 
opportunity to quantify, compare and contrast the estimated dynamics of infection for 
these waves and during different phases of control strategies.  
However, in many settings such systematic data collection is not carried out and it is not 
possible to model the spread of infection at such a macroscopic level. Instead analysis is 
carried out on a smaller scale but at a higher resolution, either within an experimental 
setting or where data is collected in the field in an attempt to obtain a snapshot of different 
aspects of the overall transmission process. In such contexts, final size of outbreak methods, 
due to the relatively low data requirements they impose, provide a useful means by which 
to quantify transmissibility within or between a flock of birds. In recent years such 
techniques have been applied to assess the efficacy of many of the vaccines currently used 
in various countries in Southeast Asia and beyond. 
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In light of this, the second half of this thesis concerned the use of final size methods to 
quantify the effects of vaccination at the flock level with an investigation as to the possible 
effects of different vaccine actions upon estimates of vaccine efficacy fitted to experimental 
data and assessing the effects of a vaccination field trial in Indonesia. 
7.1.1 The development of techniques to assess the impact of interventions 
when data are limited. 
Bayesian methods constitute valuable tools for obtaining the maximum amount of 
information from an epidemic (Streftaris and Gibson 2004; Cauchemez, Temime et al. 2006). 
In particular, working within a Bayesian framework makes it possible to treat missing data in 
the form of nuisance parameters. For partially observed epidemics, this substantially 
simplifies what would otherwise be a prohibitively cumbersome likelihood which can then 
be fitted to the observed data using relatively straightforward to implement methods for 
simulating from such distributions such as MCMC (O'Neill and Roberts 1999; Streftaris and 
Gibson 2004; Chis Ster, Singh et al. 2008; Jewell, Keeling et al. 2008).  
Using these methods during my PhD I was able to simultaneously estimate the spatial 
transmissibility and infection-to-report distribution for waves of outbreaks in Vietnam and 
Thailand based solely on routine outbreak report and poultry population data, to use the 
reconstructed epidemic tree from this to assess how infectivity varies at different stages of 
these waves and how model fit varies with surveillance effort and to explore the potential 
effects of more rapid detection of outbreaks. Also, although the way the data was collected 
is likely to mean it cannot be used to interpret the overall effect of vaccination in the region, 
I was able to estimate the effect of vaccination upon outbreaks investigated during a field 
trial in Indonesia based only upon final outbreak sizes in the absence of explicit data on 
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vaccination coverage. This serves to highlight that, by reducing the data requirements 
necessary to allow the fitting of transmission models to reports of outbreaks and outbreak 
investigations, such techniques have the potential to enhance the role that modelling can 
play in quantifying the spread of infection and the effects of control measures in a wide 
range of settings. In particular, such models could plausibly be fitted to waves of outbreaks 
of many different animal diseases including HPAI, ND, FMD, CSF, sheep and goat pox and 
any future outbreaks of rinderpest where information gathering and outbreak reporting 
follows standard FAO guidelines (FAO 1999) and data on the denominator population are 
also available.  
7.1.2 The impact of vaccination in Vietnam 
My results suggest that, a year following the implementation of mass nationwide 
vaccination in Vietnam, outbreaks occurring during the 2007 wave of outbreaks in northern 
Vietnam were less readily reported than during waves which occurred both before 
vaccination and around the time the campaign was first implemented. As a result, although 
the rate at which infection could spread between infectious communes had been 
substantially reduced, sustained transmission could still occur in the form of a less intense 
but more prolonged wave of outbreaks. Such an increase in the time between a commune 
becoming infected and the presence of infection being reported supports the notion that 
vaccination can lead to a scenario where, either through increasing the prevalence of 
asymptomatic infection or by reducing flock mortality below established thresholds, 
outbreaks are harder to detect. 
An exploration of the possible chains of transmission which led to the wave found that, had 
such a reduction in detection capacity been avoided, the overall impact of vaccination, in 
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terms of limiting the size and duration of the wave and reducing the likelihood of a wave 
occurring, would have been improved markedly. Whilst these findings were based upon 
strong assumption regarding the future of the epidemic, they do highlight the importance of 
supplementary strategies aimed towards improving outbreak surveillance such as the use of 
sentinel birds or small-holder awareness campaigns to ensure that the potential for 
vaccination to reduce transmission is realised, both for future mass vaccination campaigns 
in different contexts and as Vietnam moves towards a transitional strategy of more focussed 
vaccination. 
Comparing the waves occurring in late 2004 and mid-2005 I found that, whilst 
transmissibility of infection did not vary much between the two waves, there was 
substantial evidence that the rate at which outbreaks were reported had increased 
following a rise in the compensation offered by the Vietnamese government to farmers with 
infected flocks, suggesting that measures aimed towards ensuring farmers are less 
negatively affected as a result of reporting outbreaks may substantially improve disease 
surveillance.  
7.1.3 Active surveillance and the role of different poultry sectors in 
Thailand 
The large industrial production sector in Thailand has created areas with extremely high 
poultry concentrations. As a consequence, unlike in Vietnam, it was not possible to generate 
a model with infectivity increasing linearly with the poultry population within a tambon 
which produces a spatial distribution of risk of transmission resembling the observed 
distribution of outbreaks. As when modelling these outbreaks, some form of heterogeneity 
in per-bird infectivity and susceptibility with increased intensity of production should be 
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incorporated into any model, this can be done by either modelling saturating infectivity as 
flock size increases, producing a more plausible spatial distribution of risk or by stratifying 
the poultry population by production type.  
Reconstructing the epidemic tree from this model it was found that, whilst the majority of 
infection was transmitted from backyard flocks, both in terms of those infected and the 
total number of flocks, the per-flock probability of transmitting infection was highest in 
commercial flocks, suggesting that commercial flocks played a disproportional role in 
propagating the wave of outbreaks. This result was, however, based upon the assumption 
that outbreaks of each production type were equally likely to be reported which may not be 
the case. The finding that the estimated time between infection to report contracted during 
periods of active ‘X-ray’ surveillance also suggests that the extent to which different 
production types were likely to have been detected also varied throughout the wave, 
although this would at least suggest that, when applied, these measures improve the overall 
level of control achieved. 
7.1.4 Using final size methods to estimate the effects of vaccination 
When experimental vaccination studies are conducted, inference is often carried out to 
determine whether the vaccine has successfully brought the reproduction number within a 
flock below unity. The simplest, and most often used, way of doing this, based upon data on 
the number of birds within a flock infected at the end of the experiment is to make the 
assumption that the vaccine affects the transmissibility of all birds equally. This does, 
however, produce the most optimistic estimate of vaccine efficacy. When such a model is 
fitted to data where unvaccinated infectious birds are introduced into a flock of vaccinated 
birds and, if  has already been estimated to be relatively high, it may be possible to fit 
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more conservative assumptions about the action of a vaccine which explain the 
experimental data more readily. Moreover, when, as is often the case, multiple birds are 
infectious at the beginning of an experiment, such an assumption can easily lead to 
scenarios where a vaccine which resembles an all-or-nothing model of vaccine action but 
fails to reduce the reproduction below unity is wrongly assessed to be sufficiently 
efficacious to prevent sustained transmission in the context of a larger flock size. If these 
challenged birds have also already received vaccination, the effect of any misspecification of 
vaccine action and, as a result, the extent to which the leaky vaccine estimator is likely to 
underestimate the true reproduction number will be exacerbated.  
Such methods were also used to calculate the between and within flocks transmissibility of 
H5N1 from outbreak investigations in Indonesia. These contribute to, and agree quite 
closely with, the limited number of existing estimates in the literature. When outbreaks 
were stratified according to treatment group, the final size estimate of the within-flock 
reproduction number in the vaccination zone was lower than in those which had not been 
assigned vaccination and there was also substantial evidence of a lower between-flock 
reproduction number. Using the estimates of the reproduction number in the non-
vaccination areas, and treating the unobserved protective effect of vaccination in each flock 
as extra model parameters, it was found that this effect was equivalent to a mean 
protective effect of 11% of the flock for the outbreak flocks and 14% of the number of 
households within the outbreak neighbourhoods investigated in vaccinated areas. This may 
suggest that, even in a field trial context, biannual vaccination campaigns may not be 
sufficient to ensure that vaccination coverage is maintained at sufficiently high levels 
throughout all designated areas to prevent onward transmission, although the inherent 
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biases resulting from data collection based upon such retrospective outbreak investigations 
do make it difficult to assess the extent to which these results can be generalised. 
7.2 Limitations and potential avenues for future research 
There are a number of aspects of the modelling of waves of outbreaks in both Vietnam and 
Thailand which could have been improved had additional or more specific outbreak data 
been available. For Vietnam, higher resolution poultry data may have improved the 
accuracy of model, particularly in urban areas or for outbreaks in provinces with relatively 
low overall poultry populations. For similar reasons, it would have also been interesting to 
see the extent to which outbreaks occurring in the border regions corresponded to the 
intensity of infection in the equivalent border regions in Laos and China. Species-specific 
poultry data may also have offered the opportunity to elucidate the role of waterfowl in the 
dissemination of infection, an issue which has been the subject of much debate (Hulse-Post, 
Sturm-Ramirez et al. 2005; Gilbert, Chaitaweesub et al. 2006; Webster, Hulse-Post et al. 
2007). The results of such an analysis would, however, come with similar caveats to that of 
the Thai data as to the problems associated with asymptomatic infection, especially during 
the second half of the 2005 wave and in 2007 when vaccination protocols varied between 
species.  
It would also be interesting to assess the extent to which the obtained results are sensitive 
to some of the remaining modelling assumptions. In particular the assumption that all 
outbreaks were eventually reported and that the time taken to control an outbreak 
following the report of infection within a commune was constant. The former would involve 
imputing both the time of infection and the time of report for unreported outbreaks whilst 
the latter would involve treating all removal dates as nuisance parameters. Both of these 
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analyses would, however, substantially increase the number of model parameters necessary 
to fit the outbreak wave and would, therefore, either require the development of a more 
efficient model-fitting algorithm or additional computing power. 
As it constituted the main change in control strategy which occurred before the 2007 wave, 
it is justifiable to highlight ways in which the changes in estimated dynamics of infection for 
this wave relative to previous waves may be attributable to the move towards mass 
vaccination. However, it cannot be shown conclusively that this is, directly or indirectly, the 
case and other factors such as mutations in the virus, changes in the production patterns of 
ducks or changes in the willingness of farmers to report outbreaks may explain these 
differences. Data on the timing, location, and coverage of vaccination may have helped to 
assess whether vaccination could be linked to changes in infectivity and infectious period 
and provided more nuanced understanding as to mechanism of any such effects and the 
potential role of vaccinators in the spread of infection. It would also be interesting to 
explore the extent to which other suggested risk factors such as the presence of live bird 
markets, altitude or vegetation factors play a role in determining the infectiousness and 
susceptibility of a commune (Gilbert, Xiao et al. 2008; Henning, Pfeiffer et al. 2009).  
The method used to assess the impact of improved surveillance following vaccination used 
in this analysis also involved making strong assumptions about the epidemic which are likely 
to result in the overestimation of the potential benefits of such control measures. Future 
analyses could avoid this problem by instead modelling the spread of infection using the 
concept of thresholds of infectious pressure (Cook, Gibson et al. 2008), allowing a fully 
retrospective analysis of the effect of different durations between the infection entering a 
commune and the report of an outbreak.  
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For both Thailand and Vietnam the use of a Euclidean kernel made it necessary to limit the 
areas of each country over which transmission was estimated, resulting in outbreaks in each 
dataset being excluded from the analysis. One way to overcome this limitation, if such data 
became available, would be to use some other measure of spatial connectedness such as 
the shortest distance by road or by incorporating some estimate of the extent to which 
communes share the same live bird market. Moreover, as there were distinct genotypes of 
the virus circulating in Vietnam during the time period studied (Nguyen, Nguyen et al. 2008), 
if there had been specific data on the genotype of each outbreak, it may have been possible 
to reduce the level of uncertainty in the reconstructed epidemic tree and assess whether 
changes in the genotype of the virus affect the transmissibility of infection. 
The poultry population data available were more detailed in Thailand than for Vietnam. 
However the fact that they were collected during the ongoing wave means the accuracy of 
the tambon-level data for outbreaks occurring before the poultry census in October 2004 is 
questionable, especially as Thailand had implemented stringent stamping out measures. 
This is highlighted by the existence of a handful of outbreaks occurring in tambons where 
the census had found no poultry. The estimate of an extended infection-to-report 
distribution for outbreaks reported outside of “X-ray” active surveillance also highlights the 
relative shortcomings of the existing passive surveillance infrastructure and the effects of 
these upon the results obtained is not easy to predict. Whilst some degree of heterogeneity 
in transmission risks for different types of poultry production was explored, there is likely to 
be further important heterogeneity within the three categories into which poultry 
production was stratified in these models. Other poultry farming factors such as whether 
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ducks are free-grazing, the presence of fighting cocks, and different categories of industrially 
produced have all been shown to have significant effects upon the relative risk of outbreaks 
occurring within a tambon (Gilbert, Chaitaweesub et al. 2006; Paul, Tavornpanich et al. 
2010). Further developing the model to incorporate such detailed heterogeneity would, to a 
certain extent, be possible with the available data. However, adding additional complexity 
to the model would make fitting the model even more computationally intensive and any 
further estimates would be subject to the same data limitations as those currently obtained. 
The chapter exploring the impact of different modes of vaccine action upon observed 
estimates of vaccine efficacy highlighted some of the limitations associated with the final 
size methods currently used to assess the adequacy of vaccines from experimental data. 
However, whilst it is important to understand the extent to which estimates may mistakenly 
overemphasize the effective level of control achieved, the only alternative I found 
constitutes a conservative assumption as to the action of the vaccine, both in terms of the 
reduction in susceptibility and the reduction in infectivity achieved, and relies upon 
knowledge of the basic reproduction number. Whilst this method may be useful in 
establishing that an estimate of effectiveness is robust to such assumptions it would fail to 
identify some vaccines which, despite leading to limited amounts of transmission, 
successfully reduce the reproduction number below zero (i.e. those where the method 
overestimates the level of heterogeneity in vaccine response or underestimates the effect 
of the vaccine upon reducing secondary infections when vaccinated birds become infected). 
Instead it would be useful to investigate further the types of experiments which are likely to 
provide information about determinants of the outcome of these transmission experiments 
such as the effect of vaccination upon infectivity and susceptibility and the inherent level of 
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heterogeneity this creates. It may then be possible to find an estimator of within-flock 
transmissibility which provides the most sensitive test of vaccine effectiveness, for a set 
experiment size in terms of the number of birds used, whilst ensuring that estimates of the 
control achieved are not overly-optimistic. 
The data collected during outbreak investigations of H5N1 at the flock level in Indonesia 
included details on various possible risk factors including farming practices such as whether 
birds were caged or allowed to range freely, whether birds bought and sold at market, the 
actions of farmer in response to an outbreak such as quarantine, slaughter and selling and 
the presence of different species of birds within an RT. However, more detailed analysis as 
to the influence of these factors wasn’t possible due to the relatively small sample size and 
the fact that, for many variables, data weren’t available for any of the flocks which avoided 
infection. The relatively simplistic model used in this analysis, which makes the assumption 
of outbreaks involving single introduction of infection into a closed population, is also 
unlikely to reflect reality. Furthermore, as there were no data on the vaccination status of 
individual birds, the measure of the effect of vaccination was made using the strong 
assumption of a perfectly effective vaccine. More rigorous outbreak investigation protocols 
and a larger study size may have avoided these problems however the additional resources 
necessary to make this worthwhile may be restrictive. 
7.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion this thesis demonstrates that fitting of epidemic models using data 
augmentation techniques to account for missing data can be beneficial in better evaluating 
the effectiveness of past, future or current interventions for animal diseases even when 
data are limited. This is especially important in the case of H5N1 in Southeast Asia where 
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significant resources continue to be invested in an attempt to reduce the spread of 
infection. In countries such as Thailand, where the large industrial sector and export market 
provides a strong incentive to prevent infection, the control of infection appears to be 
achievable, although the equity of the consequences of achieving this control has been 
debated. In contrast, in countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam, the failure of stamping out 
measures has led to the adoption of mass vaccination as a key control policy. Whilst this 
has, especially in Vietnam, resulted in reductions in the burden of disease and the number 
of human cases in the short term, the findings in this thesis suggest that maintaining a level 
of coverage and detection capacity sufficient to have a long-term impact on the circulation 
of disease remains extremely challenging. Such obstacles need to be considered carefully as 
control strategies enter an inevitable phase of transition as it increasingly becomes accepted 
that the threat H5N1 poses to livestock, livelihoods and human health will not be eliminated 
in the near future.  
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